On this argument it may be observed:—
(1) It has been abundantly shown in this work, that one part of the foregoing affirmation is strictly true. Men are not urged to action exclusively by their pleasures and their pains. They are urged by other motives, of the impassioned kind; among which, is to be signalized sympathy with the pains and pleasures of others. If this had been the only instance of action at variance with the regular course of the will, we should be able to maintain that the motive to act is still happiness, but not always the agent's own happiness. We have seen, however, that individuals, not unfrequently, act in opposition both to their own, and to other people's happiness; as when mastered by a panic, and when worked up into a frenzy of anger or antipathy.
The sound and tenable position seems to be this:—Human beings, in their best and soberest moods, looking before and after, weighing all the consequences of actions, are generally disposed to regard Happiness, to some beings or others, as the proper end of all endeavours. The mother is not exclusively bent on her own happiness; she is upon her child's. Howard abandoned the common pleasures of life for himself, to diminish the misery of fellow creatures.
(2) It is true that human beings are apt to regard Virtue as an end-in-itself, and not merely as a means to happiness as the final end. But the fact is fully accounted for on the general law of Association by Contiguity; there being many other examples of the same kind, as the love of money. Justice, Veracity, and other virtues, are requisite, to some extent, for the existence of society, and, to a still greater extent, for prosperous existence. Under such circumstances, it would certainly happen that the means would participate in the importance of the end, and would even be regarded as an end in itself.
(3) The great leading duties may be shown to derive their estimation from their bearing upon human welfare. Take first, Veracity or Truth. Of all the moral duties, this has most the appearance of being an absolute and independent requirement. Yet mankind have always approved of deception practised upon an enemy in war, a madman, or a highway robber. Also, secrecy or concealment, even although misinterpreted, is allowed, when it does not cause pernicious results; and is even enjoined and required in the intercourse of society, in order to prevent serious evils. But an absolute standard of truth is incompatible, even with secrecy or disguise; in departing from the course of perfect openness, or absolute publicity of thought and action, in every possible circumstance, we renounce ideal truth in favour of a compromised or qualified veracity—a pursuit of truth in subordination to the general well-being of society.
Still less is there any form of Justice that does not have respect to Utility. If Justice is defined as giving to every one their own, the motive clearly is to prevent misery to individuals. If there were a species of injustice that made no one unhappier, we may be quite sure that tribunals would not be set up for enforcing and punishing it. The idea of equality in Justice is seemingly an absolute conception, but, in point of fact, equality is a matter of institution. The children of the same parent are, in certain circumstances, regarded as unequal by the law; and justice consists in respecting this inequality.
The virtue of Self-denial, is one that receives the commendation of society, and stands high in the morality of reward. Still, it is a means to an end. The operation of the associating principle tends to raise it above this point to the rank of a final end. And there is an ascetic scheme of life that proceeds upon this supposition; but the generality of mankind, in practice, if not always in theory, disavow it.
(4) It is often affirmed by those that regard virtue, and not happiness, as the end, that the two coincide in the long run. Now, not to dwell upon the very serious doubts as to the matter of fact, a universal coincidence without causal connexion is so rare as to be in the last degree improbable. A fiction of this sort was contrived by Leibnitz, under the title of 'pre-established harmony;' but, among the facts of the universe, there are only one or two cases known to investigation.
12. II.—It is objected to Utility as the Standard, that the bearings of conduct on general happiness are too numerous to be calculated; and that even where the calculation is possible, people have seldom time to make it.
(1) It is answered, that the primary moral duties refer to conduct where the consequences are evident and sure. The disregard of Justice and Truth would to an absolute certainty bring about a state of confusion and ruin; their observance, in any high degree, contributes to raise the standard of well-being.