Now, what applies to the Appetites and Affections applies to Benevolence; it is a distinct motive or urgency, and should have its scope like every other propensity, in order to happiness.
Such is his reasoning, grounded on his peculiar Psychology. He then adduces the ordinary arguments to show, that seeking the good of others is a positive gratification in itself, and fraught with pleasure in its consequences.
In summary, Butler's views stand thus:—
I.—His Standard of Right and Wrong is the subjective Faculty, called by him Reflection, or Conscience. He assumes such an amount of uniformity in human beings, in regard to this Faculty, as to settle all questions that arise.
II.—His Psychological scheme is the threefold division of the mind already brought out; Conscience being one division, and a distinct and primitive element of our constitution.
He has no Psychology of the Will; nor does he anywhere inquire into the problem of Liberty and Necessity.
He maintains the existence of Disinterested Benevolence, by saying that Disinterested action, as opposed to direct self-regard, is a much wider fact of our mental system, than the regard to the welfare of others. We have seen that this is a mere stroke of ingenuity, and owes its plausible appearance to his making our associated ends the primary ends of our being.
III.—With regard to the Summum Bonum, or the theory of Happiness, he holds that men cannot be happy by the pursuit of mere self; but must give way to their benevolent impulses as well, all under the guidance of conscience. In short, virtue is happiness, even in this world; and, if there be any exception to the rule, it will be rectified in another world. This is in fact the Platonic view. Men are not to pursue happiness; that would be to fall into the narrow rut of self-love, and would be a failure; they are to pursue virtue, including the good of others, and the greatest happiness will ensue to each.
It is a remarkable indication of the spirit of Butler's age, or of his estimate of it, that he would never venture to require of any one a single act of uncompensated self-sacrifice.
IV.—The substance of the Moral Code of Butler is in no respect peculiar to him. He gives no classification of our duties. His means and inducements to virtue have just been remarked upon.