Nouns are names of genera, and not of individuals; our perceptions are, on the contrary, all individual, not general. Hence, to denote one or more individuals of a species, numerals, or words significant of number, were invented. Some express a precise number, as one, two, three; others number indefinitely, as some, few, many, several. Our perceptions being all individual, and one being the basis of all number, the term significant of unity must frequently recur in expressing our sentiments. To denote this idea our forefathers employed ae, ane. In the progress of language, where unity was not to be expressed, as opposed to two or more, the terms, thus becoming unemphatical, would naturally be abbreviated into a, an. These latter, therefore, are the offspring of the names of unity, and belong to the class of words named cardinal numerals. To what part of speech these are reducible (if they can be reduced to any) it is difficult to determine. In some languages they have the form of adjectives; but, if their meaning be considered, it is clear that they have no claim to this appellation, as they express no accident, quality, or property whatever. In fact, they appear to be a species of words totally different in character from any of the parts of speech generally received; all of them, except the first of the series, being abbreviations for the name of unity repeated.
It being necessary not only to express an individual indefinitely of any species, but also to specify and select some particular one, which at first would probably be done by pointing to the object, if in sight, the words this and that, hence called demonstratives, were employed; the one to express the nearer, the other the more distant object. From one of these proceeded the word the, having the same relation to its original as a or an has to the name of unity. Hence the words synonymous with this and that, in those languages which have no definite article, are frequently employed to supply its place.
The use of these terms being to express any individual whatever of a class, and likewise some certain or particular object; we have also the words few, some, many, several, to denote a number indefinitely, and the cardinal numerals two, three, four, &c., a precise number of individuals.
CHAPTER III.
OF PRONOUNS.
Whether we speak of things present, or of things absent, of ourselves, or of others, and to whomsoever we address our discourse, the repetition of the names of those persons or things would not only be tiresome, but also sometimes productive of ambiguity. Besides, the name of the person addressed may be unknown to the speaker, and the name of the speaker may be unknown to the person addressed. Hence appears the utility of pronouns, words, as the etymology of the term denotes, supplying the place of nouns. They have therefore been denominated by some grammarians, nouns of the second order.
When the person who addresses speaks of himself, the pronoun I, called the pronoun of the first person, is employed instead of the name of the speaker, as, “The Lord said to Moses, I (the Lord) am the God of Abraham.”
When the person addressed is the subject of discourse, the pronoun thou, called the pronoun of the second person, is used instead of his name, as, “Nathan said unto David, Thou (David) art the man.”
When neither the person who speaks, nor the person addressed, but some other person or thing, is the subject of discourse, we employ the pronouns of the third person, namely, he, she, it; as, “When Jesus saw the multitude, he (Jesus) had compassion on them.”
I have said that pronouns are employed to prevent the tiresome repetition of names. It is not, however, to be hence inferred, that even the repetition of the name would, in all cases, answer the same purpose, or denote the subject with the same precision as the pronoun. For, as there is hardly any name, strictly speaking, proper or peculiar to one individual, the employment of a name, belonging to more persons than one, would not so clearly specify or individuate the object as the appropriate pronoun. Hence it would often be necessary to subjoin to the name some distinctive circumstances, to discriminate the person intended from others of that name; or the speaker would be obliged to point to the individual if he happened to be present. Nay, though the person or subject designed might be thus sufficiently ascertained, it is easy to see that the phraseology would have nothing of that simplicity and energy which accompany the pronoun. If, in the first example, instead of saying, “I am the God,” we should say, “The Lord is the God;” or in the second, instead of “Thou art the man,” “David is the man,” the energy of the expression would be entirely destroyed. If any person, speaking of himself, should distinguish himself from others of the same name, by subjoining the necessary discriminating circumstances, so as to leave no doubt in the mind of the hearer, it is obvious that this phraseology would not only be inelegant, but also feeble and unimpressive. To be convinced of the truth of this observation, it is only necessary to compare the exanimate, stiff, and frequently obscure diction of a common card, with the freedom, perspicuity, and vivacity of a letter.