On August 25, 1330, the Christian and Moorish armies faced each other near Theba on the Andalusian frontier. Froissart states that Douglas mistook a forward movement of the Spanish troops for the onset of battle, and charged the Moors furiously; but the Spaniards had halted and left him unsupported. The story seems little consonant with Douglas's warlike intelligence. Barbour says that Alfonso assigned to Douglas the command of the van—which is very unlikely, unless he also assigned him an interpreter. He also asserts that Douglas hurled the precious casket 'a stone-cast and well more' into the ranks of the enemy, exclaiming—
'"Now pass thou forth before
As thou wast wont in field to be,
And I shall follow, or else dee"';
and that he fought his way to it and recovered it, 'taking it up with great daintie.' This, too, is but a fantastic embellishment of the cloister. Barbour, of course, proceeds to rout the Moors and to make Douglas press on ahead of his company, attended by only ten men. Seeing Sir William de St Clair surrounded, however, Douglas spurred to his friend's rescue, but was overpowered by numbers and slain. Among those that fell with him were Sir William de St Clair and Sir Robert and Sir Walter Logan.
The bones of Douglas were brought home by Sir William de Keith, who had been kept out of the battle by a broken arm, and were buried in the church of St Bride of Douglas. The silver casket with the heart of Bruce was buried by Randolph, 'with great worship,' in Melrose Abbey.
Douglas has been charged with breach of trust. It is argued that he ought not to have gone to Spain, but to have crossed the continent to Venice or the south of France, and made direct for Jerusalem. It is hardly worth while to remark that this is just what Boece says he did, his death taking place in Spain on his way home. It is more to the purpose that the Holy Sepulchre was then in the hands of the Saracens, and that Spain was the central point of opposition to the infidels. But what Douglas ought or ought not to have done depends solely on the precise terms of his trust; and it may be taken as certain that he knew King Robert's mind better than either Barbour or Froissart, or even their critics, and that he decided on his course in consultation with Randolph and the other magnates, prelates as well as barons. Edward's safe conduct and commendatory letter show by their terms that his going to Spain was no afterthought, but his original intention. To attribute to Douglas lack of 'strength of purpose' is to miss the whole significance of his career.
*****
King Robert must obviously have been a man of powerful physique and iron constitution. The early hardships and continuous toils of his reign could not have been sustained by any ordinary frame; and his recorded feats of strength, such as in the case of Wallace have been scouted as fabulous, have always been accepted without question. The Merton MS. of the 'Flores Historiarum' calls him 'a very powerful man,' on the occasion of his striking down Comyn. The killing of Sir Henry de Bohun in face of both armies speaks convincingly of muscle as well as of nerve. If the bones discovered in 1818 were his, they indicate that he stood about six feet in height. 'In figure,' says Major, 'he was graceful and athletic, with broad shoulders. His features were handsome, and he had the yellow hair of the northern race, and blue and sparkling eyes.'
Bruce's outstanding characteristic, in Barbour's analysis, was his 'hardiment:' he 'hardy was of head and hand.' That is to say, he was a strong, bold, and resolute soldier. But with hardiment he joined 'wit'—judgment, prudence, measure; and the union of the two is 'worship.' This 'worship' was undoubtedly the fundamental cause of Bruce's great career; and the most simple and conspicuous illustration of it is seen in the dramatic episode of De Bohun's death. Fordun pronounces that he 'was, beyond all living men of his day, a valiant knight.' And Barbour sums up—
'To whom, into gude chevelry,
I dar peir nane, wes in his day.
For he led hym with mesure ay.'
It was this splendid hardiment controlled and directed by cool judgment, and supported by untiring industry in details, that ranked King Robert not merely as the second knight in Christendom, but as one of the most renowned generals of the age. His patient drudgery of preparation, his wary dispositions, his firmness of resolution, his promptitude to mark and remedy a weakness of his own and to strike hard at a weakness of the enemy, were superbly illustrated on the field of Bannockburn. King Robert's military renown does not need the false attribution of tactical discoveries that he certainly did not make. It was not Bannockburn that showed him what infantry could do against mailed cavalry; nor was it the example of the Flemings at Courtrai. Sir William Wallace had proved the power of the schiltron before Bannockburn and before Courtrai; and he is not to be deprived of the honour by the imperfect historical knowledge of Sir Thomas Gray. If the tactic was known in these islands before the time of Wallace, or if Wallace gained the knowledge of it from elsewhere, the fact yet remains to be historically demonstrated. King Robert and his generals simply practised the lesson of Wallace with notable ability. Nor did they advance beyond Wallace in the still more important principles of large strategy. But, apart from this, the Bruce's capacity as a military commander stands forth pre-eminent. And though many painful incidents inevitably stain the records of his campaigns, they are attributable more to the age than to the man. It is impossible to charge on his memory any reckless or wanton cruelty. His mind with all its sternness ever tended to clemency, and his constitutional prudence, or measure, forbade purposeless excess.