And now activity of special interest was discovered. A considerable detachment of the Allied Navy, scouts and armored cruisers, together with four of the older battleships, was cruising to the eastward of the Azores and approaching near enough to the coast of Portugal to make things look very interesting. Intercepted messages and radio-compass bearings taken on their signals by the shore stations at Vigo, Lisbon, and Gibraltar told the story, leaving no chance of mistake as to the actual approach of ships to the coast. Such a force as this, if cut off from the rest of the Allied fleet, would be easy prey for the Mediterranean Navy; and a chance to destroy it would be a golden opportunity, for the loss of these cruisers and battleships, even though the latter were nearly obsolete and inferior to the first-line capital ships, would be a serious blow to the Allies; it would measurably weaken their navy, and greatly improve the outlook for a subsequent battle between the two fleets.
But could this force be really cruising so far away from the main fleet as to render it liable to be cut off from support? With redoubled vigilance the radio forces in the Portuguese and Spanish stations listened for clues to the presence of a supporting force of capital ships, or to some explanation of the apparently isolated position of the cruiser force.
Now, in radio communications, as elsewhere, the chain is often no stronger than its weakest link. A slip on the part of a single operator entrusted with a message may work vast havoc through the resulting confusion. Before long, as the messages of the Allied flagships were decoded and studied by the enemy experts in Gibraltar, an explanation of the dangerous move of the Allied cruisers came to light. This force, conducting a sweep of the waters east of the Azores on the chance of finding enemy commerce raiders, was supposed to be remaining within reach of the main fleet, still at the Azores; that is, so near that if the enemy should put out from Gibraltar, the cruiser force and the rest of the fleet could, by steaming toward each other at full speed, effect a junction before the enemy battle cruisers with their higher speed could overtake and attack. But a message from Allied Headquarters in Punta Delgada saying, “Proceed no farther to the eastward,” had through error been transmitted, “Proceed farther to the eastward.” Before the mistake had been discovered, the cruisers had steamed close in to the vicinity of Cape Saint Vincent and Gibraltar. And now, with the slow speed of the older battleships to retard their escape, and with the rest of the fleet far away, the detached force was in a most perilous position. All this was now revealed to the enemy through their analysis of intercepted messages.
Clearly there was no time to lose in giving chase. The cruiser force had discovered the mistake and would retreat toward the supporting fleet with all possible speed. But so near was it, and so much would its speed be retarded by the slower ships, that the battle cruisers of the Mediterranean Navy could surely overtake it before reinforcements could arrive on the scene.
Emergency orders were given by the Turkish Admiral; steam was raised for maximum speed in the entire fleet, and with expedition denoting a high degree of preparedness and efficiency the fleet steamed off to the westward in search of the detached force. Speed was everything in this pursuit, and soon the advance force of the battle cruisers with a screen of scouts and destroyers thrown out ahead, speeding west at twenty-nine knots, had dropped the main battle fleet out of sight astern. It was nearly sunset when the fleet left Gibraltar, and through the night the race to the westward went on. No radio signals were sent by the advance force, for, though their strength left no doubts in the mind of the commanding officer of his ability to destroy the force that now seemed almost within his grasp, still it was desirable to avoid revealing his approach, in order that he might catch his prey unawares—he would probably make quicker work of them this way. But every radio operator listened intently for signals from the Allied cruisers. Before the night was over, they had been heard reporting progress and telling their whereabouts to the Allied battle fleet, supposedly hastening eastward in a vain endeavor to come to the rescue before a superior force from Gibraltar should have time to overtake and destroy them. To the great satisfaction of the Turkish Admiral on the battle cruiser flagship, a message soon reached him from Gibraltar reporting that bearings taken by radio compass at Lisbon and Gibraltar on the same message of the Allied cruiser force had verified the position reported by the cruisers themselves, and showed that they were only making nineteen knots. Soon after sunrise the fugitives would be overtaken, and it would not be long before the heavy guns of the battle cruisers had sunk the entire force. Even if the Allied battle fleet had started eastward at top speed as soon as the dangerous position of the cruisers was discovered, they could not possibly reach the point where the battle cruisers would overtake the fugitive detachment before the afternoon. By that time the battle cruisers would have ample time to finish off their victims, retreat, and effect a conjunction with their own battle fleet. The Mediterranean fleet thus consolidated could well afford, if conditions then seemed favorable, to meet and give battle to the Allied fleet, weakened as it would be by the loss of its cruisers and the four older battleships.
At dawn seaplanes were sent up from the Turkish battle cruiser squadron to scout to the westward and look for the Allied cruiser force, and especially to make sure that no other force, not mentioned in the dispatches, was lurking in the neighborhood. A light southwest wind was blowing; low-lying haze and clouds rendered observations from any great height impossible. This obliged the seaplanes to fly low. Just after sunrise they returned and reported sighting a considerable force of cruisers and destroyers steaming west. Being under orders to avoid approaching enemy craft near enough to be seen, they had returned without getting close enough to make out just what type of cruisers they had seen or whether the four battleships were with them, for the visibility to the westward was very poor. There was no mistake then; their prey was surely theirs. The news was acclaimed with joy on the flagship. The Admiral rubbed his palms together and smiled grimly. He recalled the great deeds of the Turkish navies of the fifteenth century, and gloried in the thought that the honor of adding a new page to their illustrious record would be his.
Onward steamed the battle cruisers, all hands in high hopes of a swift and decisive action. At half-past seven in the morning the lookouts in the Mediterranean scouts, three miles in advance of the battle cruisers, reported ships to the westward. “Action stations” was sounded and the scouting line rapidly maneuvered into battle formation. Overtaking as fast as they were, it was soon easy to make out a long line of scout cruisers to the westward, now steaming on a northwesterly course. But where were the armored cruisers, and where were the four battleships that had been holding them back? The visibility to the westward was low, and probably the scouts and destroyers, having greater speed, had held back to give warning if a pursuing force should come. Probably the rest of the force was a few miles ahead. At all events, the scouts were now in range, and the chance to do them damage was not to be lost. The battle cruisers opened fire with their big guns, and had landed two salvos close to the fleeing scout cruisers when a smoke screen from the destroyers on their flank hid them from view. When next they were seen through the smoke, they had increased speed and opened the range, so that the battle cruisers’ salvos were falling short.
The northwesterly course of the fleeing ships was a considerable change from the westerly course of the pursuit through the night. Possibly the slower ships had turned southwest in hopes of escaping in the low visibility while the scouts decoyed the battle cruisers away to the northwest. Therefore the seaplanes were sent up again to search the sea to the southwest and find the armored cruisers and battleships. After a prolonged search they returned with a report that no ships were to be seen to the west, southwest, or south for a distance of many miles.
Meanwhile the destroyers of the two fleets had come together in an attempt to maneuver for torpedo attack against the larger ships. Lively shelling at close range resulted, but only minor damage was done on either side. In consequence of this diversion, the smoke screen became sufficiently dissipated to enable the battle cruisers to catch sight of the Allied scouts speeding toward the northwest far on the port bow, near the limit of visibility. Again they opened fire and saw their salvos beginning to fall very close just before the smoke screen of the destroyers again hid them from sight.