Many of those who voted for this scheme, had as bad an opinion of it as myself; but they were induced to accede to it, by a persuasion that some plan for the purpose was expected by the States; and that none better, in the present circumstances of the country, could be fallen upon.
A leading rule which I have laid down for the direction of my conduct, is this: that while I would have a just deference for the expectations of the States, I would never consent to amuse them by attempts which must either fail in the execution, or be productive of evil. I would rather incur the negative inconveniences of delay than the positive mischiefs of injudicious expedients. A contrary conduct serves to destroy confidence in the government, the greatest misfortune that can befall a nation. There should, in my opinion, be a character of wisdom and efficiency in all the measures of the Federal Council, the opposite of a spirit of temporizing concession.
I would have sufficient reliance on the judgments of the several States, to hope that good reasons for not attempting a thing, would be more satisfactory to them than precipitate and fruitless attempts.
My idea is, that, taking it for granted the States will expect an experiment on the principle of the Confederation, the best plan will be to make it by commissioners appointed by Congress, and acting under their authority. Congress might, in the first instance, appoint three or more of the principal characters in each State for probity and abilities, with a power to nominate other commissioners under them, in each subdivision of the State. General principles might be laid down for the regulation of their conduct, by which uniformity in the manner of conducting the business would obtain. Sanctions of such solemnity might be prescribed, and such notoriety given to every part of the transaction, that the commissioners could neither be careless nor partial without a sacrifice of reputation.
To carry this plan, however, into effect, with sufficient care and accuracy, would be a work both of time and expense; and, unfortunately, we are so pressed to find money for calls of immediate necessity, that we could not, at present, undertake a measure which would require so large a sum.
To me it appears evident, that every part of a business which is of so important and universal concern, should be transacted on uniform principles, and under the direction of that body which has a common interest.
In general, I regard the present moment, probably the dawn of peace, as peculiarly critical; and the measures which it shall produce, as of great importance to the future welfare of these States. I am, therefore, scrupulously cautious of assenting to plans which appear to me founded on false principles.
Your Excellency will observe, that the valuation of the lands is to be the standard for adjusting the accounts, for past supplies, between the United States and the particular States. This, if adhered to, without allowance for the circumstances of those States which have been more immediately the theatre of the war, will charge our State for the past, according to its future ability, when in an entire condition, if the valuation should be made after we regain possession of the parts of the State now in the power of the enemy.
I have heretofore introduced a motion for repeating the call, in a more earnest manner, upon the States, to vest Congress with a power of making equitable abatements, agreeably to the spirit of the Resolution of the twentieth of February last, which few of the States have complied with. This motion has been committed. I know not what will be its fate.
Notwithstanding the opposition I have given, now the matter has been decided in Congress, I hope the State will cheerfully comply with what is required. Unless each State is governed by this principle, there is an end of the Union. Every State will, no doubt, have a right, in this case, to accompany its compliance with such remarks as it may think proper.