Our Presidents and how we make them

by Alexander K. McClure

THE POLK-CLAY CONTEST

1844

President Tyler wrecked the Whig party and defeated Henry Clay for President in 1844. The Whigs had carried a majority in both Senate and House in the Harrison sweep of 1840, and they confidently expected that the Whig policy of a national bank to take the place of the bungling Sub-Treasury, of aid to public improvements, and of a protective tariff to stimulate our industries, would inaugurate a Whig political system that could be permanently maintained by the American people. President Harrison died only a little more than a month after he had been inaugurated. He was the oldest President at the time of his inauguration that the country has had, either before or since, and he was physically unequal to the severe exactions put upon him by the clamor for political positions. Civil service reform had then no part in the politics of the country, and as Jackson and Van Buren had been vindictively proscriptive in Federal appointments, it was logically expected that there would be a general removal of the Van Buren favorites. Harrison exhausted his vitality by trying to meet his friends and confer with them about political appointments, in addition to the important questions of State which demanded his attention, and he literally wore himself out and died from exhaustion.

John Tyler, who had been one of the most ardent of the Clay Whigs, was confidently expected to maintain the policy of Harrison. The public measures advocated by Clay were well understood by all, and it was reasonable to assume that Tyler, who had been long one of his most earnest supporters, was in entire accord with his chief. A special session of Congress was summoned to meet on the 31st of May, 1841, and the Whigs expected to carry all their political theories into practical effect by national statutes at an early day. To the surprise of some of the leaders, President Tyler exhibited some measure of unsoundness on the question of the United States Bank, but after repeated conferences with him they believed that they could frame a bill that would entirely meet his views and command his approval. The bill was passed by a decided majority in both branches, and the Whigs were dumbfounded by a prompt veto from the President. Other conferences followed, and a new bill was framed, to which the President assented, and although it was passed without amendment, another veto followed. The first veto of the Bank bill brought out very angry criticisms from a number of the Whig leaders, and one of the most earnest and aggressive of Tyler’s critics was John Minor Botts, then a Whig Congressman from Virginia, and one of the most brilliant and erratic of the Whig leaders of his day. It was believed that the irritation of the President, caused by the criticisms of leading Whigs, finally decided the President to veto the second Bank bill.

Thus the Whigs were defeated in one of the cardinal measures of their faith. The Whig Senators and Representatives met in caucus and published an address to the country, in which it was declared that “those who brought the President into power can no longer in any manner or degree be justly held responsible or blamed for the administration of the Executive branch of the Government.” Thus the Whig power was broken and demoralized at the very threshold of its existence, and the chasm between the Whig Senate and House, on the one side, and the President, on the other, steadily widened and deepened until it was admittedly impassable.

President Tyler’s political antecedents offer some excuse for his failure to approve the national bank. He opposed Jackson, as did many other able men in the South, because Jackson had violated the strict construction policy of Southern leaders, especially in his aggressive warfare against nullification, and one trained in the school of strict construction of the supreme law could readily find excuse for withholding his approval from the United States Bank. The same principle applied to internal improvements by the Government, and could have been applied to forbid a protective tariff. The only fruit the Whigs gathered from their great triumph of 1840 was the protective tariff of 1842, that became so popular, especially in the North, that many Democrats who supported Polk in 1844 declared that they favored the tariff of 1842, and that it could not be disturbed if Polk were elected. In Pennsylvania it was common to see in Democratic processions banners bearing the inscription of “Polk-Dallas-Shunk and the Tariff of 1842,” and a letter received by Judge Kane, of Philadelphia, from Mr. Polk during the campaign was interpreted, and plausibly interpreted, as meaning an approval of the then existing tariff. The Whigs, defeated in all their other important measures, were sadly crippled in the campaign for the succession, and even the tariff of 1842 was repealed for a moderate free-trade tariff in 1846.

President Tyler had provoked the earnest and generally vindictive hostility of the Whigs without having made friends with the Democrats. They loved and cheered his apostasy, but gave no love or individual support to the apostate. He confidently expected that they would make him the Democratic candidate for President in 1844, and that delusion was cherished by him until the Democratic National Convention met in Baltimore to nominate national candidates. It was attended by a very large number of office-holders and other friends of Tyler. Finding that they could not command any support for their favorite in the convention, they improvised a national convention of their own on the same day that the Democratic convention met, and unanimously nominated Tyler for President without naming any candidate for Vice-President. The movement had no vitality, as there was no response from either the press or the public, and on the 20th of August Tyler wrote an elaborate and reproachful letter, withdrawing his name from the list of Presidential candidates.

When his term ended he lived in retirement on his Virginia farm, unknown and unfelt as a political factor. He was among the almost forgotten men of the past when, half a generation later, he appeared in Washington as a member of the Peace Convention that was called in 1861 to devise some measures to prevent a civil war, that he did not live to see fulfil its bloody mission.

When Van Buren was defeated for re-election to the Presidency in 1840, his friends imitated the Jackson tactics of 1825 by at once renominating him by mass-meetings and through Democratic newspapers as the Democratic candidate for President in 1844, and a decided majority of the delegates to the national convention were either instructed for Van Buren or elected as his friends. Calhoun was favored by the Democrats of South Carolina and Georgia, and ex-Vice-President Johnson was an energetic candidate for the nomination, with General Cass, of Michigan, as the man who was looked to as most likely to concentrate the opposition to Van Buren. Van Buren was in the attitude before the Democratic National Convention of 1844 that Seward was before the Chicago Republican Convention of 1860. A decided majority of the delegates desired his nomination, but many of them believed that Clay would defeat him, and they were quite willing to reaffirm the two-thirds rule, even against the earnest protest of Van Buren’s most faithful leaders, because it was well known that he never could attain the two-thirds vote of the convention.

Van Buren was regarded as a most accomplished and rather an unscrupulous politician. He was certainly a brilliant political leader, a very sagacious counsellor, and believed in shaping the policy of the party chiefly or wholly with the view of success; but a short time before the meeting of the national convention he made one of the boldest political deliverances of his life against the annexation of Texas, and he did it with the knowledge that the Democrats of the South were practically united in the support of annexation, with a very large proportion of the Northern Democrats in harmony with it. In the month of May letters were given to the public from both Van Buren and Clay, opposing the annexation of Texas at that time as inexpedient, because it would mean war with Mexico, unless annexed with the consent of that nation. Clay’s letter did not strengthen him in the South, but certainly strengthened him in the North, and should have prevented the Abolition vote in New York from sacrificing Clay and electing an ardent supporter of the annexation of Texas with its slave Constitution, and under a treaty that permitted its subdivision into four new States, each of which would increase the slave power in the Senate.