Our Presidents and how we make them

by Alexander K. McClure

I have read many romances about how, why and by whom Abraham Lincoln was nominated for President at Chicago, but the explanation is very simple, and when presented must be accepted by all as conclusive. Henry S. Lane had been nominated as the Republican candidate for Governor of Indiana, and Andrew G. Curtin had been nominated by the Republicans for Governor of Pennsylvania. These States voted for Governor and other State officers on the second Tuesday of October, and they were the pivotal States of the national contest. It was an absolute necessity to carry them in October to assure the election of a Republican President, and the first inquiry of the Republican leaders at Chicago, outside of those who were blindly devoted to Seward, was “Who can carry Indiana and Pennsylvania?”

Lane and Curtin were there solely for the purpose of getting the strongest possible national ticket nominated to aid them in their State contests. With Lane was John D. Defrees, as Chairman of the Republican State Committee of Indiana, and I was with Curtin, as he had charged me with the same responsible duty in Pennsylvania. Curtin and Lane decided that they could not be elected if Seward were nominated for President. They were not personally or politically hostile to him; they had but one thing in view, and that was their own election, which was essential to elect a Republican President.

Prior to 1860 the Republican party had never carried either Pennsylvania or Indiana. Opposition to the pro-slavery policy of the Buchanan administration had crystallized antislavery Democrats, Whigs, and Americans into the support of Union State tickets, and had elected them; but in Pennsylvania the Republican name was omitted from necessity, and the organization was entitled the People’s party. In both of these States there was an organized and powerful American party yet in existence, without which the Republicans could not succeed. It was the remnant of the American or Know-Nothing revolution of 1854, and they cherished their own faith with great fidelity and would not support any candidate who was friendly to the Catholics.

When Seward was elected Governor of New York in 1838 it was largely by the influence of Archbishop Hughes, one of the ablest Catholic prelates this country has ever had; and Seward, not only because of his gratitude to his Catholic friends, but because of his broad and liberal views generally, in a message to the Legislature urged a division of the school fund between the Catholics and Protestants. That was the rock on which Seward was wrecked. Had he been nominated, the entire American element of the opposition would have been aggressively against him, and Pennsylvania and Indiana would have been lost not only by the defeat of Curtin and Lane in October, but by the defeat of Seward in November.

The situation was earnestly presented by Curtin and Lane, and Mr. Defrees and I accompanied them in their conferences with various delegations which were devoted to Seward, but were willing to abandon him—not because they loved Seward less, but because they loved Republican success more. I saw several rural delegates from New England States shed tears as they confessed that they must abandon Seward because he could not carry Pennsylvania and Indiana, and certainly more than one-third of all the delegates who voted for Lincoln in that convention did it in sincerest sorrow because compelled to abandon their great leader for the sake of victory.

Under such conditions the Seward lines were steadily weakening, but never was a movement so ably led as was the Seward movement at Chicago. It was literally a battle of giants. Thurlow Weed, the master of masters in politics, led the fight for Seward, and he had around him Governor Morgan, Chairman of the National Committee; Raymond, of the Times, and many others of distinguished ability in such struggles. Weed invited Lane to drive with him, and, in the course of their conversation, assured him that if his delegation would support Seward all the money needed to carry his election in Indiana would be generously furnished; but Lane knew that no amount of money could give him victory in October with Seward as the national candidate.

The convention met on Wednesday, May 16, and George Ashman, of Massachusetts, was made permanent president. The first day was devoted to routine duties, and the second to the adoption of a platform and rules to govern the convention. The convention adjourned on Thursday evening profoundly impressed with the great battle that was to be fought on the following day, and both sides exhausted political strategy to gain the advantage. Weed organized a most imposing street parade of the Seward people. They had thousands of Seward spectators outside of the delegates, and it was one of the most impressive public displays I have ever witnessed. They paraded the streets for an hour or more before the meeting of the convention.

The friends of Lincoln had been tireless in their efforts, and they displayed wonderful ability in handling their forces. The leaders in immediate charge of the Lincoln people were Colonel Medill, of the Chicago Tribune; David Davis, afterward Judge of the Supreme Court; Norman B. Judd, Chairman of the Republican State Committee, and Leonard Swett, who was almost a copy of Lincoln physically, and who was Lincoln’s closest friend until the day of his death. When they found that the Seward parade was to come off, they counselled how to meet it, and they finally decided that while the Seward men were parading they would fill the immense temporary wigwam—erected for the convention, and capable of holding five thousand spectators—with men who should go there solely for the purpose of hurrahing for Lincoln. They carried this plan into very successful operation, and when the Seward procession attempted to march into the convention hall they found it filled to overflowing, and very few Seward men outside the delegation could obtain admission.

Just before the convention opened I saw the New York delegation file in and fill the only vacant place in the immense building. They were appalled when they saw how they had been outgeneralled. Almost immediately behind the New York men, who were under the lead of Evarts as Chairman of the delegation, sat Horace Greeley at the head of the Oregon delegation. That new State, just admitted into the Union, was so far from civilization, as the iron horse had not yet been heard in either the Rockies or the Sierra Nevadas, that the Republican convention selected a number of prominent men in the East, including Greeley, to represent the State. I never saw a more benignant face than that of Greeley’s when the nomination of Lincoln was declared. It was known by the supporters of Seward that Pennsylvania and Indiana had both decided to support Lincoln, the Pennsylvanians having declared for Lincoln by four majority over Bates, after giving a complimentary ballot to Cameron.

With very little preliminary movement the ballot began, and Seward’s two-thirds vote of the convention dwindled down to 173¹⁄₂ when 234 were necessary to a choice. Lincoln, with Pennsylvania and Ohio giving complimentary ballots to Cameron and Chase, had 102 votes. As the ballots were announced, every vote for Lincoln was cheered to the echo, while there were but few cheers for Seward except from the delegates themselves. When the 2d ballot was called the Seward people felt that they must largely increase their strength or fall in the race. As Lincoln gained most of the vote of Pennsylvania, with important gains from other States, the wildest cheering greeted the announcements, and when the ballot was given with only 10 votes gained by Seward and 75 votes gained by Lincoln, it became evident to all that Seward’s strength was exhausted and that Lincoln was the coming man. The next and last ballot soon showed Lincoln as leading Seward, and from that time on it was difficult to announce the votes of the States because of the frenzied cheers for “Abe Lincoln.”