Our Presidents and how we make them

by Alexander K. McClure

My first and only meeting with Grant before his retirement from the Presidency, at which we had any protracted conversation, was a short time before his inauguration. Chief Justice Read, of Pennsylvania, handed me a letter, addressed to the President-elect, and asked me to deliver it in person when I next visited Washington. I did not know its contents, but inferred that it related to the appointment of Curtin to a Cabinet office. A few days thereafter when in Washington I called upon General Grant at his headquarters and delivered the letter, and after a very brief conversation, rose to take my leave. He had opened the letter in the meantime, and as I reached the door he called me back, saying that Judge Read’s letter strongly urged the appointment of Curtin to the Cabinet, and that he desired to tell me frankly as a close friend of Curtin why he could not meet the wishes of the many friends of Curtin by giving him a Cabinet portfolio. He spoke very highly of Curtin, and showed his appreciation of Curtin’s position by nominating him as Minister to Russia at an early day after his inauguration, and against the protest of Senator Cameron. In the course of the conversation I saw Grant’s crude theory of conducting a national administration. He said that his Cabinet officers would be his official confidential family, and he desired to appoint them entirely in accordance with his personal preferences. I said to him that it was certainly his right to have only men in his Cabinet who were entirely agreeable to himself, but that it was very important for him to have the ablest politicians of the country largely represented in it, to save his administration from the many political complications which would otherwise confront him.

I saw that Grant was not a willing listener to any suggestions, although given in the most courteous manner, and he answered with a somewhat liberal display of what some called “obstinacy” and others called “determination,” as one of the leading attributes of his character. I then spoke more freely and frankly, and finally said to him that if I were suddenly called to the command of the army, with little or no military experience, I would feel that my greatest need was generals; and I added that it was in no measure disrespectful to him to say that, having been called from the command of the army to the Presidency of the Republic, without experience in high civil duties, his greatest need was statesmen. The advice was not grateful to Grant; on the contrary, he was obviously fretted, as none of the many who sought favors at his hands had ventured to tell him the truth so plainly. When the conversation ended he gave me a moderately cordial good-by, and I never again met him, excepting once at the large banquet given by Mr. Childs on the evening after the opening of the Philadelphia Centennial in 1876, until soon after he had retired from his eight years’ service in the Presidency, and never had any communication with him.

I opposed his renomination, participated in the Liberal Republican Convention that nominated Greeley, had charge of the Greeley campaign in Pennsylvania, and labored very earnestly for Grant’s defeat in 1872. On the day that he retired from the Presidency I had an editorial in the Philadelphia Times, speaking of General Grant as history would record his achievements, and of necessity highly complimentary to him. A few days thereafter I met him with Mr. Childs at the Continental Hotel, and he came forward in a manner that was unusually demonstrative for Grant, and was profuse in his thanks for the editorial referred to. He said that he specially valued it because it came from one who had been among his severest critics during his Presidential term, and he ended by inviting me to lunch with him at Mr. Drexel’s office that afternoon.

I willingly accepted the invitation and spent two hours with Grant, most of the time alone after Mr. Drexel and Mr. Childs had left us. I was surprised to find him one of the most agreeable of conversationalists, and he discussed politics generally and the Hayes-Tilden contest with a degree of frankness and intelligence that surprised me. He said that he confidently expected the Electoral Commission to give the vote of Louisiana to Mr. Tilden, but that as Chief Magistrate it was his duty only to maintain the law, and that when the law of the nation made the Electoral Commission a final tribunal for the settlement of the dispute, he would have maintained that judgment with all the power of the Government.

I was specially gratified at this interview to have a particular prejudice that I had cherished against Grant since 1864 entirely dissipated by a conversation into which I cautiously led him on the Lincoln-McClellan campaign of 1864. I have stated in another chapter that Mr. Lincoln hesitated in October, 1864, to send an order to General Grant to furlough five thousand of his Pennsylvania soldiers home to vote for President, and sent it to Meade. I had known how Lincoln had sustained Grant after the battle of Shiloh, when Grant had few friends and none outside of Lincoln able to sustain him. When Lincoln hesitated to send the order to Grant, I spoke very freely and reminded Lincoln how he had saved Grant, and wanted to know why he could not now trust the man who would have been overwhelmed but for the generous and heroic offices of Lincoln. Lincoln finally answered that he had never received or heard of any expression from General Grant expressing a preference for his election over General McClellan. Lincoln certainly at that time doubted Grant’s attitude in that contest, and having been one of the many who had urged Lincoln to remove Grant from his command after Shiloh, I could not fail to cherish some prejudice against Grant as wanting in fidelity to Lincoln.

In our general discussion of politics I remarked that he had very studiously avoided all political expression during the war, and that I had specially noted his silence during the campaign of 1864 between Lincoln and McClellan. His answer was prompt and given evidently in the frankest manner, as he said substantially: “Of course, I could not with propriety give any public expression in a political contest where one candidate had given me the highest commission in the army and the other candidate had been my predecessor in command of the army.” The answer was given in such simple earnestness that I never thereafter doubted Grant’s fidelity to Lincoln, although Lincoln certainly was disappointed that Grant gave no expression during the campaign. On the night of Lincoln’s election Grant sent him a very hearty telegram of congratulation.

President Grant drifted into a political control that ultimately made his administration intensely sectional and factional, and during his first administration he was intolerant of criticism, and often openly disregarded Republican sentiment in sustaining many of his favorites, who brought scandals upon his rule. On great questions, however, Grant certainly was great. He conceived the idea of territorial expansion that has been so successfully carried out by the present administration with the hearty approval of an overwhelming majority of the people. He made an earnest movement for the annexation of San Domingo, and he gave exhaustive public and private efforts to attain it. This policy was severely criticised by some of the leading members of the party, prominent among whom were Sumner and Greeley, and the San Domingo scheme was ridiculed from one end of the country to the other as a wild, visionary, political enterprise, designed to give place and fortune to administration favorites.

So bitter did the Republican national feud become that the anti-administration leaders decided to take the initiative in opposing Grant’s re-election. At no time in the history of any administration was the political machinery of the Government so complete and despotic as it was under Grant, although not in any degree personally directed by himself, and it was well known that the opposition would have little voice in the regular Republican convention, and that it was entirely powerless to prevent Grant being presented as the Republican nominee.

The first national conventions of the year were held at Columbus, O., in February. The Labor Reformers were first in the field, as their convention was held at Columbus on the 21st of February, with Edward M. Chamberlain, of Massachusetts, as President. This convention was made up largely or wholly of men who believed in the greenback policy, as it demanded an indefinite issue of greenbacks, which would be a legal tender for the payment of all public and private debts. The following is the full text of its platform:

We hold that all political power is inherent in the people, and free government is founded on their authority and established for their benefit; that all citizens are equal in political rights, entitled to the largest religious and political liberty compatible with the good order of society, as also to the use and enjoyment of the fruits of their labor and talents; and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separable endowments and privileges, or immunities from the Government, but in consideration of public services; and any laws destructive of these fundamental principles are without moral binding force, and should be repealed. And believing that all the evils resulting from unjust legislation now affecting the industrial classes can be removed by the adoption of the principles contained in the following declaration, therefore,