“In a place where the custom is to marry only one wife, it is not permitted to marry more than one woman. R. Gershom anathematized any one that should many a second, whilst his wife was alive; but this anathema does not extend to the case of the widow of a brother, who has died without children, nor to the case of a woman who is only betrothed. This ordinance, however, does not obtain in all lands, and the anathema was only to last until the end of the fifth thousand years.” Hence it appears that before R. Gershom, polygamy was lawful and practised by the Jews in Europe, but that he forbade it except in particular cases; and further, that R. Gershom’s prohibition was only temporary, it was to have full force until the end of the fifth thousand years, that is, until the year 1240 of the Christian era. This period is how long past, for the Jews reckon this year 5597, and Gershom’s anathema has therefore lost its force; consequently, the only obstacle, which their religion opposed to polygamy has been removed, and, so far as conscience is concerned, every professor of Judaism must feel himself at liberty to marry as many wives as he likes. He knows that R. Gershom’s anathema has expired, and if he goes to the codes of Jewish law, he finds that it is left doubtful. For instance, the note on the passage just cited says—
ומכל מקום בכל מדינות אלו התקנה והמנהג במקומו עומד ואין נושאין שתי נשים וכופין בחרמות ומנדין מי שעובר ונושא ב׳ נשים לגרש אחת מהן ויש אומרים דבזמן הזה אין לכוף מי שעבר חרם דר׳ גרשון מאחר שכבר נשלם אלף החמישי , ואין נוהגין כן ׃
“Nevertheless, in all these countries the ordinance and the custom remain in force, and it is not lawful to marry two wives; and he that transgresses and does so is to be compelled by anathema and excommunication to divorce one of them. But some say that in the present time he that transgresses the anathema of R. Gershom is not to be compelled, for the five thousand years have been completed long since; but the custom is not according to this.” Here then are two opinions. The most strict of the two is, that polygamy is now not lawful, and that he who marries two wives must divorce one of them: but even this cannot be very satisfactory to the woman whom he first married, for it does not define which of the two is to be divorced. It only requires that one of them should be divorced, and leaves it to the man himself to divorce which he pleases. The other opinion is, that polygamy is now lawful, and that he is not to be compelled to divorce either. Hence it appears that it is not Judaism which protects the rights and the happiness of Jewish women, or the peace and comfort of Jewish families. The influence and the laws of Christianity forbid polygamy. To Christianity, then, Jewish females are indebted, not only for the station which they hold in society, but for the peace which they enjoy in their homes. Wherever Christianity has no power, there the Jews may take as many wives as they please: and if ever Judaism should obtain supreme power, Jewesses must expect to be again degraded into the category of slaves and Amharatzin, and to have their domestic peace annihilated by the introduction of new wives and families. It may be replied, that this objection applies with equal force to the written law, for that Moses himself allows polygamy. But to this we answer, that Moses only tolerated polygamy, but that he shows clearly that it was not the purpose of God, that men should have more wives than one. He found an evil custom existing amongst a people debased by Egyptian slavery, and like a wise reformer, he did not commence his improvements by destroying all that existed, but endeavoured to restrain the evil, to show that it was contrary to God’s original institution, and to point out the consequences. He did not immediately pronounce it unlawful, for that would have been attended with serious inconveniences, but by the direction of God gave laws to protect the wives and children. In the beginning of Genesis—he showed that God’s will was, that a man should have only one wife, for that he did not create several women, but only one. He gives the words of God, saying, “It is not good that the man should be alone: I will make him an help meet for him” עזר כנגדו where “help” is in the singular number, to show that man was not to have more than one help meet for him. And again, those words, “Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife,” not unto his wives, but to his wife; where it is also to be observed, that God is laying down a law, not for Adam only, but for coming generations. By exhibiting the original institution of marriage in Paradise, whilst man was yet innocent, and stating the original law and purpose of God, Moses plainly showed, that God’s will was, that a man should have only one wife. He then goes on to show, that the first who departed from this original institution was Lamech, one of the wicked descendants of wicked Cain. “And Lamech took unto him two wives,” (Gen. iv. 19,) whom he held up as a warning, recording of him only that he had two wives, and that he was a murderer. With this he contrasts the conduct of Noah and his sons, who had only one wife each. In the history of the patriarchs he shows the evil consequences of polygamy. He shows that it was not the will of Abraham to take a second wife, but that Sarah in her eagerness to have children misled him, and that discord and domestic trouble soon followed. And by all the troubles which the sons of Ishmael have since inflicted upon the children of Isaac, God has, in his providence, confirmed the moral to be drawn from the Mosaic narrative. Moses then points out the happiness of Isaac, who had only one wife; and the troubles of Jacob, who, not by his own choice, but by the wickedness of Laban and the folly of Laban’s daughters, had more than one; and last of all, Moses gave in himself an example of the conduct which he wished Israel to pursue by having only one wife himself. A careful examination, therefore, of the law of Moses will show that he only tolerated polygamy as an existing evil, but that he intended to discourage it, by exhibiting the original institution of marriage, and the many evils that result from a departure from God’s purpose. When, therefore, we show that the oral law permits men to have more wives than one, and that consequently it is accountable for all the evil thence resulting, we cannot be charged with reproaching the law of Moses. The oral law says expressly, that a man may marry many wives, even a hundred. The law of Moses nowhere says any thing of the kind. It only legislates in case that such a thing should happen. The oral law plainly advises a man not to take more than four wives. The law of Moses holds up the evil of having more than one. If men would carefully read the law of Moses, they would see that the original intention was, that a man should have only one wife. But if a man follow the oral law, he will be encouraged to take as many as he can support. It is evident, therefore, that if the Jews in Europe do not practise polygamy, their conduct is not to be ascribed to the influence of Judaism, but of Christianity.
It is, further, evident that this Christian practice of having only one wife, cannot be objected to as an unauthorized alteration of the law of Moses. If R. Gershom was allowed to forbid polygamy, and the Jews considered themselves bound to obey him, they cannot reasonably object to the Christian laws on the same subject. Christianity has only effected by its influence what R. Gershom endeavoured to accomplish by anathema. The only difference is, that Christianity was first, and that R. Gershom learnt the evil of polygamy from Christians. If it was lawful for a rabbi, it was still more lawful for the Messiah to restore the original constitution of marriage as established in Paradise, and to deliver Jewish wives and families from all that confusion and discord which results from polygamy. But it is particularly deserving of notice that R. Gershom, by forbidding the Jews to have more wives than one, made a great and decided change in the oral law. That which the oral law allows, R. Gershom forbids. We grant, indeed, that by thus changing the oral law, he approximated to the mind and intention of Moses: but he altered the oral law, and thereby shows us that he himself did not believe that the oral law was to last for ever, or that it is of eternal obligation. If he had considered it unchangeable, he would not have dared to make the change; but by making so important a change as this, to forbid what it allows, he plainly shows it as his opinion, that where there is a grave reason, the oral law may be changed or abolished; and all the Jews who acquiesce in his ordinance, and think it is unlawful to marry more wives than one; consent to the change. But if it be lawful to change in one thing, it must also be lawful to change in another, so that the rabbinical Jews have no reason whatever for reproaching their brethren who renounce the oral law totally. Such persons are only acting upon a principle practically acknowledged by all the Jews of Europe. It may be said that R. Gershom’s change was only temporary, and that the present acquiescence of European Jews is only a sort of homage to Christian principles. This is certainly true, and this reply leads us to consider the dreary prospect presented to Jewish females, if ever modern Judaism should obtain power. The influence of Christian principle would then cease,—polygamy would again be lawful, and the matrons of Israel, who now appear as the participators in the family government and the guides of their households, would again be degraded into one of a herd of female slaves. They might have a hundred competitors and rivals in their husbands’ affections, and even if the husband should follow the advice of the rabbies, and take only four wives, they would at least have three. Now, we ask every matron in Israel whether she would wish such a change, or whether she would prefer the present state of things, where a man can have only one wife? If she prefers the present state, then she prefers the Christian principle, and acknowledges that Christianity is better than Judaism. If she does not wish for the restoration of polygamy, then she confesses that the doctrines of Judaism are injurious, and that she does not desire the triumph of her own religion. Then why should she profess a religion which she acknowledges to be prejudicial to her welfare—or why should she reject a religion which protects her peace and comfort? There can be no question, that Christianity has prevented amongst the Jews that practice of having many wives; it has, therefore, been a blessing to Jewish families for centuries; why, then, should they despise or oppose a religion which has been, and still is, a blessing? And we propose this question, not only to Jewish wives, but to Jewish husbands. Is it not a fact, that God’s original institution was that a man should have only one wife—does not Moses show that the first polygamist was a descendant of wicked Cain, and, that family discord and unhappiness is the consequence of having more wives than one? Does not reason, and the state of Mahometan countries, show that where there are many wives, woman is degraded, and the education of children necessarily neglected? Is not the moral, the intellectual, and scientific progress of mankind greatly superior in Christian countries, where men have only one wife? Is not, then, the practice of having only one wife a blessing? Has it not been a blessing to Jewish husbands, wives, and children? Are not, then, the Jews deeply indebted to Christianity for that measure of peace and moral improvement which they have derived from this practice? And would not an adherence to their own oral law in the same degree have proved a disadvantage, if not a curse? How, then, can they oppose a religion which has been to them a blessing?—or how can they adhere to a religion which contains principles subversive of their domestic peace, and destructive to the well-being, and the moral and intellectual improvement of one-half the human race? The rabbies say, that the oral law is eternal in its obligation: if so, then polygamy is to be eternal in its continuance, and then men are never to return to that state of perfection which they enjoyed in Paradise. Who is there that does not see that the race of men was most happy when sin was unknown, and most perfect in intellect when he could hold converse with the Deity and dwell in the garden of God? But if Judaism be true, men are never again to enjoy that state, for then polygamy was unknown. Adam had only one wife; and until sin entered into the world, and ripened even into murder, no man had two wives. Judaism is, therefore, opposed to the pure and perfect state of things that existed in Paradise, and favourable to that confusion introduced by the murderous Lamech, the son of murderous Cain—and Christianity resembles, in its principles of marriage, the happy state ordained by God in Paradise. Here, then, we have another and a practical proof that the oral law is not of God. Its authors totally misunderstood the mind and purpose of Moses, the servant of God, and misinterpreted his temporary toleration of an existing evil into a positive permission and sanction for continuing it. We have also another proof of the divine origin of Christianity.
No. XLVIII.
DIVORCE.
When God delivered the commandments at Sinai, he placed those which related to himself first, to teach us that our first duty is to love and serve him: and immediately after these he gave the command “Honour thy father and thy mother,” to show us that, next to himself, we are bound to reverence, to love, and to obey those to whom we owe our existence. This order of things was not an arbitrary choice, but founded in that natural constitution of creation which God ordained as most conducive to the intellectual and moral well-being as well as to the happiness of his creatures. He does not command us to love and serve Him, and Him only, merely because He has the light on the one hand, and it is our bounden duty on the other; but because a conformity to his will is an approximation both to wisdom and happiness. Neither does he tell us to honour father and mother, because we owe them all such reverence, as from them we have derived our being, and to them are indebted for all the care and affection with which they have tended and watched over our infancy; but because He has himself constituted the relation of parent and child, and ordained parental affection and filial duty as the means of promoting our welfare in time and in eternity. Any religion, therefore, whose tendency is to render obedience to that command impossible, must not only be contrary to the will of God, but to the happiness of man; and this is one of the many reasons for which we think that Judaism must be false. The religion of the oral law has a direct tendency to diminish a son’s respect for his mother. We do not mean to say that in this or any other Christian country Jewish sons despise their mothers. The co-existence of Christianity necessarily counteracts the development of rabbinical principles. We intend only to exhibit the natural and necessary consequences, if there were no counteracting force. The contempt which the oral law pours upon women in general, and the encouragement which it gives to polygamy have necessarily the effect of lessening their respect both in the eyes of their husbands and their sons, and this tendency is still more increased by the rabbinic doctrine of divorce, which we now propose to consider. The law of Moses permits divorce under certain circumstances. It says, “When a man hath taken a wife, and married her, and it come to pass that she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness, רות דבר, in her; then let him write her a bill of divorcement, and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house,” &c. (Deut. xxiv. 1.) But this permission, founded on grave and important considerations, the rabbies have perverted into an unlimited licence to divorce on the most trifling pretext.
בית שמאי אומרים לא יגרש אדם את אשתו אלא אם כן מצא בה ערות דבר דדרשי ליה לקרא כפשטיה אם לא תמצא חן בעינו לפי שמצא בה ערות דבר , ובית הלל סברי אפילו הקדיחה תכשילו דדרשי לקרא הכי כי מצא בה ערות דבר או ערוה או דבר אחר שפשעה כנגדו , ור׳ עקיבא סבר אפילו מצא אחרת נאה הימנה דדריש ליה לקרא הכי והיה אם לא תמצא חן בעיניו פי׳ חן של נוי או שמצא ערות דבר והלכה כבית הלל שאם פשעה כנגדו יכול לגרשה ׃
“The school of Shamai says, A man is not to divorce his wife unless he shall find some uncleanness in her, for they interpret the verse according to its simple meaning, if she find no favour in his eyes on account of his finding some uncleanness in her. The school of Hillel thinks, that if a woman let the broth burn it is sufficient for they interpret the words, ‘a matter of uncleanness,’ to mean, Either uncleanness, or any other matter in which she has offended him. But R. Akiva thinks, that a man may divorce his wife, if he only find another handsomer than she is, for he interprets the verse thus, ‘If she find no favour in his eyes,’ where he explains favour to refer to the favour of beauty, or if he find a matter of uncleanness. But the legal decision is according to the school of Hillel, that is, if a wife sin against her husband, he may divorce her.” (Arbah Turim, Hilchoth Gittin., 1.) This monstrous passage is in itself sufficient to shake the authority of the oral law, for in the first place we find three grave authorities, Shamai, Hillel, and Akiva, all differing as to the sense of a most important passage, bearing upon a subject that most nearly affects the happiness and well-being of human society. One of the gravest questions that can be propounded is, When is a man justified in divorcing his wife? If there be an oral law at all, it ought certainly to answer this question clearly, unequivocally, and satisfactorily. The existence of disputation shows that these three rabbies had no authoritative tradition on the subject, but were merely giving their own private opinions: and that therefore the assertion, that an oral law exists, is a mere fiction invented to impose upon the credulous, but insufficient to beget faith in any man or woman that will make use of the reason given by God. The old fable, that God caused a voice to be heard from heaven, saying, when the rabbies differ, “That
אלו ואלו דברי אלהים חיים ׃
both speak the words of the living God,” will not do now. Every one can understand that God does not speak contradictions. No one will believe that the profane sentiment of R. Akiva, That a man may divorce his wife as soon as he finds another who pleases him better, can proceed from the God of holiness and justice. It is true that his opinion is not the law; but the opinion of Hillel, which is the law, is not a whit better. It pronounces that if a woman only spoil the broth she may be divorced: now this interpretation or the words of Moses is plainly contrary to the grammatical sense: עֶרְוַת is in Regimen (סמיכה) and joined to דָּבָר by a munach, and can therefore by no means be separated from it so as to signify “Either uncleanness or some other matter.” The words of Moses, the points, and the accents, all decide that there is only one cause for which a man may put away his wife. Hillel and his successors have wilfully passed by the plain sense of the Hebrew words, in their eagerness to obtain a facility for putting away their wives. They were not ignorant of the right sense, for that was plainly asserted by Shamai, but were determined to get rid of it; and such was the state of the Jews at the time, that they had influence enough to turn their false interpretation into law; and such has been the state of the Jews ever since, that it continues law to this very hour. A rabbinical Jew may, according to his religious tenets, turn away his wife, the mother of his children, on a pretext that would hardly justify the dismissal of a servant. He may rudely tear asunder the sacred ties of conjugal affection, and separate between mother and children, if the unhappy woman should only make a mistake in her cookery. One of the worst charges brought against the slave-dealers was, that they had no respect either for maternal or filial affection; that they separated between mother and children. The very same accusation can be brought against modern Judaism, which legitimatizes the very same disregard for the feelings of a mother. Can, then, such a religion, which thus daringly snaps the ties of nature, be from God? Is it possible that God should thus expose one half of his rational creatures to the caprice and the tyranny of those who ought to be their defenders and protectors from every insult and every harm? If the same right were given to women, though the laws would be most contrary to the divine institution of marriage, it would at least have the appearance of justice; but this is denied. The oral law says,—