In this position there could be no better course than to punish and disarm the Daimio Prince Nagato.
That course had these three separate advantages:—
1. It gave the best promise of concurrence of the four Powers, as France, Holland, and the United States had all been sufferers from the Prince of Choshiu's violations of treaty, while we were most exposed to risk and loss by any Japanese attack on Yokohama.
2. It involved proceeding only against a rebellious vassal, and not against the Mikado or the Tycoon.
3. If the operation should prove successful, the four Powers were under no obligation to undertake further hostilities unless fresh provocation should be received.
Her Majesty's Government have received with great satisfaction the account of the naval operations of the four squadrons, and their result, contained in your despatch of September 28. Those operations were conducted in the most gallant manner; the loss was not considerable; the four Powers acted in harmony together; no defenceless city suffered during the hostilities; and the terms granted to the offending Daimio were moderate towards him, and sufficient for us.
I have only to add, that I am commanded to express to you her Majesty's full approbation of your conduct.
So far so good. But the slow mail service of those days, and the entire absence of the telegraph, admitted of wonderful interpolations in correspondence with such far-off countries as Japan. Events marched quicker than the course of post could follow them, and despatches were sometimes written which the writer would have given a good deal to recall. Such was the case here. We have said that soon after Sir Rutherford Alcock's return to Japan he addressed some weighty despatches to the Foreign Office on the situation, undoubtedly leading up to the ultimate employment of force in vindication of the foreign treaties. This was in full accord with the spirit of Earl Russell's instructions dated December 17, 1863. These were—
- 1. To require from the Tycoon and the Daimios the execution of the engagements of the treaty.
- 2. To consult the admiral and any military officer who may be sent to Japan as to the means of strengthening and holding our position in Yokohama.
- 3. To endeavour to procure from Hongkong the services of a regiment of infantry.
- 4. The admiral to be authorised to land marines and destroy the batteries which have been erected for the evident purpose of interrupting the passage of our merchandise, &c.; but he must take care that no unarmed and peaceable town should be bombarded.