In short, supposing we are to cherish a feeling of revenge and devise schemes to subvert foreign Powers, it will be necessary to wait until—with large armies and abundant supplies, with no rebel or Mohammedan outbreaks in the provinces, and no difficulties in the capital—we can cope with them without hesitation. We shall be a match then for all adversaries; but otherwise we cannot engage in a rash and random conflict. Even when it is supposed that we are ready for the struggle, it will still be necessary to exercise extreme and continual caution, and to wait until our spirit is high, and our aspect, therefore, formidable. Then should there be no war, the question would be disposed of; but in the event of our taking the field, it would not be unvictoriously.
Memorialist, however, has had several years' experience in conducting business with foreigners, and is thoroughly familiar with their character. He has found that, no matter what they are engaged in, they act honourably without deceit or falsehood. But although it is possible to acquire a general knowledge of their mode of action in the conduct of their own affairs, yet there is no means of becoming thoroughly acquainted with the details and motives of their conduct. Their bearing, however, in military matters affords clear evidence of their straightforwardness. There is the instance of the Englishman Gordon, late commander-in-chief at Soochow, who, having organised 3000 troops of the Ever-Victorious Army, took the field against the rebels. Subsequently, at the capture of Soochow, the memorialist himself observed that officer personally leading in advance of his troops with a courage and sang-froid worthy of all praise. He subsequently became the recipient of the imperial commendation and reward.
The writer has also, in conjunction with Tsêng Kwo-fan, acting viceroy of the two Kiang, been associated with foreigners in organising foreign-drilled infantry and cavalry, and in making arrangements for the building of steam-vessels. He is thoroughly convinced that they are actuated by upright and amicable principles, and entertain no feelings of animosity towards China. With the knowledge of these facts before us, it is possible to draw our conclusions upon other matters.
It is from these considerations, therefore, that the writer suggests the policy to be pursued in intercourse with foreigners. There seems to be no necessity to dispose of the several questions hastily and on the instant, nor do the resident foreign Ministers at Peking apparently intend to insist upon an immediate settlement.
It would be well if H.I.M. on attaining his majority were himself to adopt the policy suggested, and in that case no difficult questions would arise.
6th year, 11th month, 6th day.
As perhaps the best essay yet extant in translating the Chinese imperial tradition into the language of the modern world, this paper of Li Hung-chang's is full of instruction for foreign diplomatists. Read in the light of the subsequent thirty years, we see that it sets forth the principles which have inspired the whole public life of the most prominent man in China. His recognition of the honourable character of foreigners, as he knew them, represented a notable advance on the like testimony of Commissioner Lin in 1841, inasmuch as Lin deduced from it the ease by which their good faith could be abused, while Li made it a ground of confidence in co-operation with them. His recommendation to his contemporaries, to cultivate intimacy with foreign officials in order to obviate misunderstandings in the execution of the treaties, was only preaching that which he has consistently practised throughout his official life. He was the first high official who braved public opinion by sitting with open doors. This conciliatory temper and open mind has made Li Hung-chang the lubricator in many jarring conflicts; and it kept him, contrary to constitutional usage, for twenty-five years at the diplomatic outpost of the capital.
His delicate handling of the suggestion of the Central Government, to resist by hostile means the proposals of foreigners, is also characteristic of the man who had seen war and hated it. While bowing to the imperial will, he proposed postponement of its execution. In a similar case many years afterwards a memorial of Li's was quoted as an incitement to war with Japan, whereas it was an extinguisher, in diplomatic form, put upon the bellicose proposal of another.
Not the least interesting part of Li's memorial is the ground on which he advocates reform—the proved superiority of foreign nations. His argument takes the identical form, and is expressed in the very words, used by the Daimios of Japan; and the circumstances of the two countries in their foreign relations were in the main so similar, that it cannot but be instructive to observe how they comported themselves respectively under the stress of the foreign irruption. Both had been overawed by foreign forces, and both sought revenge by using the strength of their opponents for their own regeneration. The difficulty, as we see it, in the carrying out of the scheme of regeneration was of the same nature in both countries—the want of unity and centralisation. Japan was divided up into feudal principalities; China into provinces and prefectures as independent as self-governing British colonies. The councils of the Daimios bore a rough analogy to the consultations with the governors and governors-general of China. The enemy was the same, and the means of overcoming him are as clearly laid down in Li Hung-chang's memorial as in the most perfervid of the Japanese manifestoes. How, then, did it come about that the same leaven should have fermented with such miraculous rapidity in the one country, while in the other it has been buried in a torpid mass? Obviously this is a matter which will repay the consideration of those who concern themselves with the state and prospects of China.