The first Coalition Government drew up a program of policy. As this program was somewhat vaguely worded, coalition in the strict and true sense of the word was not secured. The socialists had entered the coalition under pressure, as we saw. Some of them felt called upon to justify the step in a statement, later discovered and made public, to socialists of other countries. In the statement they explained that they had entered the government, in order to "deepen and extend the class struggle." And this is what some of them did actually start in to do, using their authority and powers as ministers to turn the organs of revolutionary democracy in this direction, promoting suspicion of and antagonism toward the bourgeoisie. The socialist ministers also held themselves directly responsible to the Councils. Finally the socialist members of the government tried to force immediate decisions on questions of a fundamental nature, which should be decided only by the Constituent Assembly, thus not adhering to the program drawn up as the basis for the coalition. The position of the non-socialist members of the government therefore became untenable, and a whole group of them resigned.
The resignation of the most influential bourgeois group of the first Coalition Government coincided quite accidentally with an armed uprising which the extremists, the Bolsheviki, had been planning for several weeks. For the extremists were again putting forward their demand, this time supported by armed force, that all the "capitalist" ministers resign, and that all authority pass into the hands of the Councils. But the Councils refused to take over authority, the constructive majority replying that they would not accept the responsibility. In their judgment only a government representing all the vital forces of the country, that is a coalition government, could succeed. The moderate socialists prevailed in the Councils, and a second coalition was formed, this time under the presidency of a socialist, Kerensky. Some weeks elapsed before the new government was finally organized. The non-socialist groups were willing to enter a coalition government led by a socialist, but only on a definite program, which would exclude all fundamental legislation. Objection was raised also to certain individual socialists, whose record in the first coalition government made one doubt their willingness to adhere honestly to any coalition program. This objection was withdrawn later; but the non-socialists gave only their second-best men as members of the new government. The non-socialists also had demanded that the Provisional Government be absolutely independent, its members not responsible to any councils or party committees. For the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies were as we saw exclusively socialistic, and had become mere party bodies.
In the meantime the democratization of local government bodies was going on apace, and very successfully in view of the chaotic conditions produced by revolution and war. As the new local municipal and provincial councils, elected by universal suffrage, began to convene, the revolutionary committees and councils were expected gradually to disappear. The elections for the Constituent Assembly were to take place as soon as the new local governing bodies could verify and correct the lists of voters. The Constituent Assembly was to replace definitely not only all revolutionary councils and committees, but also the Duma, which continued to exist legally, though without functioning. The main objective of the constructive elements was to hold the situation together until the Constituent Assembly could be convened; the date had been advanced, even at a sacrifice of regularity in election procedure. And a coalition government seemed to be the only possible solution, despite the difficulties already encountered in applying the principle.
The councils, the land committees and the other organizations that had come into existence with and in the course of the revolution were, as we saw, almost exclusively socialist in their political affiliations. This was true even of the peasant congresses, though it was generally admitted that the bulk of the peasantry was not consciously socialistic. Of all the revolutionary bodies the peasant councils were clearly the least representative. This was particularly true of the first alleged all-Russian Peasant Congress. The peasantry, the great mass of the population, became articulate very slowly. The non-socialist groups were striving to bring about a more true expression of peasant views; and their moderate program was making headway, though they found it difficult to compete with the extremists, who made most generous promises. But the non-socialist groups were beginning to take a stronger line, as they saw the experiments of the extremists lead to disillusionment. They proposed to organize councils and congresses of the non-socialist elements. This project was immediately branded as counter-revolutionary by "revolutionary democracy." Perhaps to ward off the contemplated move of the non-socialists, Kerensky issued a general invitation for a state conference at Moscow of all parties, groups, and organizations, at which the opinions of all could be expressed, presumably for the guidance of the Coalition Government.
The Moscow Conference did in fact give to all organizations, Duma, Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, the recently elected local-government bodies, coöperative and professional unions, in fact every group, socialist and non-socialist, revolutionary and pre-revolutionary institutions, the opportunity to express views. The speeches did perhaps help the Coalition Government to sense the situation with which it had to deal, though the Conference showed that the Coalition Government was unstable, and that the extreme ideas of the Bolsheviki had penetrated deeply in the broader masses. Again the Bolsheviki attacked the principle of coalition, and demanded that revolutionary democracy take over all authority.
Then came the Kornilov affair, which in its conception was an effort on the part of the constructive groups, including the moderate socialists, to discredit the extremists, and establish a stronger government, free from party ties and party programs, representing a national movement to organize "all the vital forces of the country," to use again the phraseology of the revolution. But there was a misunderstanding, and also perhaps it was premature—"revolutionary democracy" was not yet sufficiently sobered to accept a program of common constructive effort. The movement had the opposite effect; it split the country into two openly hostile camps, and brought revolutionary democracy still more under the influence of the extremists. The Coalition Government fell to pieces, and a Directorate of Five, with almost dictatorial powers, still headed by Kerensky, assumed authority.
The Bolsheviki now demanded the absolute and final renunciation of the principle of coalition, and the formation of a purely socialistic government. Kerensky and the constructive socialists refused to participate in such a government, and opened negotiations with the non-socialist leaders, to attempt once more the coalition form of government. The extremists then sent out a call to "revolutionary democracy" to meet in another conference, which they called a Democratic Conference, as opposed to the State Conference of Moscow. They declared that no bourgeois, counter-revolutionary group would be admitted to the conference. Kerensky allowed the conference to meet. It passed contradictory resolutions, first voting against the principle of a coalition form of government, but later seeming to advocate and support this principle. The moderate socialists fought hard for the coalition idea, and Kerensky and his followers seemed at last to have won out. In any case, at the beginning of October, Kerensky formed a third coalition government, and convened a preliminary parliament in which all parties were represented. This time a definitely outlined program, as the basis for coöperation, was accepted by the socialists, which made it possible for the non-socialists to give their best men to the new combination. The Provisional Government of October 8, at least the fifth since the revolution, and the third Coalition Government, unquestionably brought together the strongest and most representative group of men since the revolution. The Bolsheviki declared their intention to break it up as quickly as possible, and there was not much optimism in non-socialist circles; one felt that it would not survive many weeks. But this third Coalition Government gave a greater promise of success than any previous attempt. There was hope that it would last, and hold the situation together, at least until the Constituent Assembly could meet.
This hope was not realized, as we know, and the break-up of the government came within a month, when the Bolsheviki at last accomplished their long-planned armed uprising, and by force established what they called the dictatorship of the proletariat. Acting on the very eve of the opening of the Constituent Assembly, the elections for which were already in progress, the Bolsheviki showed clearly their contempt for a really national, popular form of government. The Bolshevik uprising was followed by civil war. But this was the aim of the extremists, for they were against social peace, cooperation, coalition, and were striving for class war.
Until this last month the Russian Revolution, though marked by extreme antagonisms, and much wrangling, was nevertheless comparatively peaceful in character. There was no extensive violence, such as would justify the use of the term "civil war." It was to avoid civil war that such constant, and on the whole honest, efforts were made to "unite all the vital forces of the country." For it was seen that civil war would perhaps ruin the revolution, and in any case would eliminate Russia as a factor in the war, and the constructive leaders constantly emphasized that on the successful outcome of the war depended also the success of the revolution. But the efforts of the more constructive and moderate groups failed. This very short outline of the attempts to solve the problems with which revolutionary Russia was confronted by applying the principle of coalition gives an interpretation of the recent events in Russia from another angle. In any case one has tried to point out the forces in conflict during these last months, perhaps suggesting one of many possible issues from the present chaos.