HEAD II.

The sufferings of many for refusing to own the tyrant's authority vindicated.

The other grand ordinance of God, magistracy, which he hath in his sovereign wisdom, justice, and goodness, appointed, ordained, and consecrated, for the demonstration, illustration, and vindication of his own glory, and the communication, conservation, and reparation of the peace, safety, order, liberty, and universal good of mankind, is next to that of the ministry of great concern: wherein not only the prudence, policy, property, and liberty of men, but also the conscience, duty, and religion of Christians, have a special interest. And therefore it is no less important, pertinent, profitable, and necessary for every one that hath any of these to care and contend for, keep and recover, to inquire into and understand something of the institution, constitution, nature, and boundaries of the sacred ordinances of magistracy, than into the holy ordinance of the ministry; so far at least as may consist with the sphere of every one's capacity and station, and may conduce to the satisfaction of every one's conscience, in the discharge of the duties of their relations. Every private man indeed hath neither capacity, concern, nor necessity, to study the politics, or search into the secrets, or intrigues of government, no more than he is to be versed in all the administrations of ecclesiastical policy, and interests of the ministry; yet every man's conscience is no less concerned, in distinguishing the character of God's ministers of justice, the magistrates, to whom he owes and owns allegiance, that they be not usurping tyrants, everting the ordinances of the magistracy, than in acknowledging the character of Christ's ministers of the gospel, to whom he owes and owns obedience, that they be not usurping prelates or impostors, perverting the ordinance of the ministry. The glory of God is much concerned, in our owning and keeping pure and entire, according to his will and word, both these ordinances. And our conscience as well as interest is concerned in the advantage or hurt, profit or prejudice, of the right or wrong, observation or prevarication, of both these ordinances; being interested in the advantage of magistracy, and hurt of tyranny in the state, as well as in the advantage of the ministry, and hurt of diocesan, or erastian supremacy in the church; in the advantage of liberty, and hurt of slavery in the state, as well as in the advantage of religion, and hurt of profaneness in the church; in the profit of laws, and prejudice of prerogative in the state, as well as in the profit of truth, and prejudice of error in the church; in the profit of peace and true loyalty, and prejudice of oppression and rebellion in the state, as well as in the profit of purity and unity, and prejudice of defection, and division or schism in the church. So that in confidence, we are no more free to prostitute our loyalty and liberty absolutely, in owning every possessor of the magistracy; than we are free to prostitute our religion and faith implicitly, in owning every pretender to the ministry. This may seem very paradoxical to some, because so dissonant and dissentient from the vulgar, yea almost universal and inveterate opinion and practice of the world, that hitherto hath not been so precise in the matter of magistracy. And it may seem yet more strange, that not only some should be found to assert this; but that any should be found so strict and strait laced, as to adventure upon suffering, and even to death, for that which hath hitherto been seldom scrupled, by any that were forced to subjection under a yoke, which they had no force to shake off, and wherein religion seems little or nothing concerned; for not owning the authority of the present possessors of the place of government: which seems to be a question not only excentric and extrinsic to religion, but such a state-question, as for its thorny intricacies and difficulties, is more proper for politicians and lawyers to dispute about, (as indeed their debates about this head of authority, have been as manifold and multiplied as about any one thing) than for private christians to search into, and suffer for, as a part of their testimony. But if we will cast off prejudices, and the tyranny of custom, and the bondage of being bound to the world's mind in our inquiries about tyranny, and suffer ourselves to ponder impartially the importance of this matter; and then to state the question right; we shall find religion and conscience hath no small interest in this business. They must have no small interest in it, if we consider the importance of this matter, either extensively, objectively, or subjectively. Extensively considered, it is the interest of all mankind to know and be resolved in conscience, whether the government they are under be of God's ordination, or of the devil's administration? Whether it be magistracy or tyranny? Whether it gives security for religion and liberty, to themselves and their posterity? Or whether it induces upon themselves, and entails upon the posterity, slavery as to both these invaluable interests? Whether they have matter of praise to God for the blessings and mercies of magistracy, or matter of mourning for the plagues and miseries of tyranny, to the end they may know both the sins and snares, duties and dangers, cases and crisis, of the times they live in? All men, that ever enjoyed the mercy of a right constitute magistracy, have experienced, and were bound to bless God for the blessed fruits of it: and, on the other hand, the world is full of the tragical monuments of tyranny, for which men were bound both to search into the causes, and see the effects of such plagues from the Lord, to the end they might mourn over both. And from the beginning it hath been observed, that as people's sins have always procured the scourge of tyranny; so all their miseries might be refounded upon tyrants encroachments, usurping upon or betraying their trust, and overturning religion, laws and liberties. Certainly mankind is concerned in point of interest and conscience, to inquire into the cause and cure of this epidemic distemper, that hath so long held the world in misery, and so habitually, that now it is become, as it were, natural to ly stupidly under it; that is, that old ingrained gangrene of the king's evil, or compliance with tyranny, that hath long afflicted the kingdoms of the world, and affected not only their backs in bearing the burden thereof; but their hearts into a lethargic stupor of insensibleness; and their heads in infatuating and intoxicating them with notions of the sacredness and uncontroulableness of tyranny; and their hands in infeebling and fettering them from all attempts to work a cure: or else it hath had another effect on many that have been sensible of a touch of it; even equivalent to that, which an ingenious author, Mr. Gee, in his preface to the divine right and original of the civil magistrate, (to which Mr. Durham is not absonant) expounds to be the effect of the fourth vial, Rev. xvi. 8, 9. when in these dog days of the world, power is given to the sun of imperial, especially popish, tyranny, by their exorbitant stretches of absolute prerogative, to scorch men with fire of furious oppressions, they then blaspheme the name of God which hath power over these plagues, in their male-content complaints, grumblings, grudgings, and murmurings under the misery, but they do not repent, nor give him glory, in mourning over the causes promeriting such a plague, and their own accession in exposing themselves to such a scorching sun, nakedly without a sconce. Certainly this would be the remedy that conscience would suggest, and interest would incite to, an endeavour either of allaying the heat or of subtracting from it under a shelter, by declining the oblique malignity of its scorching rays. But will the world never be awakened out of this dream and dotage, of dull and stupid subjection to every monster that can mount a throne? Sure at length it may be expected, either conscience from within as God's deputy, challenging for the palpable perversion of this his excellent ordinance, or judgments from without, making sensible of the effects of it, will convince and confute these old inveterate prejudices. And then these martyrs for that universal interest of mankind, who got the fore-start and the first sight of this, will not be so flouted as fools, as now they are. And who knoweth, what prelude or preparative, foreboding and presaging the downfal of tyranny, may be in its aspirings to this height of arbitrary absoluteness, and in the many questions raised about it, and by them imposed upon consciences to be resolved. If we consider the object of this question; as conscience can only clear it, so in nothing can it be more concerned. It is that great ordinance of God, most signally impressed by a very sacred and illustrious character of the glorious majesty of the Most High, who hath appointed magistracy; in which, considering either its fountain, or dignity, ends, or effects, conscience must have a very great concern. The fountain, or efficient cause of magistracy, is high and sublime. The powers that are, be of God, not only by the all-disposing hand of God in his providence, as tyranny is, nor only by way of naked approbation, but by divine in-institution; and that not only in the general, by at least a secondary law of nature, but also the special investiture of it, in institution and constitution, is from God; and therefore they are said to be ordained of God, to which ordinance we must be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake: which is the great duty required in the fifth commandment, the first commandment with promise; that hath the priority of place before all the second table, because the other commandments respect each some one interest, this hath a supereminent influence upon all. But tyrannical powers are not of God in this sense. And it were blasphemy to assert they were of the Lord's authorization, conscience cannot bind to a subjection to this. Again, the dignity of magistracy, ordained for the maintenance of truth and righteousness, the only foundations of people's felicity, whether temporal or eternal, including the bonds and boundaries of all obedience and subjection, for which they are intended, and to which they refer, is supereminent; as that epithet of higher, added to the powers that are of God, may be rendered; making them high and sublime in glory, whose highest prerogative is, That, being God's ministers, they sit in the throne of God, anointed of the Lord; judging not for man, but for the Lord, as the scripture speaks. To this conscience is concerned in duty to render honour as due, by the prescript of the fifth commandment; but for tyranny, conscience is bound to deny it, because not due, no more than obedience, which conscience dare not pay to a throne of iniquity, and a throne of the devil, as tyranny may be called, as really as magistracy is called the throne of God. Next, conscience is much concerned in the ends of magistracy, which are the greatest, the glory of God, and the good of mankind. And, in the effects of it, the maintenance of truth, righteousness, religion, liberty, peace, and safety, and all choicest external blessings; but the ends and effects of tyranny are quite contrary, domineering for pleasure, and destroying for profit. Can we think that conscience is nothing concerned here, that these great ends shall be subverted, and the effects precluded; and to that effect, that tyranny not only be shrouded under a privilege of impunity, but by our subjection and acknowledgement of it, as a lawful power, encouraged into all enormities, and licensed to usurp, not only our liberties, but God's throne by an uncontroulable sovereignty? But if we consider the subjective concern of conscience, it must be very graat, when it is the only thing that prompts to subjection, that regulates subjection, and is a bottom for subjection to lawful powers. If it were not out of conscience, men that are free born are naturally such lovers of liberty, and under corruption such lusters after licentiousness, that they would never come under the order of this ordinance, except constrained for wrath's sake: but now, understanding that they that resist the power, resist the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation, they must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. If conscience were not exercised in regulating our duty to magistrates, we would either obey none, or else would observe all their commands promiscuously, lawful or unlawful, and would make no difference either of the matter commanded, or the power commanding: but now, understanding that we must obey God rather than man, and that we must render to all their dues, fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour, conscience regulates us what and whom to obey. And without conscience there is little hope for government to prove either beneficial or permanent; little likelihood of either a real, regular, or durable subjection to it. The discernible standing of government upon conscientious grounds, is the only thing that can bring in conscience, and a conscientious submission to it; it being the highest and most kindly principle of, and the strongest and most lasting obligation to any relative duty. It will not be liberty of conscience, (as saith the late declaration for it) but reality of conscience, and government founded upon a bottom of conscience, that will unite the governed to the governors, by inclination as well as duty. And if that be, then there is needful a rule of God's revealed preceptive will, (the only cynosure and empress of conscience), touching the founding and erecting of government, that it have the stamp of God's authority. It must needs then follow, that conscience hath a very great concernment in this question in the general, and that before it be forced to an abandoning of its light in a matter of such moment, it will rather oblige people that are conscientious to suffer the worst that tyrants can do; especially when it is imposed and obtruded upon conscience, to give its sufferage and express acknowledgment that the present tyranny is the authority of God, which is so visible in the view of all that have their eyes open, that the meanest capacity that was never conversant in laws and politics can give this verdict that the constitution and administration of the government of the two royal brothers, under whose burden the earth and we have been groaning these twenty-seven years past, hath been a complete and habitual tyranny, and can no more be owned to be magistracy, than robbery can be acknowledged to be a rightful possession. It is so plain, that I need not the help of lawyers and politicians to demonstrate it, nor launch into the ocean of their endless debates in handling the head of magistracy and tyranny: yet I shall improve what help I find in our most approved authors who have enlarged upon this question, (though not as I must state it) to dilucidate the matter in Thesi, and refer to the foregoing deduction of the succession of testimonies against tyranny, to clear it in Hypothesi. Whence we may see the occasion, and clearly gather the solution of the question, which is this:

Whether a people, long oppressed with the encroachments of tyrants and usurpers, may disown their pretended authority; and, when imposed upon, to acknowledge it, may rather choose to suffer than to own it?

To clear this question: I shall premit some concessions, and then come more formally to resolve it.

1. It must be granted the question is extraordinary, and never so stated by any writer on this head; which makes it the more difficult and odious, because odd and singular, in the esteem of those who take up opinions rather from the number of votes than from the weight of the reasons of the asserters of them. It will also be yielded, that this was never a case of confession for Christians to suffer upon. And the reason of both is, because, before these seven years past, this was never imposed upon private and common subjects to give an account of their thoughts and conscience about the lawfulness of the government they lived under. Conquerors and usurpers sometimes have demanded an acknowledgment of their authority, from men of greatest note and stroke in the countries they have seized; but they never since the creation urged it upon common people, as a test of loyalty; but thought always their laws and power to execute them on offenders, did secure their subjection. Or otherwise to what purpose are laws made, and the execution of them committed to men in power, if they be not thought a sufficient fence for the authority that makes them; except it also have the actual acknowledgment of the subjects to ratify it? Men that are really invested with authority, would think it both a disparagement to their authority, and would disdain such a suspicion of the questionableness of it, as to put it as a question to the subjects, whether they owned it or not. But the gentlemen that rules us, have fallen upon a piece of unprecedented policy; wherein they think both to involve the nation in the guilt of their unparalelled rebellion against the Lord, by owning that authority that promotes it; and so secure their usurpations, either by the suffrage of all that own them, or by the extirpation of the conscientious that dare not, with the odium and obloquy of being enemies to authority; by which trick they think to bury the honour of their testimony. Yet in sobriety without prophesying it may be presumed, at the long run, this project will prove very prejudicial to their interest: and herein they may verify that Scots proverb, 'o'er fast o'er loose,' and accomplish these divine sayings, 'He disappointeth the devices of the crafty, he taketh the wise in their own craftiness, and the counsel of the froward is carried headlong.' For as they have put people upon this question, who would not otherwise have made such inquiries into it, and now finding they must be resolved in conscience to answer it, whenever they shall be brought before them; upon a very overly search, they see terrible tyranny written in legible bloody characters almost on all administrations of the government, and so come to be fixed in the verdict that their conscience and the word of God gives of it; so it may be thought, this question now started, for as despicable beginnings it hath, yet ere it come to a full and final decision, will be more enquired into through the world, and at length prove as fatal to tyranny, as ever any thing could be, and then they may know whom to thank. But however, though the question be extraordinary, and the sufferings thereupon be unprecedented, and therefore, among other contradictions that may be objected, that neither in history nor scripture we can find instances of private people's refusing to own the authority they were under, nor of their suffering for that refusal; yet nevertheless it may be duty without example. Many things may be done, though not against the law of God, yet without a precedent of the practice of the people of God. Though we could not adduce an example for it, yet we can gather it from the law of God, that tyranny must not be owned, this will be equivalent to a thousand examples. Every age in some things must be a precedent to the following, and I think never did any age produce a more honourable precedent, than this beginning to decline a yoke under which all ages have groaned.

2. It will be also granted, it is not always indispensibly necessary, at all times, for a people to declare their disclaim of the tyranny they are under, when they cannot shake it off; nor, when they are staged for their duty before wicked and tyrannical judges, is it always necessary to disown their pretended authority positively; when either they are not urged with questions about it, then they may be silent in reference to that; or when they are imposed upon to give their judgment of it, they are not always obligated, as in a case of confession, to declare all their mind, especially when such questions are put to them with a manifest design to entrap their lives, or intangle their conscience. All truth is not to be told at all times; neither are all questions to be answered when impertinently interrogate, but may be both cautiously and conscientiously waved. We have Christ's own practice, and his faithful servant Paul's example, for a pattern of such prudence and Christian caution. But yet it were cruel and unchristian rigour, to censure such as, out of a pious principle of zeal to God and conscience of duty, do freely and positively declare their judgment, in an absolute disowning of their pretended authority, when posed with such questions, though to the manifest detriment of their lives, they conscientiously looking upon it as a case of confession. For where the Lord hath not peremptorily astricted his confessors to such rules of prudence, but hath both promised, and usually gives his Spirit's conduct, encouraging and animating them to boldness, so as before hand they should not take thought how or what they shall speak, and in that same hour they find it given them, it were presumption for us to stint them to our rules of prudence. We may indeed find rules to know, what is a case of confession; but hardly can it be determined, what truth or duty we are questioned about is not, or may not be, a case of confession. And who can deny, but this may be in some circumstance, a case of confession, even positively to disown the pretended authority of a bloody court or council? when either they go out of their sphere, taking upon them Christ's supremacy, and the cognizance of the concerns of his crown, whereof they are judges noways competent; then they must freely and faithfully be declined. Or when, to the dishonour of Christ, they blaspheme his authority, and the sacred boundaries he hath prescribed to all human authority, and will assert an illimited absolute authority, refusing and discharging all offered legal and scriptural restrictions to be put thereupon, (as hath been the case of the most part of these worthy though poor martyrs, who have died upon this head) then they must think themselves bound to disown it. Or when they have done some cruel indignity and despite to the Spirit of God, and to Christ's prerogative and glory, and work of reformation, and people, in murdering them without mercy, and imposing this owning of their king, by whose authority all is acted, as a condemnation of these witnesses of Christ their testimony, and a justification of their bloody cruelties against them, which hath frequently been the case of these poor people that hath been staged upon this account: in this case, and several others of this sort that might be mentioned, then they may be free and positive in disowning this test of wicked loyalty, as the mark of the dragon of the secular beast of tyranny. And in many such cases, when the Lord gives the spirit, I see no reason but that Christ's witnesses must follow his pattern of zeal in the case of confession, which he witnessed before Pontius Pilate in asserting his own kingship, as they may in other cases follow his pattern of prudence. And why may we not imitate the zeal of Stephen who called the council before whom he was staged stiff-necked resisters of the Holy Ghost, persecutors of the prophets, and betrayers and murderers of Christ the just one, as well as the prudence of Paul? But, however it be, the present testimony against this pretended authority lies in the negative, which obliges always, for ever and for ever; that is to say, we plead, that it must never be owned. There is a great difference between a positive disowning and a not owning; though the first be not always necessary, the latter is the testimony of the day, and a negative case of confession, which is always clearer than the positive. Though we must not always confess every truth, yet we must never deny any.

3. It is confessed, we are under this sad disadvantage besides others, that not only all our brethren, groaning under the same yoke with us, will not take the same way of declining this pretended authority, nor adventure, when called, to declare their judgment about it, (which we do not condemn, as is said, and would expect from the rules of equity and charity, they will not condemn us when we find ourselves in conscience bound to use greater freedom) but also some when they do declare their judgment, give it in terms condemnatory of, and contradictory unto our testimony, in that they have freedom positively to own this tyranny as authority, and the tyrant as their lawful sovereign: and many of our ministers also are of the same mind. And further, as we have few expressly asserting our part of the debate, as it is now stated; so we have many famous divines expresly against us in this point, as especially we find in their comments upon, Rom. xiii. among whom I cannot dissemble my sorrow to find the great Calvin, saying, Sæpe solent inquirere, &c. 'Men often enquire, by what right they have obtained their power who have the rule! it should be enough to us that they do govern; for they have not ascended to this eminency by their own power, but are imposed by the hand of the Lord.' As also Pareus saying too much against us. For answer to this, I refer to Mr. Knox's reply to Lethington, producing several testimonies of divines against him upon this very head; wherein he shews, that the occasions of their discourses and circumstances wherein they were stated, were very far different from those that have to do with tyrants and usurpers, as indeed they are the most concerned, and smart most under their scourge, are in best case to speak to the purpose. I shall only say, mens averment, in a case of conscience, is not an oracle, when we look upon it with an impartial eye, in the case wherein we are not prepossessed: it will bear no other value, than what is allayed with the imperfections of fallibility, and moreover is contradicted by some others, whose testimony will help us as much to confirm our persuasion, as others will hurt us to infirm it.

4. But now when tyrants go for magistrates, lest my plea against owning tyranny, should be mistaken, as if it were a pleading for anarchy, I must assert, that I and all those I am vindicating, are for magistracy, as being of divine original, institute for the common good of human and Christian societies, whereunto every soul must be subject, of whatsoever quality or character, and not only for wrath but also for conscience sake (though as to our soul and conscience, we are not subject) which whosoever resisteth, resisteth the ordinance of God, and against which rebellion is a damnable sin, whereunto (according to the fifth commandment, and the many reiterated exhortations of the apostles) we must be subject, and obey magistrates, and submit ourselves to every ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake, whether it be unto the king as supreme, &c. And we account it a hateful brand of them that walk after the flesh, to despise government, to be presumptuous, self-willed, and not afraid to speak evil of dignities: and that they are filthy dreamers, who despise dominion, and speak evil of dignities: and of those things which they know not. We allow the magistrate, in whatsoever form of government, all the power the scripture, laws of nature and nations, or municipal do allow him; asserting, that he is the keeper and avenger of both the tables of the law, having a power over the church, as well as the state, suited to his capacity, that is, not formally ecclesiastical, but objectively, for the church's good; an external power, of providing for the church, and protecting her from outward violence, or inward disorder, an imperate power, of commanding all to do their respective duties; a civil power of punishing all, even church-officers, for crimes; a secondary power of judicial approbation or condemnation; or discretive, in order to give his sanction to synodical results; a cumulative power, assisting and strengthening the church in all her privileges, subservient, though not servile, co-ordinate with church-power, not subordinate (though as a christian he is subject) in his own affairs, viz. civil; not to be declined as judge, but to be obeyed in all things lawful, and honoured and strengthened with all his dues. We would give unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's; but to tyrants, that usurp and pervert both the things of God and of Cæsar, and of the peoples liberties, we can render none of them, neither God's, nor Cæsar's, nor our own: nor can we from conscience give him any other deference, but as an enemy to all, even to God, to Cæsar, and the people. And in this, though it doth not sound now with court-parasites, nor with others, that are infected with royal indulgencies and indemnities, we bring forth but the transumpt of old principles, according to which our fathers walked when they still contended for religion and liberty, against the attemptings and aggressions of tyranny, against both.

5. It must be conceded, it is not an easy thing to make a man in the place of magistracy a tyrant: for as every escape, error, or act of unfaithfulness, even known and continued in, whether in a minister's entry to the ministry, or in his doctrine, doth not unminister him, nor give sufficient ground to withdraw from him, or reject him as a minister of Christ: so neither does every enormity, misdemeanor, or act of tyranny, injustice, perfidy, or profanity in the civil magistrate, whether as to his way of entry to that office, or in the execution of it, or in his private or personal behaviour, denominate him a tyrant or an usurper, or give sufficient ground to divest him of magistratical power, and reject him as the lawful magistrate. It is not any one or two acts contrary to the royal covenant or office, that doth denude a man of the royal dignity, that God and the people gave him. David committed two acts of tyranny, murder and adultery; yet the people were to acknowledge him as their king (and so it may be said of some others, owned still as kings in scripture) the reason is, because though he sinned against a man or some particular persons, yet he did not sin against the state, and the catholic good of the kingdom, subverting law; for then he would have turned tyrant, and ceased to have been lawful king. There is a great difference between a tyrant in act, and a tyrant in habit; the first does not cease to be a king. But on the other hand, as every thing will not make a magistrate to be a tyrant; so nothing will make a tyrant by habit a magistrate. And as every fault will not unminister a minister; so some will oblige the people to reject his ministry, as if he turn heretical, and preach atheism, Mahometanism, or the like, the people, though they could not formally depose him, or through the corruption of the times could not get him deposed; yet they might reject and disown his ministry: so it will be granted, that a people have more power in creating a magistrate, than in making a minister; and consequently they have more right, and may have more light in disowning a king, as being unkinged; than in disowning a minister, as being unministred. It will be necessary therefore, for clearing our way, to fix upon some ordinary characters of a tyrant, which may discrimate him from a magistrate, and be ground of disowning him as such. I shall rehearse some, from very much approved authors; the application of which will be as apposite to the two brothers, that we have been burdened with, as if they had intended a particular and exact description of them. Buchanan de jure regni apud Scotos, shews, 'That the word tyrant was at first honourable, being attributed to them that had the full power in their hands, which power was not astricted by any bonds of laws, nor obnoxious to the cognition of judges; and that it was the usual denomination of heroes, and thought at first so honourable, that it was attributed to the gods: but as Nero and Judas were sometimes among the Romans and Jews names of greatest account, but afterwards by the faults of two men of these names, it came to pass, that the most flagitious would not have these names given to their children, so in process of time, rulers made this name so infamous by their wicked deeds, that all men abhorred it, as contagious and pestilentious, and thought it a more light reproach to be called hangman than a tyrant.' Thereafter he condescends upon several characters of a tyrant. 1. 'He that doth not receive a government by the will of the people, but by force invadeth it, or intercepteth it by fraud, is a tyrant; and who domineers even over the unwilling (for a king rules by consent, but a tyrant by constraint) and procures the supreme rule without the peoples consent, even tho' for several years they may so govern, that the people shall not think it irksome.' Which very well agrees with the present gentleman that rules over us, who, after he was by public vote in parliament secluded from the government, of which the standing laws of both kingdoms made him incapable for his murders, adulteries and idolatries, by force and fraud did intercept first an act for his succession in Scotland, and then the actual succession in England, by blood and treachery, usurping and intruding himself into the government, without any compact with, or consent of the people; though now he studies to make himself another Syracusan Hiero, or the Florentine Cosmo de medices, in a mild moderation of his usurped power; but the west of England, and the west of Scotland both, have felt the force of it. 2. He does not govern for the subjects welfare, or public utility, but for himself, having no regard to that, but to his own lust, 'acting in this like robbers, who cunningly disposing of what wickedly they have acquired, do seek the praise of justice by injury, and of liberality by robbery; so he can make some shew of a civil mind; but so much the less assurance gives he of it, that it is manifest, he intends not hereby the subjects good, but the greater security of his own lusts, and stability of empire over posterity, having somewhat mitigated the peoples hatred, which when he had done, he will turn back again to his old manners; for the fruit which is to follow, may easily be known, both by the seed and by the sower thereof.' An exact copy of this we have seen within these two years, oft before in the rule of the other brother.