4. The monarchy of France is very absolute; yet there also the state hath taken order with their tyrants; not only have we many instances of resistances made against them, but also of disowning, disabling, and invalidating their pretended authority, and repressing their tyranny. So was the two Childerici served: so also Sigebertus, Dagabertus, and Lodowick the II. kings of France.
5. The great body of Germany moves very slowly, and is inured to bear great burdens: yet there also we find Joanna of Austria, mother of Charles V. was put to perpetual imprisonment: which example is adduced by the earl of Morton, in his discourse to the queen of England (whereof I rehearsed a part before) vindicating the deposing and disowning queen Mary of Scotland. 'If, saith he, we compare her with Joanna of Austria—what did that poor wretch commit, but that she could not want a little lustful pleasure as a remedy necessary for her age? and yet, poor creature, she suffered that punishment, of which our dame, convicted of most grievous crimes, now complains.'—Buchanan's History of Scotland, book xx. p. 748. The duke of Saxon, the landgrave of Hesse, and the magistrates of Magdeburgh, joined in a war against her son Charles V. and drew up a conclusion by resolution of lawyers, wherein are these words——'Neither are we bound to him by any other reason, than if he keep the conditions on which he was created emperor. By the laws themselves it is provided, That the superior magistrate shall not infringe the right of the inferior, and if the superior magistrate exceed the limits of his power, and command that which is wicked, not only we need not obey him, but if he offer force we may resist him.' Which opinion is confirmed by some of the greatest lawyers, and even some who are patrons of tyranny, Grotius none of the greatest enemies of tyrants, de jure belli. lib. 1. chap. 4. p. 11. saith out of Barclaius, and with him, That the king doth lose his power when he seeketh the destruction of his subjects. It was upon the account of the tyranny of that bloody house of Austria over the Helvetians, that they shook off the rule and government of that family, and established themselves into a republic. And at this present time, upon the same accounts, the tyranny and treachery of this imperial majesty, the Hungarians have essayed to maintain and justify a revolt in disowning the emperor, now for several years.
6. Poland is an elective kingdom, and so cannot but be fertile of many instances of casting off tyrants. Henricus Valesius, disowned for fleeing, and Sigismundus for violating his faith to the states, may suffice. Lex Rex, q. 24. p. 217.
7. In Denmark, we find Christiernus their king, was, for his intolerable cruelty, put from the kingdom, he and all his posterity, and after twenty years did end his life in prison.
8. In Swedland, within the compass of one century, the people deposed and banished the two Christierns, and dethroned and imprisoned Ericus, for their oppressions and tyranny, and for pursuing the destruction of their subjects.
9. The Portuguese, not many years ago, laid aside and confined Alphonsus their king, for his rapines and murders.
10. Some dukes of Venice have been so disowned by these commonwealths men, that laying aside their royal honours as private men, they have spent their days in monasteries. Buchan. de jure regni apud Scotos.
11. If we will resolve the old Roman histories, we shall find no small store of such examples, both in the time of their kings, consuls, and emperors. Their seventh king Tarquinius Superbus was removed by the people, for his evident usurpation: saith Livius, 'That is, for he had nothing for a right to the government, but mere force, and got the rule neither by the people's consent and choice, nor by the authority of the senators.' So afterwards the empire was taken from Vitellius, Heliogabulus, Maximinus, Didius, Julianus, Lex Rex, ubi supra.
12. But it will be said, Can there be any instances of the primitive christians adduced? Did ever they, while groaning under the most insupportable tyranny of their persecuting emperors, disown their authority, or suffer for not owning it? To this I answer, 1. What they did, or did not of this kind, is not of moment to enquire.: seeing their practice and example, under such disadvantages, can neither be known exactly, nor what is known of it be accommodated to our case: for (1.) They were never forced to give their judgment, neither was the question ever put to them, whether they owned their authority or not? If they transgressed the laws, they were liable to the punishment, they craved no more of them. (2.) They confess themselves to be strangers, that had no establishments by law; and therefore they behoved to be passively subject, when in no capacity to resist; there was no more required of them. Yet Lex Rex Quest. 35. page 371. cites Theodoret affirming, 'Then evil men reigned through the unmanliness of the subjects.' (3.) Their examples are not imitable in all things; they were against resistance, which we doubt not to prove is lawful against tyrannical violence: many of them refused to flee from the fury of persecutors: they ran to martyrdom, when neither cited nor accused; and to obtain the crown thereof they willingly yielded up their lives and liberties also to the rage of tyrants. We cannot be obliged to all these. 2. Yet we find some examples not altogether unapplicable to this purpose. When Barochbach, the pretended king of the Jews, after the destruction of Jerusalem, set himself as king in Bitter, a city in Arabia; the Christians that were in his precincts, refused to own him as king; which was one great cause of his persecuting them. It is true he persecuted them also for other things, as for their not denying Christ; so are we persecuted for many other things, than for our simple disowning of the king: yet this is reckoned as a distinct cause of their suffering, by Mr. Mede, on the Revel. Part. 1. Page 43. Gees Magist. Origin. Chap. 10. Sect. 7. Page 361. The same last cited author shews, that when Albinus, Niger, and Cassius, successively usurped the empire, having none of them any legal investiture, the Christians declined the recognition of their claim, and would not own them; and that upon this Tertullian says, That is, the Christians could never be found to be Albinians, or Nigrians, or Cassians, meaning they were never owners of these men for magistrates. And so may we say, We may be ashamed to be found amongst the Charlites and Jacobites of these times. Not unlike is the passage of Ambrose, who, in favours of Valentinian the rightful governor, contested against Maximus the tyrant, and not only disowned him, but excommunicated him, for which he was threatened with death. And yet it is observable, that when Maximus offered to interpose his power in defence of Ambrose, that he might not be banished by Justina the empress, he would not accept of the help of Maximus, whose power he disallowed and disowned. Whence I observe, that it is not without a precedent for a minister to disown a tyrant, to refuse favour from him: yea, and to excommunicate him, yea, even without the concurrence of his fainting brethren; for all which some of our faithful ministers have been much condemned in our day, especially Mr. Donald Cargil for excommunicating Charles the II, and James, Duke of York, as if such a thing had never been done before: whereas, we see what Ambrose did to Maximus. And this same faithful minister, Ambrosius minister at Milan, in Italy, did also hold out of the assembly of the Christians Theodosius the emperor, though a most virtuous prince, for that grievous scandal committed by him, against the innocent people at Thessalonica in killing so many of them in a passionate transport. But, 3. since this objection of primitive Christians is much insisted on, both against this and the head of defensive arms: I shall further take notice of several distinctions, that do make the difference between their case and ours very vast. (1.) There is a great difference betwixt a prince of the common religion of his subjects, but distinct from some of them, whom yet he does not seek to entice to his religion, but gives them liberty, and the benefit of the law as other subjects: which was the case of many in these primitive times sometimes. And a prince, by all means, both foul and fair, pressing to a revolt from the true, and to embrace a false religion. In this case (which is ours with a witness) it must be granted we should be wary, that we neither engage with him, nor own allegiance to him, when he would withdraw us from our allegiance to God. (2.) There is a great difference betwixt a prince persecuting the true religion, which only a few of his subjects here and there did profess, who in regard of their paucity were never in capacity to be looked upon as the body of the people, impowering him as their public servant; (which was their case) and a prince persecuting that religion, which was professed by the body of the nation, when they set him up. In this latter case, men of great sense have denied he should be owned for a prince, because then he is stated against the common good. This was our case under the former king, and yet under this, though all professors be not now persecuted, the public religion and ancient reformation is persecuted in a few, whom he intends to destroy, and in their destruction to bury it. (3.) There is a difference betwixt a prince persecuting religion, publicly owned and received of his subjects, yet never approved nor confirmed by law (as it was not in the primitive times) and a prince persecuting religion ratified and established by the laws of the land, which is our case. It will seem clear to every soul, not benighted with court darkness, that he then of course, and by law, falleth from his right in this case, because now he is not only stated against the common good, but against the very laws by which the subjects must be ruled. Then he ruleth not as a prince, to whom the law giveth his measures and bounds, but rageth as a tiger and tyrant, and ought to be carried towards as such. (4.) There is a difference betwixt a prince suppressing that religion established by law, which he never professed, nor never gave his consent to these laws (as might be the case of some of the Arian emperors) though it be unlawful for any people to set up any mortal over them, who is not in this case bound to the good behaviour; and a prince, opposing and oppressing that religion, which himself hath professed, and is ratified by laws with his own consent: which was our case under the former king, who did give the most solemn ratification of them that ever was given, but afterwards most perfidiously retracted it.
As also this apostate papist, did sometime profess himself protestant, and consented to the laws establishing it, and the penal statutes against papists, though now he is going about to raze all, and ruin that alone valuable treasure of our nation, religion. (5.) There is a difference betwixt a prince consenting to laws establishing religion which he now persecuteth (which might have been the case of Julian the apostate) and a prince, who not only consented to these laws, but who did upon these very terms, and no other, get and receive his crown and sceptre, that he should preserve the religion as reformed, and protect as a father the professors thereof, and maintain the laws establishing it, which yet he, perfidiously, being once settled in the government, breaks, casts, cassates and overturns (which was done by Charles) or, and a prince who will be bounded by the laws consented to, nor be bound to the observation of any laws whatsoever; but challenges it as his prerogative royal, to be absolute above all laws, and denying all security upon terms, is free to destroy religion and liberty, and all the valuable interests of the nation, when he pleases. This is James's character. (6.) There is a difference betwixt a prince breaking the main and only article of his covenant, in a fit of fury and rage being transported upon some mistakes (which was the case of Theodosius the emperor) and a prince not only violating this upon deliberation, but plainly declaring, that neither oath nor declaration can or will bind him; but these being made void, he will destroy without restraint all these covenanted privileges (this was the case of Charles) or, and a prince who, as he never will come under the bond of a covenant with his people: so tho' he makes never so many fair promises with the greatest solemnities, maintains a principle, that he will keep no promises, but when, and with whom he pleases, and can get a dispensation to break all when he likes. (This is James's ingenuity.) Sure in this case, such as are characterized, declare themselves so far from being princes, that they profess before the world, they are no more men to be conversed with: for if neither their words, writs, vows, promises, oaths, declarations, nor protections can bind them, what society can be had with them? Are they not to be looked upon, and carried towards as common enemies of morality, religion, righteousness, liberty, humanity, yea even of mankind itself? Now then, let the world be judge, if the people of Scotland can be judged in conscience, reason, prudence, policy, or any imaginable way, bound to own their authority, being so stated, and by the act rescissory all human ground rescinded, that ever it shall be otherwise; let them go seek other slaves where they can find them, for we will not sell ourselves and posterity to tyrants as slaves, nor give up our religion and the exercise of it to the mouldings of the court.