They were not the magistrate's depending deputies, but in the act of judging, they were independent, and their consciences as immediately subjected to God as the superior magistrate, who was to add his approbative suffrage to their actings, but not his directive nor imperative suffrage of absolute pleasure, but only according to the law; he might command them to do their duty, but he could do nothing without them. (2.) They had power, not derived from the prince at all, even a power of life and death. The rebellious son was to be brought to the elders of the city, who had power to stone him, Deut. xxi. 18, 24. They had power to punish adultery with death, Deut. xxii. 21. They had power to cognosce whom to admit into, and whom to seclude from the cities of refuge: so that if the king had commanded to take the life of an innocent man, they were not to deliver him, Josh. xx. throughout. But besides the elders of cities, there were the elders and heads of the people, who had judicial power to cognosce on all criminal matters, even when Joshua was judge in Israel we find they assumed this power, to judge of that matter of the two tribes and the half, Josh. xxii. 30. And they had power to make kings, as Saul and David, as was shewed: and it must needs follow, they had power to unmake them in case of tyranny. (3.) They had power to conveen, even without the indiction of the ruler, as in that, Josh. xxii. They conveen without him; and without advice or knowledge of Samuel, the ruler, they conveen to ask a king, 1 Sam. viii. And without any head or superior, they conveen and make David king, notwithstanding of Ishbosheth's hereditary right. Without and against tyrannous Athaliah's consent, they conveen and make Joash king, and cared not for her Treason, treason, 2 Kings xi. But now the king alone challenges the prerogative power of calling and dissolving parliaments as he pleases, and condemns all meetings of estates without his warrant, which is purely tyrannical; for, in cases of necessity, by the very law of nature, they may and must conveen. The power is given to the king only by a positive law, for order's sake; but otherwise, they have an intrinsical power to assemble themselves. All the forecited commands, admonitions, and certifications, to execute judgment, must necessarily involve and imply a power to conveen, without which they could not be in a capacity for it: not only unjust judgment, but no judgment, in a time when truth is fallen in the streets, and equity cannot enter, is charged as the sin of the state; therefore they must conveen to prevent this sin, and the wrath of God for it: God hath committed the keeping of the commonwealth, not to the king's only, but also to the people's representatives and heads. And if the king have power to break up all conventions of this nature, then he hath power to hinder judgement to proceed, which the Lord commands: and this would be an excuse, when God threatens vengeance for it. We would not execute judgment, because the king forbade us. Yet many of these forementioned reproofs, threatnings, and certifications were given, in the time of tyrannous and idolatrous kings, who, no doubt, would inhibit and discharge the doing of their duty; yet we see that was no excuse, but the Lord denounces wrath for the omission. (4.) They had power to execute judgment against the will of the prince. Samuel killed Agag against Saul's will, but according to the command of God, 1 Sam. xv. 32. Against Ahab's will and mind Elijah caused kill the priests of Baal, according to God's express law, 1 Kings xviii. 40. It is true it was extraordinary, but no otherwise than it is this day; when there is no magistrate that will execute the judgment of the Lord, then they who have power to make the magistrate, may and ought to execute it, when wicked men make the law of God of none effect. So the princes of Judah had power, against the king's will, to put Jeremiah to death, which the king supposes, when he directs him what to say to them, Jer. xxxviii. 25. They had really such a power, though in Jeremiah's case it would have been wickedly perverted. See Lex Rex, q. 19, 20. (5.) They had a power to execute judgment upon the king himself, as in the case of Amaziah and Uzziah, as shall be cleared afterwards. I conclude with repeating the argument: if the king be accountable, whensover this account shall be taken, we are confident our disowning him for the present will be justified, and all will be obliged to imitate it: if he be not, then we cannot own his authority, that so presumptuously exalts himself above the people.
10. If we will further consider the nature of magistracy, it will appear what authority can conscientiously be owned, to wit, that which is power, not authorised power, not might or force; moral power, not merely natural. There is a great difference betwixt these two: natural power is common to brutes, moral power is peculiar to men; natural power is more in the subjects, because they have more strength and force; moral power is in the magistrate, they can never meet adequately in the same subject; natural power can, moral only may warrantably exercise rule; natural power is opposed to impotency and weakness, moral to illicitness or unlawfulness; natural power consists in strength, moral in righteousness; natural power may be in a rout of rogues making an uproar, moral only in the rulers; they cannot be distinguished by their acts, but by the principle from which the acts proceed; in the one from mere force, in the other from authority. The principle of natural power is its own might and will, and the end only self; moral hath its rise from positive constitution, and its end is public safety. The strength of natural power lies in the sword, whereby its might gives law; the strength of moral power is in its word, whereby reason gives law, unto which the sword is added for punishment of contraveeners: natural power takes the sword, Matth. xxvi. 52. Moral bears the sword, Rom. xiii. 4. In natural power the sword is the cause; in moral it is only the consequent of authority; in natural power the sword legitimates the sceptre; in moral the sceptre legitimates the sword: the sword of the natural is only backed with metal, the sword of the moral power is backed with God's warrant: natural power involves men in passive subjection, as a traveller is made to yield to a robber; moral power reduces to conscientious subordination. Hence the power that is only natural, not moral authority, not power, cannot be owned; but the power of a tyrant's and usurper's is only natural, not moral, authority, not power: Ergo it cannot be owned. The major cannot be denied; for it is only the moral power that is ordained of God, unto which we must be subject for conscience sake. The minor also; for the power of tyrants is not moral, because not authorized, nor warranted, or ordained of God by his preceptive ordinance, and therefore no lawful magistratical power. For the clearer understanding of this, let it be observed, there are four things required to the making of a moral or lawful power; the matter of it must be lawful, the person lawful, the title lawful, and the use lawful. 1. The matter of it, about which it is exerted, or the work to be done by it, must be lawful and warranted by God: and if it be unlawful it destroys its moral being. As the pope's power, in dispensing with divine laws, is null and no moral power; and so also the king's power, in dispensing with both divine and human laws is null. Hence that power, which is, in regard of matter unlawful, and never warranted by God, cannot be owned; but absolute power, which is the power of tyrants and usurpers, (and particularly of this of ours) is in regard of matter unlawful, and never warranted by God: Ergo—2. The person holding the power must be such as not only is capable of, but competent to the tenure of it, and to whom the holding of it is allowed; and if it be prohibited, it evacuates the morality of the power. Korah and his company arrogated to themselves the office of the priesthood, this power was prohibited to them, their power then was a nullity. As therefore a person that should not be a minister, when he usurps that office is no minister; so a person that should not be a magistrate, when he usurps that office, is no magistrate. Hence, a person that is incapable and incompetent for government cannot be owned for a governor; but the duke of York is such a person, not only not qualified as the word of God requires a magistrate to be, but by the laws of the land declared incapable of rule, because he is a papist, a murderer, an adulterer, &c. 5. There must be a moral power, a lawful title and investiture, as is shewed above; which, if it be wanting, the power is null, and the person but a scenical king, like John of Leyden. This is essentially necessary to the being of a magistrate; which only properly distinguishes him from a private man; for when a person becomes a magistrate, what is the change that is wrought in him? what new habit or endowment is produced in him? he hath no more natural power than he had before, only now he hath the moral power, right and authority to rule, legally impowering him to govern. Let it be considered, what makes a subordinate magistrate, whom we own as such; it must be only his commission from a superior power, otherwise we reject him; if one come to us of his own head, taking upon him the stile and office of a bailiff, sheriff or judge, and command our persons, demand our purses, or exact our oaths; we think we may deny him, not taking ourselves to owe him any subjection, not owning any bond of conscience to him; why? because he hath no lawful commission. Now, if we require this qualification in the subordinate, why not in the supreme? Hence, that magistrate, that cannot produce his legal investiture, cannot be owned; but the duke of York cannot produce his legal investiture, his admission to the crown upon oath and compact, and with the consent of the subjects, according to the laws of the land, as is shewed above: therefore——4. There must also be the lawful use of the power; which must be not only legal for its composure, but right for its practice; its course and process in government must be just, governing according to law, otherwise it is mere tyranny: for what is government, but the subjecting of the community to the rule of governors, for peace and order's sake, and the security of all their precious interests? and for what end was it ordained, and continued among men, but that the stronger may not domineer over the weaker? and what is anarchy, but the playing the rex of the natural power over the moral? Hence, that power which is contrary to law, evil and tyrannical, can tie none to subjection; but the power of the king, abused to the destruction of laws, religion and liberties, giving his power and strength unto the beast, and making war with the Lamb, Rev. xvii. 13, 14. is a power contrary to law, evil and tyrannical: therefore it can tie none to subjection: wickedness by no imaginable reason can oblige any man. It is objected by some, from Rom. xiii. 1. There is no power but of God; the usurping power is a power: therefore it is of God, and consequently we owe subjection to it. Ans. 1. The original reading is not universal, but this: for there is no power if not from God: which confirms what I plead for, that we are not to own any authority, if it be not authorized by God.
The words are only relative to higher powers, in a restricted sense and at most are but indefinite, to be determined according to the matter; not all power simply, but all lawful power. 2. It is a fallacy from what is said according to a certain thing, there is no power but of God, that is no moral power, as universal negatives use to be understood, Heb. v. 4. No man taketh his honour unto himself, but he that is called of God; which is clear, must not be understood for the negation of the fact, as if no man at all doth or ever did take unto himself that honour, for Korah did it, &c. but, no man taketh it warrantably, with a moral right and God's allowance without God's call: so also the universal imperative, in that same text, must not be taken absolutely without restriction; for if every soul without exception were to be subject, there could be none left to be the higher powers; but it is understood with restriction to the relation of a subject. So here, no power but of God, to be understood with restriction to the relation of a lawful magistrate. It is also to be understood indiscriminately, in reference to the divers species, sorts and degrees of lawful power, supreme and subordinate, whether to the king as supreme, or to governors, &c. as Peter expresses it: or whether they be Christian or pagan; it cannot be meant of all universally, that may pretend to power, and may attain to prevailing potency; for then by this text, we must subject ourselves to the papacy now intended to be introduced; and indeed if we subject ourselves to this papist, the next thing he will require will be that. 3. To the minor proposition, I answer, the usurping power is a power; it is power, I grant, that it is power, or authority, I deny.
Therefore it is of God by his providence, I concede; by his ordinance, I deny. Consequently we owe subjection to it, I deny. We may be subject passively, I grant. Actively, out of conscience, I deny. But some will object, 2. Though the power be usurped, and so not morally lawful in all these respects; yet it may do good, its laws and administrations may be good. Answ. I grant all is good that ends well, and hath a good beginning. This cannot be good which hath a bad principle, good from the entire cause. Some government for constitution good, may, in some acts, be bad; but a government for constitution bad cannot, for the acts it puts forth, be good. These good acts may be good for matters but formally they are not good, as done by the usurper: they may be comparatively good, that is better so than worse; but they cannot be absolutely, and in a moral sense good: for to make a politic action good, not only the matter must be warrantable, but the call also. It may indeed induce subjects to bear and improve to the best, what cannot be remedied; but cannot oblige to own a magistratical relation.
II. The nature of the power thus discovered, let us see the nature of that relative duty, which we owe and must own as due to magistrates, and what sort of owning we must give them; which, to inquire a little into, will give light to the question. All the duty and deference the Lord requires of us, towards them whom we must own as magistrates, is comprehended in these two expressions, honour required in the fifth command, and subjection required in Rom. xiii. 1. &c. 1 Pet. ii. 13. &c. Whomsoever then we own as magistrates, we must own honour and subjection as due to them: and if so be, we cannot, upon a conscientious ground, give them honour and subjection, we cannot own them as magistrates. The least deference we can pay to magistrates is subjection, as it is required in these words; Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, and, submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake. But this cannot be given to tyrants and usurpers; therefore no deference can be paid to them at all: and consequently they cannot be owned. That this subjection, which is required to the higher powers, cannot be owned to tyrants, will be apparent, if we consider, 1. The subjection required is orderly subjection to an orderly power, that we be regularly under him that is regularly above; but usurpation and tyranny is not an orderly power, orderly placed above us; therefore we cannot be orderly under it. This is gathered from the original language, where the powers to be subjected to, are ordained of God and the ordinance of God, and he that resisteth the power is counter-ordered, or contrary to his orderly duty; so the duty is to be subject. They are all words coming from one root, which signifies to order; so that subjection is to be placed in order under another relative to an orderly superiority; but, to occupy the seat of dignity unauthorized, is an ataxy, a breaking of order, and bringing the commonwealth quite out of order. Whereby it may appear, that, in relation to an arbitrary government, there can be properly no orderly subjection. 2. The thing itself must import that relative duty which the fifth command requires; not only a passive stooping endurance, or a feigned counterfeit submission, but a real active duty including obedience to lawful commands; and not only so, but support and maintenance; and that both to the acts of his administration, and to his standing and keeping his station, assisting him with all our abilities, both human and Christian; and not only as to the external acts of duties, but the inward motions of the heart, as consent, love, reverence, and honour, and all sincere fealty and allegiance.
But can a subjection of this extent be paid to a tyrant or usurper? Can we support those we are bound to suppress? Shall we love the ungodly, and help those that hate the Lord? Can we consent, that we and our posterity should be slaves? Can we honour them who are vile, and the vilest of men; how high soever they be exalted? 3. The ground of this subjection is for conscience sake, not for wrath, that is, so far and so long as one is constrained by fear, and, to avoid a greater evil, to stoop to him, but out of conscience of duty, both that of piety to God who ordained magistracy, and that of equity to him who is his minister for good, and under pain of damnation if we break this orderly subjection, Rom. xiii. 2, 5. But can it be imagined, that all this is due to a tyrant and usurper? Can it be out of conscience, because he is the Lord's minister for good? The contrary is clear, that he is the devil's drudge serving his interest: Is resistance to tyrants a damnable sin? I hope to prove it to be a duty. 4. If subjection to tyrants and usurpers will inveigle us in their snares, and involve us in their sin and judgment, then it is not to be owned to them; but the former is true; therefore the latter. In the foregoing head I drew an argument, for withdrawing from and disowning the prelatic ministers, from the hazard of partaking in their sin, and of being obnoxious to their judgment, because people are often punished for their pastor's sins; Aaron and his sons polluting themselves, would have brought wrath upon all the people, Lev. x. 6. because the teachers had transgressed against the Lord, therefore was Jacob given to the curse, and Israel to reproaches, Isa. xliii. 27, 28. and all these miseries lamented by the church, were inflicted for the sins of her prophets, and the iniquities of her priests, Lam. iv. 13. the reason was, because they owned then, followed them, countenanced them, complied with them, or connived at them, or did not hinder, or else disown them. The same argument will evince the necessity of withdrawing our subjection from, and disowning, usurping, and tyrannical rulers, when we cannot hinder their wickedness, nor give any other testimony against them, to avert the wrath of the Lord. If the defections of ministers will bring on the whole nation desolacing judgments; then much more have we reason to fear it, when both magistrates and ministers are involved in, and jointly carrying on, and caressing and encouraging each other in promoting a woful apostasy from God: when the heads of the house of Jacob and princes of the house of Israel, abhor judgment, and pervert all equity. The heads judge for reward, and the priests teach for hire, and the prophets divine for money, and yet lean upon the Lord, and say, is not the Lord among us: none evil can come upon us. Then we can expect nothing, but that Zion for their sake shall be plowed as a field, and Jerusalem become heaps, and the mountain of the house as the high places of the forest, Mic. iii. 9, 11, 12. Certain it is, that subjects have smarted sore for the sins of their rulers: for Saul's sin, in breaking covenant with the Gibeonites, the land suffered three years famine, 2 Sam. xxi. 1. and the wrath of the Lord could not be appeased, till seven of his sons were hanged up unto the Lord. What then shall appease the wrath of God, for the unparalleled breach of covenant with God in our days? For David's sin of numbering the people, 70,000 men died by the pestilence, 2 Sam. xxiv. 5. For Jeroboam's sin of idolatry, who made Israel to sin, the Lord threatens to give Israel up, because of the sins of Jeroboam, I Kings xiv. 16. only they escaped this judgment, who withdrew themselves and fell into Judah. For Ahab's sin of letting go a man whom the Lord had appointed to utter destruction, the Lord threatens him, thy life shall go for his life, and thy people for his people, 1 Kings xx. 42. Because Manasseh, king of Judah, did many abominations, therefore the Lord threatened to bring such evil upon Jerusalem and Judah, that whosoever heard it, his ears should tingle, &c. 2 Kings xxi. 11, 12. and notwithstanding of his repentance and the reformation in the days of Josiah, notwithstanding the Lord turned not from the fierceness of his great wrath, wherewith his anger was kindled against Judah, because of all the provocations that Manasseh had provoked him withal, 2 Kings xxiii. 26. which was accomplished by the hands of the Chaldeans, in Jehoiakim's time. Surely, at the commandment of the Lord, came this upon Judah, to remove them out of his sight, for the sins of Manasseh according to all that he did, and also for the innocent blood which he shed,——which the Lord would not pardon, 2 Kings xxiv. 3, 4. And Jeremiah further threatens, that they should be removed into all kingdoms of the earth, because of Manasseh for that which he did in Jerusalem, Jer. xv. 4. Certainly passages were recorded for our learning, Rom. xv. 4. and for our examples, to the intent we should not do as they did, 1 Cor. x. 6. and for our admonition, ver. 11. Whence we may be admonished, that it is not enough to keep ourselves free of public sins of rulers; many of those then punished, were free of all actual accession to them; but they became accessory to, and involved in the guilt of them, when they did not endeavour to hinder them, and bring them to condign punishment for them, according to the law of God, which respecteth not persons; or, at least, because they did not revolt from them, as Libnah did: there might be other provocations on the peoples part, no doubt, which the Lord did also punish by these judgments; but when the Lord specifies the sin of rulers as the particular procuring cause of the judgment; it were presumption to make it the occasion only of the Lord's punishing them: for plain it is, if these sins of rulers had not been committed, which was the ground of the threatening and execution, the judgment would have been prevented; and if the people had bestirred themselves as became them, in repressing and restraining such wickedness, they had not so smarted; and when that sin, so threatened and punished, was removed, then the judgment itself was removed or deterred. It is just and necessary, that the subjects, being jointly included with their rulers in the same bond of fidelity to God, be liable to be punished for their rebellion and apostacy, when they continue under the bond of subjection to them. But how deplorable were our condition, if we should stand obnoxious to divine judgments, for the atheism, idolatry, murders, and adulteries of our rulers, and yet be neither authorized nor capacitated to hinder it, nor permitted to withdraw ourselves from subjection to them? But it is not so; for, the Lord's making us responsible for their debt, is an impowering us either to repress their wickedness when he gives us capacity, or at least to save ourselves harmless from their crimes, by disowning them; that being the only way of standing no longer accountable for their souls.
12. It remains to consider the ends for which government was institute by God, and constitute by men; from whence I argue, that government, that destroys the ends of government, is not to be owned; but tyranny, and especially this under which we howl, destroys all the ends of government; therefore it is not to be owned. The minor I prove thus, That government, that destroys all religion and safety, destroys all the ends of government; but this popish and arbitrary absolute power, destroys religion and safety; therefore—it is evident, both from the laws of nature and revelation, that the ends of government are the glory of God, and the good of mankind. The first is the glory of God, the ultimate end of all ordinances; to which whatever is opposite, is not to be owned by them that fear him: whatever power then is destructive to religion, and is applied and employed against the glory of the universal King, and for withdrawing us from our fealty and obedience to him, is nothing but rebellion against the supreme Lord and Lawgiver, and a traiterous conspiracy against the Almighty, and therefore not to be owned: and they are enemies to religion, or strangers to it, who are not sensible this hath been the design of the present government, at least these twenty-seven years, to overturn the reformed covenanted religion, and to introduce popery. Hence, seeing a king at his best and highest elevation, is only a mean for preserving religion, and for this end only chosen of the people to be keeper of both tables of the law, he is not to be regarded, but wholly laid aside, when he not only moves without his sphere, but his motion infers the ruin of the ends of his erection, and when he employs all his power for the destruction of the cause of Christ, and advancement of antichrist, giving his power to the beast; he is so far from deserving the deference of the power ordained of God, that he is to be looked upon, and treated as a traitor to God, and stated enemy to religion and all righteousness. The second end of government is the good of the people, which is the supreme and cardinal law; the safety of the people is the supreme law. Which cannot be denied, if it be considered, 1. For this only the magistrate is appointed of God to be his minister for the people's good, Rom. xiii. 4. and they have no goodness but as they conduce to this end: for all the power they have of God is with this proviso, to promote his people's prosperity. (It were blasphemy to say, they are his authorised ministers for their destruction) to which if their conduct degenerate, they degrade themselves, and so must be disowned. He is therefore, in his institution, no more than a mean for this end; and himself cannot be either the whole or half of the end; for then he should be both the end and the mean of government; and it is contrary to God's mould to have this for his end, to multiply to himself silver and gold, or lift up himself above his brethren, Deut. xvii. 17, 20. If therefore he hath any other end than the good of the people, he cannot be owned as one of God's moulding, 2. This only is the highest pitch of good princes ambition, to postpone their own safety to the peoples safety. Moses desired, rather than the people should be destroyed, that his name should be razed out of the book of life. And David would rather the Lord's hand be on him and his father's house, than on the people, that they should be plagued, 1 Chron. xxi. 17. But he that would seek his own ambitious ends, with the destruction of the people, hath the spirit of the devil, and is to be carried towards as one possessed with that malignant spirit. 3. Originally their power is from the people, from whom all their dignity is derived, with reserve of their safety, which is not the donative of kings, nor held by concession from them, nor can it be resigned or surrendered to the disposal of kings; since God hath provided, in his universal laws, that no authority make any disposal, but for the good of the people. This cannot be forfeited by the usurpation of monarchs, but being always fixed in the essential laws of government, they may reclaim and recover it when they please. Since then we cannot alienate our safety, we cannot own that authority which is inconsistent with it. 4. The attaining this end was the main ground and motive of peoples deliberating to constitute a government, and to choose such a form, because they thought it most conducible for their good; and to admit such persons as fittest instuments for compassing this end; and to establish such a conveyance, as they thought most contributive for this end. When therefore princes cease to be what they could be constitute for, they cease to have an authority to be owned; but ceasing to answer these ends of government, they cease to be what they could be constitute for. 5. For no other end were magistrates limited with conditions, but to bound them, that they might do nothing against the peoples good and safety.
Whosoever then breaking through all legal limitations, shall become injurious to the community, lists himself in the number of enemies, and is only to be looked upon as such. 6. For this end all laws are ratified or rescinded, as they conduce to this end, which is the soul and reason of the law: then it is but reason, that the law establishing such a king, which proves an enemy to this, should be rescinded also. 7. Contrary to this end no law can be of force; if then, either law or king be prejudicial to the realm, they are to be abolished. 8. For this end, in cases of necessity, kings are allowed sometimes to neglect the letter of the laws, or private interests, for the safety of the community: but if they neglect the public safety, and make laws for their own interests, they are no more trustees but traitors. 9. If it were not for this end, it were more eligible to live in desarts, than to enter into societies. When therefore a ruler, in direct opposition to the ends of government, seeks the ruin, not only of religion, but also of the peoples safety, he must certainly forfeit his right to reign. And what a vast, as well as innocent number, have, for religion, and their adherence to their fundamental rights, been ruined, rooted out of their families possessions, oppressed, persecuted, murdered, and destroyed by this and the deceased tyrant, all Scotland can tell, and all Europe hath heard. If ever the ends of government were perverted and subverted in any place. Britain is the stage where this tragedy has been acted.
13. I may argue from the covenant, that to own this authority is contrary to all the articles thereof. 1. That authority which overturns the reformation of religion in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, which we are sworn to preserve against the common enemies thereof, in the first article, cannot be owned; but the present pretended authority overturned (and continues more to overturn) the reformation of religion, &c. therefore it cannot be owned. For against what common enemy must we preserve it, if not against him that is the chief enemy thereof? And how can we own that authority, that is wholly employed and applied for the destruction of religion? 2. If we are obliged to extirpate popery, without respect of persons, lest we partake in other mens sins; then we are obliged to extirpate papists without respect of persons; and consequently the head of them. (For how otherwise can popery be extirpated? Or how otherwise can we cleanse the land of their sins?) But in the 2d article we are obliged to extirpate popery without respect of persons, lest we partake in others mens sins: therefore we are obliged to extirpate papists without respect of persons, and consequently the crowned Jesuit, and therefore cannot own him: for how can we own him, whom we are bound to exstirpate? 3. If we be engaged to preserve the rights and liberties of parliaments, and the liberties of the kingdoms, and the king's authority only in the preservation and defence of the true religion and liberties of the kingdoms, then we cannot own his authority, when it is inconsistent with, opposite to, and destructive of all these precious interests, as now it is with a witness. But in the 3d article we are engaged to preserve the rights and privileges of parliaments, and the liberties of the kingdoms, and the king's authority only in the preservation and defence of the true religion and liberties of the kingdoms: therefore all allegiance that we can own to any man, must stand perpetually thus qualified, in defence of religion and liberty; that is, so far as it is not contrary to religion and liberty, and no further; for if it be destructive of these, it is null. If we should then own this man, with this restricted allegiance, and apply into his own authority (as we must apply it to all authority that we can own) it were to mock God and the world, and own contradictions: for can we maintain the destroyer of religion, in defence of religion, and the destroyer of all our rights and liberties, and all our legal securities for them, in the preservation of these rights and liberties? That were pure nonsense. 4. If we be obliged to endeavour, that all incendiaries and malignants, &c. be brought to condign punishment, then we cannot own the authority of the head of these incendiaries and malignant enemies; but in the fourth article, we are obliged to endeavour, that all incendiaries and malignants, &c. be brought to condign punishment: therefore——The connexion of the major cannot well be doubted, for is it imaginable, that the head of that unhallowed party, the great malignant enemy, who is the spring, and gives life unto all these abominations shall be exempted from punishment, or owned for a sacred majesty? shall we be obliged to discover, and bring to justice the little petty malignants, and this implacably stated enemy to Christ escape with a crown on his head? Nay, we are by this obliged, if ever we be in case, to bring these stated enemies to God and the country to condign punishment, from the highest to the lowest: and this we are to do, as we would have the anger of the Lord turned away from us, which cannot be, without hanging up their heads before the Lord against the sun, as was done in the matter of Peor, Numb. xxv. 4. For hath not he and his accomplices made the kingdom a curse? and we, with our own consent, have made ourselves obnoxious to it, if we do not procure, each in our capacities, and pursue these traitors and rebels, that the judgment of the Lord be executed upon the accursed. 5. No wilful opposer of peace and union between the kingdoms is to be owned; but, according to the 5th article, we are obliged to endeavour, that justice be done upon him: but this man and his brother have been wilful opposers of peace and union between the kingdoms, all true peace and union, except an union in confederacy against the Lord; for they have taken peace from both the kingdoms, and destroyed and annulled that which was the bond of their union, to wit, the solemn league and covenant. 6. If we are obliged to assist and defend all those that enter into this league and covenant, in the maintaining and pursuing thereof, and never to suffer ourselves to be divided, to make defection to the contrary part, &c. According to the 6th article then, we must not owt the butcher of our covenanted brethren, who hath imbrued his hands in their blood, in maintaining and pursuing thereof, and would have us withdrawn into so detestable a defection; for we cannot both own him as he requires to be owned, and as God requires every magistrate to be owned (so as not to resist him under pain of damnation, Rom. xiii. 2.) and assist our brethren too in refilling his murders: and our owning of him were a dividing of ourselves from our brethren that oppose him, into a defection to the contrary part, whereof he is head and patron. Lastly, In the conclusion, we are obliged to be humbled for the sins of these kingdoms, and to amend in a real reformation; whereof this is one to be mourned for, that after the Lord had delivered us from the yoke of this tyrannical family, we again joined in amity with the people of these abominations, and took these serpents into our bosom again, which hath bit us so sore, and wherewith the Lord hath scourged us severely. And if it was our sin to engage with them at first, then it is our sin to continue under their subjection; and is not consistent with that repentance, that the Lord's contendings call for, to continue owning that power which was our sin to own at first.
III. In the third place, I promised to confirm my thesis from more express scripture arguments. Therefore I shall endeavour to gather them as briefly as may be. 1. From scripture inferences, nearly and natively consequential. 2. From scripture assertions. 3. From scripture precepts. 4. From scripture practices. 5. From scripture promises. 6. From scripture threatnings. 7. From scripture prayers.