5. Though a man be really so criminal, as that he deserves death by the law of God and man; yet it may be murder to kill him, if we do not certainly know it, and can prove it, and convict him of it upon trial: for no man must be killed not indicted, or the cause unknown. Thus even magistrates may murder murderers, when they proceed against them without probation or cognition according to law, far more private persons. Thus the Abiezrites would have murdered Gideon, not only unjustly, for his duty of throwing down the altar of Baal, but illegally; because they would have had him brought out that he might die without any further trial, Judg. vi. 29, 30. So likewise the Jews that banded and bound themselves under a curse to kill Paul before he was tried, would have murdered him, not only unjustly for his duty, but illegally before he was tried, Acts xxiii. 12. But this doth not condemn the actions of those sufferers, in maintaining the necessary execution of judgment, upon persons who are notorious murderers, yea, professing a trade and prosecuting habitually a tract of continued murdering the people of the Lord.

6. Though it should be certainly known, and sufficiently proven that a man is a murderer, &c. yet it were murder for an inferior, under a relation of subjection to him, to kill him, as long as that subjection were acknowledged; for, whensoever the common and mutual right or relation, either natural, moral, civil, or religious, to the prejudice or scandal of the church, or state, or particular persons, is broken by killing any person, that is murder, though the person killed deserve to die. As if a subject should kill an acknowledged king, a son by nature or in law should kill his natural or legal father, a servant should kill his master, breaking these relations, while their right and tie were acknowledged, (as some of them must still be acknowledged as long as the correlates continue in being, to wit, that of a father is not broken by his becoming a murderer) and to the danger, detriment, and scandal of the church and state; that were properly assassination: for assassins are they, who being subject to others, either out of their own head, for their own ends, or by command of their superiors, kill their superiors, or such as they command them to kill, as Alstedius describes them, Theol. Caf. cap. 18. de homicid. reg. 55. Therefore David would not kill Saul, because he acknowledged him to be the Lord's anointed, to whom he was under a relation of subjection, and because he was his master and father in law, and because it would have tended to the hurt of the kingdom, and involved it in combustions and contentions about the succession, and prejudged his own right, as well as to the scandal of the people of God, though Saul deserved otherwise to be capitally punished. So Ishbosheth was killed by Baanah and Rechab, 2 Sam. iv. 7. so Jozachar and Jehozabad, who killed Joash, 2 Kings xii. 21. were punished as murderers, chap. xiv. 6. because they were his servants, and did assassinate him to whom they were subject: so the servants of Amon were punished by the people, as conspirators against their king and master, 2 Kings xxi. 23, 24. though Amon deserved to have been punished as well as Amaziah was. Hence generally it is observed by some; that though right be given to equals or superiors, to bring their nearest relations to condign punishment, when they turn enticers to idolatry, Deut. xiii. 6. Yet no right or law, upon any cause or occasion whatsoever, is given to inferiors, as children, &c. to punish their fathers. See Pool. Synop. Critic. in locum. However it be, this cannot condemn the taking off of notorious murderers, by the hand of such as were no way subject nor related to them; but as enemies, who, in extreme necessity, executed righteous judgment upon them, without prejudice of the true, necessary, and chief good of the church and commonwealth, or of any particular person's just right and security, as Naphtali qualifies it, pag. 12, 23. first edition.

7. Though the matter of the action were just, and the murderer such a person as we might punish without any breach of relative obligations, or duties; yet the manner may aggravate it to some degree of murder; if it be done secretly, when it may be execute publicly, or suddenly and precipitantly, when it may be done deliberately, without rushing upon such an action, or hurrying the murderer to eternity; as this also might have had some weight with David not to murder Saul secretly and suddenly in the cave, or when he was sleeping; so Ishbosheth, and Joash, and Amon were murdered; or if it be done subtilly, when it may be performed in more plain and fair dealing; or treacherously, under colour of friendship; or cruelly without regard to humanity; and especially when the actors are at peace with the person, whose blood they shed, as Joab shed the blood of war in peace, 1 Kings ii. 5. in killing Abner and Amasa so craftily and cruelly; and Absalom made his servants assassinate Amnon, 2 Sam. xiii. 28, 29. But this cannot be changed upon them who executed righteous judgment, as publicly, deliberately, and calmly, as the extraordinary exigence of pressing necessity, in extremity of danger, could allow, upon notorious murderers, with whom they were in open and avowed terms of hostility.

8. Though the manner also be inculpable; yet if the principle and motive of killing, even those that deserve to die, be out of malice, hatred, rage, or revenge, for private or personal injuries, it is murder. For the affection and intention doth make one and the same action of taking away the life, homicide or no homicide: Lex Rex faith, Quest. 31. Pag. 338. If a man out of hatred deliberately take away another man's life, he is in so far a murderer, but if that same man had taken away the other's life, by the flying off of his ax head, he neither hating him before, nor intending to hurt him, he is no murderer by God's express law, allowing cities of refuge for the one, and not for the other, Deut. iv. 42. Deut. xix. 4, &c. private revenge is indignity to God, whose it is to take vengeance, Deut. xxxii. 35. Rom. xii. 19. "Dearly beloved avenge not yourselves, for vengeance is the Lord's." For which cause Jacob curses Simeon and Levi their murder of the Shechemites: for in their anger they slew a man, Gen. xlix. 6, 7. So David would not put forth his hand against Saul, for his own private and personal quarrel. So Joab killed Abner, and Absalom Amnon. But this doth not make the execution of judgment, out of zeal for God, respect to righteousness, love to the nations interest, and care to preserve the persecuted people of God from imminent destruction, upon public enemies, incendiaries, that are trampling upon all these precious interests, and threatening the utter ruin of them, and in a particular manner their destruction who thus prevent them.

9. Though the motive or cause were upon a public account, yet it may be murder to have a wrong end in it; as either to intend simply the destruction of the person on whom they execute judgment, as the end to which all their action is directed, or to make their own advantage or honour the end of the action. Thus David would not kill Saul, because it might have been thought he did it to obtain the kingdom, of which he was rightful successor: and deservedly he punished the Amalekite, that brought news of his killing Saul; and Baanah and Rechab, for their killing Ishbosheth, thinking thereby to advance themselves at David's court. So also Joab murdered Amasa to secure himself in the general's place. And Jehu, though upon the matter he executed righteous judgment, his end was only himself, it is condemned as murder. But when the execution of righteous judgment is both formally intended by the actors, and natively and really doth conduce to the glory of God, the preservation of the remnant threatened to be destroyed by these murderers, the suppressing of impiety, doing of justice, turning away wrath and removing of present, and preventing of future judgments, then it may be duty, Napthtali, pag. 23. first edition.

10. Though the end also were not culpable; yet it may be murder to kill criminals by transgressing the sphere of our vocation, and usurping upon the magistrate's sword: for he, by office, is a revenger, to execute wrath upon him that doth evil, Rom. xiii. 4. none must make use of the sword of vindictive justice, but he to whom the Lord giveth it; therefore they that came to take Christ are condemned and threatened for this, Matth. xxvi. 52. "All they that take the sword, shall perish with the sword." The God of order hath assigned to every man his station and calling, within the bounds whereof he should keep, without transgressing by defect or excess, let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called, 1 Cor. vii. 20. and study to be quiet, and do his own business, 1 Thess. iv. 11. Therefore David would not kill Saul, because he would have done it beside his calling. And therefore the killing of Joash and Amon was murder, because the assassins did transgress their vocation. But when notorious incendiaries do not only transgress their vocation, but the limits of human society, and turn open enemies to God and man, destroying the innocent, making havoc of the Lord's heritage, and vaunting of their villanies, and boasting of their wickedness, and thereby bringing wrath upon the land if such effrontries of insolence should pass unpunished, and when there is no magistrate to do that work of justice, but all in that place are art and part with them, patrons and defenders of them; yea, no magistrate that can be acknowledged as a minister of God to be applied unto; in that case, it is not a transgression of our vocation, nor an usurpation upon the magistrates, where there is none, to endeavour to avert wrath, by executing righteous judgment. Otherwise, if for fear, or suspicion of the accidental hazard of private men's usurping the office, or doing of the duty of public persons, every virtuous action which may be abused, shall be utterly neglected, impiety shall quickly gain universal empire, to the extermination or all goodness, Naphtali, pag. 24. first edition. To clear this, it must be considered, that a man's calling is twofold; his particular calling, whereunto in the ordinary course of things he is regularly confined: and his general calling, not circumscribed by particular rules, which from the common obligation of the end for which all callings are institute, in the clear exigence of an extraordinary emergent, according to the general rules of righteousness, bind to an agreeable practice; therefore circumstances may sometimes so diversify actions, that what in the ordinary and undisturbed state of things would be accounted an excess of our particular calling, and an usurpation, in an extraordinary occurrence may become a necessary duty of our general calling.

11. Though it were no usurpation beyond our calling; yet it may be murder, to kill any without the call of God in a case of necessity, either in the immediate defence of life, or though it be in the remote when the hazard is unavoidable. Every thing must have God's call in its season to make it duty, so also the time of killing, Eccles. iii. 3. For want of this David would not kill Saul. Lex Rex saith excellently to this, quest. 31. pag. 329, 330. 'David might have killed Saul when he was sleeping, and when he cut off the lap of his garment, but it was unlawful for him to kill the Lord's anointed, as it is unlawful for him to kill a man because he is the image of God, Gen. ix. 6. except in case of necessity,——David having Saul in his hand, was in a remote posture of defence, the unjust invasion then was not actual, nor unavoidable, nor a necessary mean in human prudence for self preservation; for king Saul was not in an actual pursuit of the whole princes, elders, community of Israel: Saul did but seek the life of one man David, and that not for religion, or a national pretended offence, and therefore he could not, in conscience, put hands on the Lord's anointed: but if Saul had actually invaded David for his life, David might, in that case, make use of Goliah's sword, (for he took not that weapon as a cypher to boast Saul) and rather kill than be killed.' Thus he. By a call here, we do not mean an express or immediate call from God, such as the prophets might have to their extraordinary executions of judgments, as Samuel and Elijah had to kill Agag and Baal's prophets; but either the allowance of man, then there is no question about it; or if that cannot be had, as in the case circumstantiate it cannot, then the providential and moral call of extreme necessity, for preservation of our lives, and preventing the murder of our brethren, may warrant an extraordinary executing of righteous judgment upon the murderers. Men may have a call to a necessary duty, neither every way mediate nor immediate, as the call of running together to quench a fire in a city, when magistrates through wickedness or negligence, will not, or do not, call people forth unto that work; they have not man's call, nor an immediate call from heaven, yet they have a lawful call from God; so they do not intrude upon the magistrates office, nor want they a call to this execution of judgment, who did materially that work for that exigent which magistrates, by office, were bound to do, being called thereto by God, by nature, and the call of inevitable necessity, which knoweth no human law, and to which some divine positive laws will cede. Jus populi. chap. 20. pag. 423.

12. Though this be a principle of reason and natural justice, when all the fore mentioned circumstances are clear, that it is lawful for private persons to execute righteous judgment, upon notorious incendiaries, and murdering public enemies, in cases of necessity; yet it might be a sinful breach of the sixth command, to draw extraordinary examples of it to an ordinary practice in killing all who might be found criminal, and would deserve death by the law, as all that have served under a banner of tyranny and violence, displayed against God and his people, to the ruin of the reformation, wasting of the country, oppression of many honest families, and destruction of many innocent people, are and would be found guilty of murder; as the chief captain would have truly alledged Paul to have been a murderer, if he had been the Egyptian which made an uproar, and led out four thousand men that were murderers, Acts xxi. 58. As for the vulgar and ordinary sort of those vermine of varlets, it is of no advantage for oppressed people to foul their fingers upon them, when their slaughter would not put a stop to, but rather increase the destruction of the people of God; and were unlawful to prevent and anticipate the due and legal execution of justice, where there is any prospect or expectation of its running in its right channel. But for the chief and principal ring leaders, and common public and habitual incendiaries, and masters of the trade of murdering the Lord's people, when there is no other way of being rid of their rage, and preserving ourselves, and preventing the destruction of our brethren, we may in that case of necessity make public examples of them, in an extraordinary procedure against them, that may be most answerable to the rules of the ordinary procedure of justice, and in imitation of the heroic actions recorded and justified in the word of God, in the like extraordinary cases; which are imitable, when the matter of their actions is ordinary, that is, neither preternatural nor supernatural though the occasion was singular, just and necessary, both by divine precept, and as a mean to good and necessary ends, and when there is no other to do the work, nor any prospect of access to justice in its ordinary and orderly course, nor possibility of suspending it till that can be obtained. We need not then any other call than a spirit of holy zeal for God, and for our own and our brethrens preservation, in that pinch of extremity. We do not hold these extraordinary actions for regular and ordinary precedents, for all times and persons universally: which if people should fancy, and heed more the glory and fame of the action, than the sound and solid rule of the scriptures, they may be tempted and carried to fearful extravagancies. But they may be warrants for private persons in their doing of these things, in an extreme necessity, to which at other times they are not called. And when the Lord, with whom is the residue of the spirit, doth breathe upon his people, more or fewer, to the exciting of more than ordinary zeal, for the execution of justice upon such adversaries, we should rather ascribe glory and praise to him, whose hand is not shortened, but many times chooseth the weak and foolish things of the world to confound the mighty and the wise, than condemn his instruments for doing such things, Naph. pag. 24, 25. prior edit.

All these cases, which are all I can think on at present, comprehending all that may any way infer the guilt of murder, I have collected; to the end I may conclude this one argument, and leave it to be considered: If this extraordinary executing of judgment, upon notorious incendiaries and murdering public enemies, by private persons, in the circumstances above declared, cannot be reduced to any case that can infer the guilt of murder; then it cannot be condemned, but justified; but this extraordinary executing of judgment, &c. cannot be reduced to any case that can infer the guilt of murder, (as will appear by the induction of all of them:) therefore, this extraordinary executing of judgment, &c. cannot be condemned, but justified.

II. In the next place, What we own may be done warrantably, in taking away the life of men without breach of the sixth command, will appear by these propositions and assertions, which will bring the matter to the present circumstantiate case.