“It also so happened, unfortunately, that Captain Akers, fearing the delays which often occur in the movements of a large number of men, as a matter of precaution directed them to start an hour earlier than they should, and to be an hour earlier at Stevensville, thinking that in all probability at least an hour would be lost in setting off, or on the march, and that if they were before the time they might be kept back a little on the way. If he had staid with them to have kept them back, it would have been all right, but unfortunately he was away when he was wanted.
“Lieut.-Col. Dennis and Capt. Akers as stated in the report, without receiving any answer from Col. Peacocke, left Port Colborne about 4 a. m. in the tug ‘Robb’ which had at that time arrived taking with them the Welland garrison battery (but without cannon, these having been removed to Hamilton, and not then returned) under command of Capt. Richard F. King, and a few men of the Dunnville naval company under command of Capt. McCallum.
“After they had left Colborne Lieut.-Col. Booker received a telegram from Col. Peacocke directing him to adhere strictly to the first plan, the particulars of which had been carried to him by Capt. Akers.”
This telegram was in these words, “Chippewa 3.45 a. m. Have received your message of 3 a. m. I do not approve of it. Follow original plan. Acknowledge receipt of this. George Peacocke.” Major Denison continues:
“Lieut.-Col. Booker, therefore had set out upon his march without the assistance he should have received from Capt. Akers, and without the opportunity of referring to him for enlightenment on those parts of his instructions which he did not clearly understand.
“Having his men all ready in the cars to start, and having heard that the railway was clear as far as Fort Erie, he decided to go by train as far as Ridgeway, and to keep his men in the cars, or at least under arms for the short time he would have to delay before starting. Having his men thus all ready there occurred none of that delay which Capt. Akers had anticipated, and to provide against which he had named an earlier hour for starting. Being in the cars ready, and only waiting for a particular hour to arrive, it can readily be believed that he would be likely to start a little before the time rather than after it. However this may be, there is no doubt Lieut.-Col. Booker started at least as early as 5 a. m., an hour or more earlier than necessary. Immediately after the force had left a telegraph arrived from Col. Peacocke directing Lieut.-Col. Booker to delay his march for one hour, which would make his time of arrival at Stevensville between 11 and 12, cautiously feeling his way in the direction of the rendezvous, Mr. Stovin of the Welland railway seeing the importance of the message took a hand car and followed Lieut.-Col. Booker as fast as he could.”
The more exact fact is that Capt. McGrath, general manager of the Welland line, seeing the importance of the message took the hand car, Mr. Stovin with him, and proceeded about half way, five miles, when they saw the train returning from Ridgeway after debarking the troops. Capt. McGrath stopped it by signal, and having a pressure of business on his own line returned with the train to Colborne. He directed Mr. Stovin to be exact in noting the time at which the telegram was delivered to Col. Booker, as he already foresaw through the various nature of the orders with an apparent desire to disobey them, that trouble would arise. The message was delivered at 7.30, when the action was just begun at the Ridge and not at 9.30 as stated by Lieut.-Col. Booker, “when the troops had been under a hot fire an hour and a half.” This telegram was addressed “to the officer commanding,” and said; “Be careful in feeling your way for fear obstacles should prevent a junction; if possible open communications with me. I will do the same. G. Peacocke.”
CHAPTER X.
Nineteenth Volunteer Battalion. Statement of occurrences which does not correspond with the official report of Colonel Peacocke, and historical narrative of Major Denison.