“Must go to the lake shore.” Could not halt then. The lake shore, from the point where this fugitive speech was made, Mrs. Ryerson’s house or thereabout, was eight, or ten, or more miles away according to the road he might take. By the road he took it was twelve miles away.
Major Gilmore says (C. of In.) he could have at any time halted and gathered around him a few hundreds of men, but deemed the effort of no use. He saw officers at different points of the road “exciting themselves frantically” to arrest the retreat. Such were his words, but he was more cool and allowed things to happen as fate and confusion without a commander would have it. Lieut. Arthur of the Q. O. has been reported as grandly stemming the tide of retreat, in its very front, at Ridgeway. He may have been one of those who “frantically excited themselves.” A more practical question, is; how did Lieut. Arthur get there so soon? Mr. Arthur a civilian gave evidence to the Court of Inquiry somewhat exculpatory of Booker. But it is not forgotten at Hamilton that this same Mr. Arthur returned from the field of action, where he had been a non-combatant, on the evening of 2nd of June, and at the railway depot was the first to give intimation that Booker had broken down as commander and made a fool of himself.
Men of the 13th called to mind on the line of retreat, that when Booker was largely pompous at the Hamilton drill-shed on the previous morning he said, “I know you will follow me.” They followed, but only a few could get sight of him.
Captains Grant, Askin, Ferguson, Lieut. Gibson, and other officers of the 13th got sight of him half a mile past Ridgeway. A considerable force was then halted on the road. They expected that a stand would be made, the ground being advantageous for resistance, and fighting. Booker was heard calling for somebody to show the road to Port Colborne. To a farmer looking on, he trotted up, then returning to the imperfect column cried “Fours right, quick march!” And so the return to Colborne was continued in that disorder which incompetency had initiated, and aggravated. Sometimes he was seen riding, again walking, and trotting on foot in the semblance of a man crazed in the head. At Sherkston, five miles west of Ridgeway, they got a railway train to Colborne. It took them at two trips.
At some point on the road Booker turned to observe the dislocated column and accosted Sergeant Gibbons whom I have named as affirming with others that the bugle calls of retire and double gave origin to the retreat. This general of brigade, who had been so grand yesterday, that “he looked and talked as if able to command fifty thousand men,” and who at Port Colborne had asserted his seniority and displaced the officer who came in command from Toronto, now murmured in whining tone, and broken speech; “Sergeant, I suppose this is not your first engagement with an enemy? It is mine.” He gave the horse to carry a sick man, and on this his apologists form a claim for magnanimity. It would have been the attitude of a General to remain mounted, especially on the retreat, that his person might be observed, his place known, his command heard. A true soldier, while modest, mild, keenly perceptive that necessary equipments were present with his force, while days were pleasant and peaceful, would have now risen with the crisis, firm in his saddle, firm in mind, lofty with the great emergency, to retrieve order out of confusion.
But Brigadier-General Booker straddled on foot a little while, then got on the horse a little while, got down again, and again ambled on foot, seeking sociality with the bugler, the groom, the sergeant, abjectly mumbling that he had never previously been in battle; then getting hold of a Lieutenant’s arm said; “I am a failure; I have failed; I acknowledge my failure.” And to a Captain uttering words to the same effect. And at Port Colborne continuing his abject confession to others.
Generous minds might have forgiven him after his miserable confessions however much they deplored the unhappy consequences of his incompetency, triumph to the enemy, derision of the Province by Americans; wild invention of calumnies against the 13th battalion, because he, its Lt.-Col., had involved the Q. O. Rifles in discredit. In face of all this his subordinate officers and battalion might have pitied the man while they deplored his military failure. But with a feeling of safety to his own person, he began to retract his confessions of incapacity, and to give currency to accusations of blame on his troops, and proclaim himself a martyr. At Colborne a report of the morning’s work was written for the authorities, imperfect, and untrue. He did not seek the assistance of any officer of the 13th all of whom could have informed him of as much of the action as they engaged in the front could know. He did not employ his own orderly room clerk to write for him. He got a person of the Q. O. to write, in order to satisfy Major Gilmore; and even then the Major gave only a general assent to the report. “Yes, its general tenor was correct, and I assented to it.” But Major Gilmore was not quite exact about it himself according to his own statement. The report said the telegram arrived at 9.30 after an hour and a half of hot fighting. That was not true. It spoke of driving the enemy from their rifle pits. There were no rifle pits. It said we were in a cul de sac. There was no cul de sac. All was open to the front except intervening woods. The enemy had retreated through the woods. The report said nothing of the 13th having as a battalion advanced from garrison road across fields and fences half a mile, the enemy retiring before their beautiful red line, and then across concession road; they engaged in fight one hour, except the supports lying within 150 yards of the skirmish line, which however were actually advancing to the relief of their right wing when the retire stopped them; while most of that one hour the Q. O. were in reserve, two companies on the right front, and one on the extreme left front only excepted. On the contrary Lt.-Col. Booker caused a telegram to be sent to his superiors reporting the 13th as demoralized, and unfit for duty. It has been denied by himself and friends that he did so. But it is known on the highest railway authority that such messages with his name appended, went over the wires. A Hamilton newspaper gave currency to that phrase, demoralization. Two days after, Lieut.-Colonel Booker visited the reporter, and besought him to retract the imputation, saying “You know it was not I who said demoralized; it was that —— rascal Gilmore.”
The Square. Ques., by Lieut.-Col. Booker to Major Gilmore. “Were you satisfied with my conduct on the field?” Ans. “Col. Booker asked me the same question in Port Colborne, and I now give him the same answer that I did then, which was that I could see nothing in his conduct to disapprove of except with regard to the formation of the square, which I thought at that time was a mistake and I think so still.”
Ques. By Court. “Who gave the order to form square?” Ans. “Lieut.-Col. Booker gave the caution to look out for Cavalry, and I gave the command to form square.”
Ammunition of Q. O. The paragraph beginning on [page 77], and ending on page 78, in this chapter is inaccurate as respects the alleged non-supply of ammunition; but not as regards the omission to post sentries on the arrival of the Q. O. at Colborne. The misstatement made on authority which I trusted was unfortunate, yet the ammunition served at Toronto was inadequate to go into a locality near the presence of an enemy. The following evidence touches this highly important question: