On the 11th of January, Lord Chelmsford, with the bulk of the mounted men of No. 3 column, met Colonel Wood with his "irregulars" about twenty miles from Rorke's Drift, and was completely satisfied with the efficiency of the latter force, and attributed the satisfactory state of Wood's column to its commander's energy and military knowledge.[20]
Burning of Sirayo's kraal.
On the 12th of January, Lord Chelmsford wrote: "We have had our first fight to-day. I ordered the whole force out this morning to reconnoitre the road along which we shall eventually have to pass. In passing by the Nkudu hill, we noticed that some herds of cattle had been driven up close under the krantz where one of Sirayo's strongholds was said to be. I ordered Colonel Glyn, with four companies 1-24th, and the 1-3rd Native Contingent, to work up under the krantz in skirmishing order. On the approach of this force near the krantz, fire was opened upon them out of the caves, and the fight commenced. It lasted about half an hour, and ended in our obtaining possession of all the caves and all the cattle. Colonel Degacher, who had been sent for from camp when we found that the krantz was occupied by the enemy, came up towards the end of the affair with half-battalion 2-24th, and about 400 of the 2-3rd Native Contingent. This force went forward to Sirayo's own kraal, which is situated under a very steep krantz filled with caves. The British soldiers and natives skirmished, or rather clambered, up the steep mountain-side, and entered all the caves, which were found empty. I ordered Sirayo's kraal to be burned, but none of the other huts were touched. The Native Contingent behaved very well, and not a native touched a woman or child, or killed the wounded men."[21] Subsequently Colonel Russell, with a small detached force, was attacked by sixty of the enemy, but his men dismounted and succeeded in killing nine or ten, among whom was one of Sirayo's sons. This action was, in fact, the storming of the stronghold of one of Cetewayo's principal chiefs, and was accompanied by the capture of 500 cattle. Lord Chelmsford says of this engagement, "I have visited two wounded Zulus who were in our hospital, and have seen that they are well looked after. Directly they are well enough I shall let them go, so that they may tell their friends how the British make war."
Both previous to the successful and unresisted crossing of the Tugela, as well as subsequently, frequent rains had caused great discomfort to the troops, as well as immensely increased the difficulties of transport. The impedimenta of the large force in the field was exceedingly great, and the want of knowledge of the character of the roads, or tracks, and the capacity of oxen to do the work, resulted in many delays and difficulties. Large masses of infantry were moved into the enemy's country, whose entire dependence for supplies was placed upon heavy waggons drawn by numerous oxen. No system of carriers was established, and, with the exception of the fourth (Wood's) column, the movement of the troops was necessarily exceedingly slow. On the march each column was exposed to be attacked at a disadvantage, so enormous was the train of waggons which had to be guarded, and the knowledge of these facts evidently enabled the Zulus to perceive the best opportunity of striking a fatal blow. At a very early stage in the war, Lord Chelmsford saw the difficulties connected with the mode of supplies adopted, as he writes on the 16th of January, "It would be impossible to keep a long line of road passable for a convoy of waggons, and were we to advance far into the country it would be almost certain that, instead of our supplies coming to us, we should have to return for our supplies."
Zulu tactics.
The country into which the British troops had entered was one in which the mountain-sides are furrowed by deep kloofs or ravines, generally covered by luxuriant vegetation. The euphorbia, the cactus, the aloe, and mimosa grow in profusion, and the bush in many places forms a natural fortress, in which savages can easily lie in wait to surprise an enemy. It was in such native fastnesses that the Kafirs of the Cape Colony loved to wait—panther-like—either in war to attack the white man, or in peace to rob his flocks and herds. The Zulus, however, fortunately adopted tactics of a different character. Their plan was to attack in the open field, and, by means of bravery and overwhelming numbers, to entirely crush the enemy. It was thus that Chaka had conquered, and it was upon the same system that Cetywayo relied.
CHAPTER IV.
LORD CHELMSFORD'S PLANS—THE BATTLE OF ISANDHLWANA—THE HEROIC DEFENCE OF RORKE'S DRIFT—PANIC IN THE COLONY—REQUEST FOR REINFORCEMENTS—REPLY FROM THE QUEEN—THE MINISTRY—SIR BARTLE FRERE—LORD CHELMSFORD.