"Should the Swazies come down to the Pongolo river, that part of Zululand which is behind a straight line drawn from the head waters of the Umvoloosi river to the junction of the Bevan and Pongolo rivers, will also, no doubt, be abandoned, and possibly as far as the Lebombo mountains.
"I trust that this plan of campaign will meet with the approval of the High Commissioner.
"From a military point of view I am convinced that it is the only practicable one at this time of year, and if successfully carried out, is capable of producing very satisfactory results.
"I am equally confident that, politically, it will also have good results.
"We shall occupy a large extent of Zululand, and shall threaten the portion which remains to the king. We shall completely cover the Natal border, and shall to a considerable extent do the same for the Transvaal. We expect Cetywayo to keep his army mobilized, and it is clear his troops will have difficulty in finding sufficient supplies."
On the 20th of January, 1879, the camp of the third column was at the Isandhlwana mountain. This force was under the command of Colonel Glyn, C.B., and the general commanding had accompanied it from the Tugela river. On the date just quoted, orders were given to Commandant Lonsdale and Major Dartnell to go out the following morning, and make a forward movement with a force composed of Native Contingent, Police, and Volunteers. On the next day (21st January), Major Dartnell sent in word that the enemy was near him in considerable force. Upon this Lord Chelmsford ordered the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, the mounted infantry, and four guns, to be under arms at once, and this force left so soon as there was light enough to see the road. Before Lord Chelmsford left, he sent the following order to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, commanding No. 2 column:—"Move up to Isandhlwana camp at once with all your mounted men and rocket battery. Take command of it. I am accompanying Colonel Glyn, who is moving off at once to attack Matyana and a Zulu force said to be twelve or fourteen miles off, and at present watched by Natal Police, Volunteers, and Natal Native Contingent. Colonel Glyn takes with him 2-24th Regiment, four guns R.A., and Mounted Infantry."[22] Major Clery, senior staff officer to the third column, says—"Before leaving the camp I sent written instructions to Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to the following effect:—'You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn. Draw in' (I speak from memory) 'your camp, or your line of defence,'—I am not certain which—'while the force is out. Also draw in the line of your infantry outposts accordingly; but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced.' I went to Colonel Pulleine's tent just before leaving camp, to ascertain that he had got those instructions, and I again repeated them verbally to him."[23] Captain Alan Gardiner, of the 14th Hussars, states that he left the camp with Lord Chelmsford on the 22nd of January, and was sent back into camp with an order from the general, between 10 and 11 a.m. that day. Colonel Pulleine was informed that the camp of the force out was to be struck, and sent on immediately; "also rations and forage for about seven days." This order came too late. At the moment of its receipt Colonel Durnford was falling back and begging Colonel Pulleine to send him reinforcements, and the enemy began to appear in large numbers.
Intentions of the Zulus.
In order to make the proceedings of this fatal day more easily understood, it is now necessary to advert to the proceedings of the Zulu army. This was 20,000 strong, and consisted of the Undi corps, the Nokenke and Umcityu regiments, and the Nkobamakosi and Inbonambi regiments. These comprised the flower of Cetywayo's troops. During the night of the 21st of January they were ordered to move in small detached bodies to a position about a mile and a half to the east of the camp at Isandhlwana, on a stony table-land, only about 1000 yards distant from the spot visited by Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Glyn on the afternoon of the 21st of January. No fires were lighted, and the stillness of death was preserved. The centre was occupied by the Undi corps, the right wing by the Nokenke and Umcityu, and the left by the Inbonambi and the Nkobamakosi regiments. The king's orders comprised a simple command to drive the third column back into Natal. But there was no intention whatever of making an attack upon the 22nd of January. The state of the moon was unfavourable, the usual medicine sprinkling had not taken place, nor had the war-song been chanted. What superstition forbade was, however, conceded to expediency. When the division of the British forces was noticed, and their gross ignorance and carelessness observed, the Zulu leaders felt like Cromwell, when he exclaimed, with reference to the Scottish army, "The Lord has delivered them into our hands."
On the morning of the 22nd of January, the mounted Basutos sent out under the command of Colonel Durnford fired upon the Umcityu regiment. This was too favourable an opportunity to be neglected. Here was a portion only of the third column, with an unfortified camp, whose defenders were scattering themselves over a large space, utterly ignorant and careless of the fact that the overwhelming and concentrated Zulu force was close beside them. The charge of the Umcityu regiment was immediately and vigorously followed by that of the Nokenke, Inbonambi, and Nkobamikosi regiments, the Undi corps holding its ground. Up to this time in the day there had been no fighting. Early in the morning, not long after the departure of the general, a body of the Native Contingent had been sent out to scout, and either did not see or pretended not to see any enemy. About 9 a.m. Colonel Durnford, R.E., arrived with 250 mounted men and 250 native infantry, who were at once divided into three bodies and scattered to the left east, the left front, and the rear. So far from a plan of concentration being adopted, the very opposite course was pursued. It was the force sent to the left east that was attacked by the Zulu army. No further concealment was now necessary, and messengers arrived informing Colonel Durnford that an enormous force was advancing. A consultation then took place between that officer and Colonel Pulleine, when some difference of opinion seemed to prevail. A company of the 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment, was then immediately moved up to a distance of about a mile and a half from the camp, where, at a neck of the Isandhlwana hill, an attempt was made to check the advance of the Zulu army. For a very short time only this manœuvre was successful.
The Zulu attack.