The garrison had 3000 oxen, but were obliged to drive away a large number, and soon learned, by the loss of 90 slaughter oxen from the ditch of the parapet, that large numbers of Zulus were close at hand. The fort soon attained a respectable appearance. It was oblong in shape—east and west sides, 300 yards each; north side, 120 yards; south, 180 yards. Waggons were placed round the inside of the parapet, a few yards distant. The church was converted into a hospital, the schoolroom and parsonage into storerooms, and all other buildings were demolished. All hands were up at réveille, and engaged all day in making the fort, and, when that was completed, in making roads. At 8 p.m. the "last post" sounded, and then all gave themselves to sleep, often broken by the alarm of the church bell, when the parapets were manned at once. A few irregular horse had been enrolled, who did outpost duty during the day. At this time an army of 20,000 Zulus was lying in wait between Ekowe and the Tugela.
Lord Chelmsford desired Colonel Pearson to reduce his garrison, and to establish a portion of it at the Tugela forts; but this was clearly impossible, and it is very surprising that such an order could ever have been issued. On the 6th of February, Colonel Pearson wrote, suggesting that twenty waggons, with a convoy, should be sent. In reply, the general sent word that there would not be a force at Lower Tugela for six weeks sufficient to insure a convoy to Ekowe, but wished the garrison there reduced and a flying column formed. This was quite out of the question, and, of course, was not attempted. On the 10th of February the fort was completed, with ditches seven feet deep and twelve feet wide, flanked by caponnières or by the parapet itself; wire entanglements on the glacis, and stakes in the ditch. The two 7-pounders were at the south-east and south-west angles, the rocket battery at the north-west, and the Gatling on the east face of the parapet.
The stench, at night particularly, was absolutely sickening, although every effort was made to keep the camp clean. Rations soon had to be reduced. A bottle of pickles fetched 25s.; sardines, 12s.; tin of milk, 23s.; a ham, £7 10s. There was always, however, a sufficient quantity of food of a coarse description, and the only famine that the garrison really suffered from was a dearth of news. Intelligence of how the war was going on, and of the outside world, was greedily and earnestly thirsted for. Convoys were always looked for and never arrived. No attack was ever made upon the fort by the wily Zulus, although they lay in wait for any opportunity.
Life at the camp.
The defence of Rorke's Drift had not only saved Natal from destruction, but Ekowe from attack. Affairs dragged on in a dull, monotonous manner all through February until the beginning of March. From a slight elevation near the camp the Lower Tugela could be seen, and H.M.S. Active cruising on the coast. Many a time were eyes stretched over the thirty-five miles of country intervening between Ekowe and Natal for some sign of relief and of succour.
An officer in Ekowe says, "The troops inside consisted of three companies of the 99th Regiment, five companies of the 2-3rd Buffs, one company Royal Engineers, one company of the Pioneers, the Naval Brigade, a body of artillery, and nineteen of the Native Contingent, amongst them being several non-commissioned officers, whom we found exceedingly useful, two of them being at once selected as butchers, whilst two others were 'promoted' to the rank of 'bakers to the troops.' Others attended to the sanitary arrangements of the garrison, and altogether they were found to be also exceedingly useful. As a portion of the column the company of pioneers under the command of Captain Beddoes did a great deal of very important work. This company was composed of ninety-eight natives, one captain, and three lieutenants, and their proceedings in connection with the making of the new road were watched with much interest. They worked with the Naval Brigade, about three companies of soldiers, and several men of the Royal Artillery. This road was found useless in consequence of the numerous swampy places at the foot of each of the numerous hills which occurred along the route. Very thick bush had to be cut through, and at first but slow progress was made. The road, as is generally known, took a direction towards the Inyezane. Whilst out on one occasion, the road party saw a torpedo explosion, which took place about three miles from where the party was working. It had been accidentally fired by Kafirs, who were unaware of the dangers connected with the implement, and it is believed that several of them were killed. The road was altogether a bad one. The relief column used it on their way up, but only the pioneers and the mounted men went by that route on the way back. In fact, it would have been useless to have attempted to use it for the passage of waggons. Whenever the road party went out they were fired on by Kafirs, but of course shots were returned, and many a Zulu warrior was knocked over whilst the work was being proceeded with. Everything in camp was conducted in a most orderly manner. We were roused at half-past five, sharp, and at eight o'clock, sharp, lights were out. For one month we existed very comfortably on full rations, but at the end of that time we were put on short rations, made up as follow:—One pound and a quarter of trek oxen beef, six ounces of meal, one ounce and a quarter of sugar, third of an ounce of coffee, onesixth of an ounce of tea, one-ninth of an ounce of pepper, and a quarter of an ounce of salt. Life of course was very monotonous. The bands of the two regiments played on alternate afternoons, and every morning they were to be heard practising outside the entrenchment. The most pleasant part of the day was just after six o'clock, when we used to be enlivened in the cool of the evening by the fife and drum band, playing the 'retreat.' The water with which we were supplied was indeed excellent, and the bathing places, I need not say, were very extensively patronized. The grazing was not nearly sufficient for the cattle, and from the first they must have suffered very much from want of nourishment. You will have heard of the fate of the 1100 head of oxen and the span of donkeys which we sent away from the camp in expectation of their reaching the Lower Tugela. They left us in charge of nineteen Kafirs; but at the Inyezane they were attacked by a large body of Kafirs. The natives in charge of the cattle decamped and reached the fort in safety, and the enemy got possession of the whole of the cattle, which they drove off. The donkeys were all killed, with the exception of one, and this sagacious animal surprised everybody in camp by returning soon after the Kafirs had come back."
Movements of Cetewayo.
Shortly after the disaster at Isandhlwana, the main body of the Zulu army went up to the king to be doctored with charms taken from the mutilated bodies of the killed of the English army. The intended movements of Cetywayo were described as follows:—"When the doctoring is done, the king will order a still stronger force than that of 22nd January; perhaps 20,000 or 30,000 to attack in one mass Colonel Glynn's column, and if they succeed, then attack Colonel Wood's column; but if they do not succeed in doing this, he will try to check and harass the English columns in Zululand by manœuvring a sufficient number of soldiers around them, and simultaneously make strong impetuous raids into the colony, as he has prohibited his people making raids in small numbers; he has furthermore plainly and repeatedly expressed himself to the effect that if he is to lose his life and kingdom, he will first make such havoc in Natal that it for ever shall be remembered." The truth is that something little short of a universal panic prevailed, which only by degrees subsided as time passed on without any invasion, and leisure was allowed for reflection. It does not seem to have been remembered that in every direction except one, and by all the columns except that of Colonel Glyn, the Zulus were defeated. Isandhlwana was a purely exceptional case, entirely attributable to blundering of the most gross and evident character. The defence of Rorke's Drift and the battle of Ineyezani were most significant. At the former a handful of infantry defended themselves successfully behind mealie-bags and biscuit-boxes against three times their number; at the latter, an overwhelming force was easily defeated in the field by the simple strategy of common sense.
No. 4 column, under Colonel Wood, operated in the north and acted as a means of defence to Utrecht and the Transvaal. It was assisted from the first by a number of irregulars and volunteers. Successful forays were made on various occasions, but it would be tedious to do more than refer to these, although the greatest gallantry and skill were exhibited. Colonel Wood most deservedly increased his reputation as a brilliant and successful leader. A fort was established at Kambula hill, entrenched in such a manner as to defy the attacks of a savage enemy.
Discontent among the Boers.