CHAPTER VII.

THE SERVICES OF NATIVE CONTINGENTS—LORD CHELMSFORD AND SIR H. BULWER—REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN—DIFFICULTIES OF TRANSPORT—IMMENSE DELAY—BURYING THE DEAD AT ISANDHLWANA.

The Native Contingent, composed of loyal Zulus, although a large force, turned out a comparatively useless one. After the battle of Isandhlwana, Colonel Glynn reports (on the 24th of January), "The whole of the Native Contingent walked off this morning." The reasons for this conduct are furnished elaborately in a minute of Sir H. Bulwer, Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, dated the 29th of January. These men had numerous complaints. On the night of the 23rd of January, whilst the European force at Rorke's Drift was entrenched, the Native Contingent had no such protection. The general and his staff leaving camp exercised a depressing influence. Uncertainty existed regarding their wives and families. These reasons, and reasons such as these, were furnished as explanations for their desertion. Sir Henry Bulwer had been always of opinion that to do away with the native system of organization for the purpose of substituting a regimental system was one of very doubtful advisableness. Nevertheless, he consented to give the men required, and no fewer than 7050 were sent into the field. Lord Chelmsford declared that he had never been able to understand what the tribal system was, and that as often as he had endeavoured to obtain information he had been baffled by vague generalities and oft-repeated laudations. So anxious, however, were the commandants to carry out what they considered the tribal system, that the companies were organized with uneven strength, in order that men of different tribes should be kept distinct. Sir Henry Bulwer believed that each column should have had a Native Contingent, and that these should have been led by officers who represented the Lieutenant-Governor, or Supreme Chief. They would have then moved and fought in accordance with their customs. The general could not agree to this. The natives must be divided into battalions 1000 strong, and into companies 100 strong. They were not to fight in their own fashion, and European officers, who did not know their language, were given commands among them. Dissatisfaction, discontent, and inefficiency resulted in such a manner that in all respects the large Native Contingent, numbering more than 7000 men, was a failure.

Bulwer and Chelmsford.

Later on, very serious differences of opinion arose between Lord Chelmsford and Sir Henry Bulwer. In reply to suggestions from the general, the Executive Council of Natal decided, on the 1st of March, that—

"(a.) In the opinion of this Council the proposition that raiding expeditions should be made into the Zulu country by the natives of this colony is unadvisable of adoption, as being an impolitic and undesirable system of war, as being calculated to provoke retaliation, and as tending to demoralize the people engaged in it.

"(b.) 1. That the proposition to call out every available native in the colony is open to serious objections.

"2. That a large proportion of the able-bodied male population has already been called out, and that this Council considers it undesirable to press the power of the Supreme Chief to a point that would probably cause serious discontent amongst the natives.

"3. That all trading, commercial, and farming operations would be thereby disorganized and ruinous consequences would ensue, the natives forming practically the only labouring portion of the population in the upper districts of the colony.

"4. That the calling out of the whole able-bodied male population would, in all probability, induce a panic, and be attended with serious inconveniences."