“A very few unscrupulous men, realizing thoroughly the changed condition of affairs, had organized the proletariat of the City; and through the form of suffrage had taken possession of its government. They saw clearly the facts of the case, which the doctrinaires, theorists and patriots studiously ignored or vehemently denied.”
And as a remedy he proposed “A recurrence to the ancient ways; a strong executive, a non-political judiciary,” and that “property must be entitled to representation as well as persons.”
Of course, the article had no perceptible effect.
Once more the impossible task of creating a good government by means of the votes of a purchasable constituency was attempted. Such of the ablest men of the city as were willing to dip into the mire of manhood suffrage politics devoted themselves to the task but in vain. The hopelessness of the undertaking ought to have been apparent from such facts as this, that Tweed’s own district re-elected him senator by a large majority in November 1871 after he had been thoroughly exposed and while he was being prosecuted for his crimes. The so-called reformers who supplanted the Tweed clique in public office were only political adventurers of a different type; more scrupulous, refined or timid than their predecessors, but politicians after all, since none other could be induced to enter the political arena. The coarse robberies of Tweed’s time were discontinued, but the government of New York City by a political clique organized on the basis of the use of the city spoils to secure the controllable vote was continued. It was only for a few months that the tempest cleared the air. The good citizens soon forgot their sudden zeal, or became discouraged at the odds against them in a manhood suffrage community. Neglecting the primaries where they had obtained but slim results they allowed nominations to fall back into the hands of spoilsmen, and the most important city offices to be fought for by factions differing only in their name and party badges, because all were clearly bent upon selfish gain. Roosevelt, writing in 1886, tells something of the political conditions of this reformed “after-Tweed” period:
“In the lower wards (of New York City), where there is a large vicious population, the condition of politics is often fairly appalling, and the (local) boss is generally a man of grossly immoral public and private character. In these wards many of the social organizations with which the leaders are obliged to keep on good terms are composed of criminals or of the relatives and associates of criminals.... The president of a powerful semi-political association was by profession a burglar; the man who received the goods he stole was an alderman. Another alderman was elected while his hair was still short from a term in the State prison. A school trustee had been convicted of embezzlement and was the associate of criminals.” (Century Magazine for November, 1866.)
Ostrogorski thus describes the period following Tweed’s overthrow:
“The principal instrument of this plunder was the police; they levied a regular toll prescribed by a fixed tariff on all the saloons, houses of ill fame, and gambling hells; extorted money on false pretenses or on no pretenses at all from small traders whom they had the power of molesting. Other perfectly lawful businesses were subjected to a tribute; steamboat companies, insurance societies, banks, etc., paid blackmail in return for the protection accorded to them. The police captains and even the policemen had to buy their places. The government of the city in fact became a huge market in which the officers might as well have sat at little tables and sold their wares openly.” (P. 81.)
In other words, the much vaunted reform uprising which overthrew Tweed was without radical or permanent results, because it left the city still at the mercy of the controllable vote.
A few later incidents may be added to Mr. Myers’ interesting collection. In 1874 one McKenna was shot dead in an election fight in New York and Richard Croker was accused of the crime and tried; the jury disagreed. Croker afterwards became Tweed’s successor and political boss of New York, retiring about 1899 to his native Ireland, with millions made out of politics. About this time the Harlem court house was built. The amount possible to steal was small, but the politicians displayed a spirit worthy of past days; for $66,000 worth of construction they collected from the city $268,000, or at the rate of four to one. In 1884 twenty-one members out of twenty-three of the Board of Aldermen of New York voted to give the franchise for a surface railway on Broadway to the Broadway Surface Railroad Company. The rival road, the Broadway Railroad Company, tried to bribe the Aldermen with $750,000, half cash and half bonds. The Aldermen feared the bonds might be traced, and considered it wiser to accept the $500,000 cash offered by the Surface Company. Each alderman was to receive $22,000. Three aldermen were convicted, six fled to Canada and three turned State’s evidence. Ten others were indicted but never brought to trial. After 1884 more scientific methods replaced the rough old ways, and New York City settled down to a steady stream of boss and machine rule, supported by small graft, blackmail, voluntary contributions and assessments on office holders. During the Croker régime, which commenced about this time, it was understood that men of means, or corporations who wanted “protection” in their property rights or in their various transactions, lawful or otherwise, were expected to send their checks for proportional sums to Croker without word or comment. For these contributions he could not be required to account as he held no public office. It was believed that Croker was fair to his contributors and that if trouble came they would be looked after. This surely was better than paying blackmail to all sorts of government officials. The machine therefore ran smoother than in Tweed’s time; and probably the same kindness towards political bosses is still practised by business men and corporations. There can be no legal objection to such methods, they are safe in every way. In 1889 the Fassett investigating committee appointed by the state senate took about 3500 pages of testimony in regard to city affairs showing that blackmail was systematically levied on gambling houses, liquor saloons, and other places. In 1892 there arose the “Huckleberry” street railway franchise scandal connected with the grant of a valuable franchise in the Bronx, New York City. In 1894 the Lexow Committee made a new state senate investigation into New York City politics, disclosing fraudulent voting under police protection; sale of police appointments at prices from $300 to $15,000; blackmail levied systematically on liquor sellers, gamblers, swindlers, and loose women. The revenue from these sources was estimated at $7,000,000 annually. This did not include contributions from corporations. In 1900 the so-called Mazet Senate Committee conducted a third investigation which brought out evidence tending to show that the mayor (Van Wyck) had been a party to a conspiracy to create a monopoly of ice in the City of New York. The essential meanness of a scheme to fatten on the needs of the poor during the sultry months was apparent even to the most stupid voter; the mayor became unpopular and at the end of his term retired to Paris with great wealth as it was said. The Mazet committee unearthed the fact that the city contracts went to politicians, not to business men.
Particulars of other scandals, such as the Ramapo Water Scheme; the system of judicial assessments for office, the silent partnerships of political leaders in city contracts, and police corruption must be omitted here for want of space. About 1900 the New York, Westchester and Boston Railroad Company, an adjunct of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, was seeking a franchise to enter New York City; it obtained it in 1904 from the New York municipal authorities. Ten years afterwards in 1914 it was ascertained in an investigation by the Interstate Commerce Commission that in order to get the franchise the Railroad Company had been required to distribute $1,500,000 in cash to politicians and to give a $6,000,000 contract to a business corporation controlled by politicians. This same corporation obtained other contracts from other quarters, about $15,000,000 in all, through political influence.