Popular misgovernment in the United States

by Alfred Byron Cruikshank

This view of the matter whereby it appears that an election is the first step in the process of the creation of a government requires the manhood suffrage question to be presented in a different form from the usual one which is, “Has a man as such a right to vote?” He has no such inherent or natural right, and the real question is whether he is of the proper material for use in the first process of democratic government making. It follows too that the burden is on the would-be voter to show that he is fit for that purpose. The mere fact that he is a dweller in the land cannot possibly confer upon him the right to inject poor material into the government-making process, any more than one of a number interested in a cider press would have the right to insist on putting decayed apples into the hopper.

But even if there was a natural right to vote Society would still have the power to regulate its exercise and to establish conditions thereof. Certainly Society would have the right to prohibit that exercise and it would be its duty to do so when the same would operate against the welfare of the community at large; or against the welfare of every other person in it except the voter himself; or even against the welfare of the majority of the citizens of the community. A man can no more have a natural right to injure his neighbor by his vote than by any other means; and just as he is free to use his personal liberty only to the extent to which his actions are harmless or beneficial to the community, so as a matter of natural right he should be only free to vote or legislate and take part in government affairs, great or small, to the extent to which his acts in that capacity are harmless or beneficial. In any aspect of the matter therefore Society has the right to limit the suffrage to such as are likely to exercise it for the benefit of the commonwealth.

Thus by disposing of the vague idea of a natural right to vote, the way is cleared for a consideration of the proper qualifications which Society should require from voters. That there are men and classes of men naturally incapable of exercising the judgment necessary to cast a ballot helpful to the community is known to all of us. Says Amiel in his Journal:

“The pretension that every man has the necessary qualities of a citizen simply because he was born twenty-one years ago, is as much as to say that labor, merit, virtue, character and experience are to count for nothing.”

Not only has the country the right to exclude incapables from the suffrage, but it is the patriotic duty of the good citizen to place a voluntary limitation on himself, and to refrain altogether from voting where through ignorance of the candidates or subject matter his vote cannot be intelligently cast. For, just as the voter is peremptorily called upon in casting his vote to disregard entirely his own interest and pleasure, and even to vote contrary to his interests and prejudices for the benefit of his country, so surely he can also be required in the public interest to surrender his privilege of voting, to remain altogether silent, and to allow the choice of men and measures to be made by his more intelligent neighbors. And it further follows, that where the ignorant voter knowingly and wilfully insists upon expressing his own opinion or prejudice at the polls in opposition to the judgment of another better qualified than he, his act is immoral and unpatriotic; and equally immoral and unpatriotic is the conduct of the legislator, writer or voter who knowingly countenances or assists in the enfranchisement of a class of people who are incompetent to vote on the questions to be presented to them, or to select the proper candidates for public offices.

Voting at a political election being an act of government, the proper test of the voter is that of capacity to govern. As Bagehot puts it:—

“Fitness to govern must depend on the community to be governed and on the merits of other persons who may be capable of governing that community. A savage chief may be capable of governing a savage tribe. He may have the right of governing it, for he may be the sole person capable of so doing: but he would have no right to govern England. Whatever may be your capacity for rule, you have no right to obtain the opportunity of exercising it by dethroning a person who is more capable; you are wronging the community if you do, if you are depriving it of a better government than that which you can give to it.... The true principle is, that every person has a right to so much political power as he can exercise, without impeding any other person who would more fitly exercise such power.... Any such measure for enfranchising the lower orders as would overpower and consequently disfranchise the higher should be resisted on the ground of abstract right; you are proposing to take power from those who have the superior capacity, and to rest it in those who have but an inferior capacity or in many cases no capacity at all.” (Parliamentary Reform, 1859.)

In calling to its counsels at the polls such citizens as the State may deem competent for that purpose, it is practically impossible to select individuals; but it is quite possible to designate certain classes to whom suffrage may or may not be permitted; and when these classes are open to receive accessions indefinitely upon conditions useful to the State and attainable by all, there is nothing in the whole transaction inimical to the best democracy, or of which complaint can be made on the ground of monopoly or injustice. The acquisition and judicious management of a reasonable amount of property are terms and conditions of just this character and experience has amply shown the necessity for their imposition in the interests of society.

To summarize this branch of the subject. The primary object of an ideal election is not to ascertain where lies the interest or to gratify the caprices or whims of individuals, but to continue and sustain, and if necessary to create the government of the country. The exercise of this function is in itself an act of government or in aid of government, and the privilege of participation therein is an acquired, a conferred authority or function, not a natural right, and should be bestowed solely for merit or capacity to be exercised in trust for the common benefit. It is the patriotic duty of all incapable, unprepared or unqualified citizens voluntarily to refrain from taking part in this function; and it is the right and duty of the State by appropriate legislation to exclude peremptorily therefrom all classes of men incapable of its proper exercise, and for this purpose to establish racial, property, educational, or other appropriate qualifications.

On the theory that the State itself may be supposed to have been originally inaugurated and its operations originally sanctioned by the suffrages of all its citizens as their creature and agent, a curious question has been raised by some writers, namely, on what ground the State can exclude from the constituent franchise a part, though ever so small, of its original creators or principals. Such writers have, however, overlooked the existence of a power higher and mightier than that of the State or of its inhabitants at any particular period; a power which is the real source of the authority of the State. This power is “Society,” and its relation to the subject of the franchise will be dealt with in the next chapter.