The picture which is here drawn sketches for us the consequences of allowing each individual to have control over the forces of nature. It is incredible that God could be induced to allow such control to individuals; but does it follow from this that He never listens to prayers respecting His direction of the forces of nature, and that consequently all such prayers are presumptuous? The conclusion does not seem to follow from the premises. The valid conclusion would rather be this: No one ought to pray to God to give him absolute control of the forces of nature. The prayer, "Lord, in Thy control of the forces of nature have mercy upon me and my fellow men," is a prayer of a very different character.
The objection to prayers for rain, or for the cessation of rain, and the like, is based on the supposition that we thereby "ask God to interfere with the regularity of the course of nature." Yet it is admitted that to "pray for submission to the Divine will, and for such wisdom as shall lead to compliance with it in the future, is a matter of course, and results inevitably from the relation between the spiritual Father and the spiritual child." But is there no regularity about the things thus admitted to be fit objects of prayer? Are human character and human intellect not subject to law? When we pray for a submissive spirit and for wisdom, are we not asking God to "interfere with that regularity" which governs the development of character and of intelligence? Either the prayer is to obtain more submission and more wisdom than we should otherwise get, or it is not. If it is to obtain it, then the regularity which would otherwise have prevailed is interrupted. If our prayer is not to obtain for us more submission and more wisdom than we should have obtained if we had not prayed, then the prayer is futile.
It will perhaps be urged that the two cases are not strictly parallel. They are not; but for the purposes of this argument they are sufficiently parallel. It is maintained that we have no right to pray for rain, because we thereby propose to interfere with the regularity of natural processes; yet it is allowed that we may pray for wisdom. To get wisdom by prayer is quite as much an interference with the regularity of natural processes as to get rain by prayer. Therefore, either we ought to pray for neither, or we have the right to pray for both. And so far as the two cases are not parallel, it seems to be more reasonable to pray for rain than to pray for submissiveness and wisdom. God has given our wills the awful power of being able to resist His will. Are we to suppose that He exercises less control over matter, which cannot resist Him, than over human wills, which He allows to do so; or that He will help us or not help us to become better and wiser, according as we ask Him or do not ask Him for such help, and yet will never make any change as to giving or withholding material blessings, however much, or however little, we may ask Him to do this?
The objection is sometimes stated in a slightly different form. God has arranged the material universe according to His infinite wisdom; it is presumptuous to pray that He will make any change in it. The answer to which is, that if that argument is valid against praying for rain, it is valid against all prayer whatever. If I impugn infinite wisdom when I pray for a change in the weather, do I not equally impugn it, when I pray for a change in the life or character of myself or of my friends? God knows without our asking what weather is best for us; and He knows equally without our asking what spiritual graces are best for us.
Does not the parallel difficulty point to a parallel solution? What right have we to assume that in either case effectual prayer interferes with the regularity which seems to characterize Divine action? May it not be God's will that the prayer of faith should be a force that can influence other forces, whether material or spiritual, and that its influence should be according to law (whether natural or supernatural) quite as much as the influence of other forces? A man who puts up a lightning-conductor brings down the electric current when it might otherwise have remained above, and brings it down in one place rather than another; yet no one would say that he interferes with the regularity of the course of nature. Is there anything in religion or science to forbid us from thinking of prayer as working in an analogous manner—according to a law too subtle for us to comprehend and analyse, but according to a law none the less? In the vast network of forces in which an all-wise God has constructed the universe a Christian will believe that one force which "availeth much," both in the material and in the spiritual world, is the earnest prayer of the righteous. It is better for us that we should be able to influence by our prayers God's direction of events than that we should be unable to do so; therefore a merciful Father has placed this power within our reach.[99]
[96] In the Dict. of Chr. Biogr., I., p. 615, Tertullian's account of public confession is given at some length, and then the question is asked, "Is not this, clearly, the exomologesis which St. James enjoins?" To this one replies that St. James enjoins confession, but says nothing about publicity.
[97] The Council of Trent anathematizes any one "who denies that sacramental confession was instituted of Divine right, or that it is necessary to salvation, or who says that the manner of confessing secretly to a priest alone, which the Church has ever observed from the beginning, and doth observe, is alien from the institution and command of Christ, and is a human invention" (Canon VI. ii. 165).
[98] Moreover, "shall absolve hym after this forme" was changed to "shall absolve hym after thys sorte," as if allowing another form in the Visitation of the Sick.
[99] Dean Plumptre has pointed out an "interesting coincidence" between this mention of Elijah and the account given by Josephus of Caligula's mad attempt to set up his statue in the Temple. P. Petronius Turpilianus had been appointed Governor of Syria in the room of Vitellius, and was commissioned to erect the statue; but he was much impressed by the earnestness of the Jews in opposing the proposed outrage, and promised large multitudes of them at Tiberias that he would do all in his power to induce Caligula to desist. It was a year of great drought, no rain falling even when the sky was overcast; but on this day, although there had been no previous signs of it, abundance of rain fell directly Petronius had finished his speech to the Jews. Josephus speaks of this as God showing His presence (παρουσία) to Petronius, and says that Petronius recognized it as a Divine manifestation (ἐπιφάνεια) of God's care of the Jews. Dr. Plumptre says that the people—"Christians, we may believe, as well as Jews"—had been praying for rain, and that Petronius regarded the rain "partly as an answer to the prayers of the people;" which may have been so, but it is not so stated by Josephus. "According to the date which, on independent grounds, has here been assigned to St. James's Epistle, the event referred to must have happened but a few months before, or but a few months after it. If before, he may well have had it in his thoughts; if after, it may well have been in part the effect of his teaching." Dr. Plumptre thinks that the Epistle was written between A.D. 44 and 51. The events recorded by Josephus took place A.D. 39. Caligula was assassinated January 24th, A.D. 41. The coincidence, therefore, breaks down upon examination. (1) The unexpected rain is represented, not as an answer to prayer, but as a sign of God's approval of the decision of Petronius. (2) Even if we place the Epistle as early as A.D. 45, it was written six years after the sudden rain at Tiberias; and St. James did not need that occurrence (of which he had possibly never heard) in order to be reminded of the drought and the rain prophesied by Elijah.