As to "structures organised to serve certain definite purposes," surely they offer no more difficulty as regards "scientific" explanation than the apparatus by which an orchid is fertilised.
We can work back to the am[oe]ba to find ourselves face to face with a scarcely organised mass of protoplasm. And then we find ourselves face to face with a problem which will, perhaps, for ever remain insoluble scientifically. But as for that, so is the primeval material of which it (protoplasm) is composed. "Matter" itself is evaporating, for it is being resolved by physical research into something which is intangible.
We cannot form the slightest idea how protoplasm [pg 097] came into existence. It is impossible to regard it as a mere substance. It is a mechanism. Although the chemist may hope to make eventually all the substances which protoplasm fabricates, and will probably do so, he can only build them up by the most complicated processes. Protoplasm appears to be able to manufacture them straight off in a way of which the chemist cannot form the slightest conception. This is one aspect of the mystery of life. Herbert Spencer's definition tells one nothing.
Science can only explain nature as it reveals itself to the senses in terms of consciousness. The explanation may be all wrong in the eyes of omniscience. All one can say is that it is a practical working basis, and is good enough for mundane purposes. But if I am asked if I can solve the riddle of the Universe I can only answer, No. Brunetière then retorts that science is bankrupt. But this is equivocal. It only means that it cannot meet demands beyond its power to satisfy.
I entirely sympathise with anyone who seeks an answer from some other non-scientific source. But I keep scientific explanations and spiritual craving wholly distinct.
The whole point of evolution, as formulated by Lyell and Darwin, is to explain phenomena by known causes. Now, directive power is not a known cause. Determinism compels me to believe that every event is inevitable. If we admit a directive power, the order of nature becomes capricious and unintelligible. Excuse my saying all this. But that is the dilemma as it presents itself to my mind. If it does not trouble other people, I can only say, so much the better for them. Briefly, I am afraid I must say that it is ultra-scientific. I think that would have been pretty much Darwin's view.
I do not think that it is quite fair to say that biologists shirk the problem. In my opinion they are not called upon [pg 098] to face it. Bastian, I suppose, believed that he had bridged the gulf between lifeless and living matter. And here is a man, of whom I know nothing, who has apparently got the whole thing cut and dried.—Yours sincerely,
W.T. THISELTON-DYER.