The deliberation of September 6, 1466, had placed the election of the highest magistrates for ten years in the hands of electors appointed by the Council of a Hundred. The heads of the party were accustomed to decide upon the names of these electors in an extraordinary meeting, and to lay them before the said council, which usually accepted them without further scruple, since only those not unfavourable to the party, even if they did not belong to its actual partizans, sat in this council. Sometimes, however, it occurred that the candidates were not all accepted, so that anxiety arose in the minds of Lorenzo and his confidants lest electors disagreeable to them might some day be appointed, and their influence over the Signoria and other high magistrates be thus limited. This seemed serious to them. However large, too, and constantly increasing an authority might be which was independent of the responsible magistrates forming the fabric of the State, the respect for forms was equally great, and is indeed a characteristic feature of these Italian communes; and their endeavour was to give to measures which gradually destroyed the spirit of the constitution the appearance of legality. In the summer of 1470, the Signoria, which was entirely subject to the Medici, made the first attempt in this direction. They proposed to the Council of a Hundred to form out of all the electors from the year 1434 who were still living, forty in number, and five new ones, a College of Electors. From this for the next sixteen years five might be annually drawn, with power to appoint the Signori and Gonfaloniere out of the lists or ballot-boxes containing the names of the citizens capable of office. The opposition to a measure which would have placed forty-five tyrants over the people was, however, so strong that the Signoria judged it advisable to withdraw the proposal. Six months later, in January 1471, something similar was, nevertheless, carried out. Instead of leaving the electors to be appointed by the Council of a Hundred, the Signoria sitting in July and August, together with the electors acting for the current year, agreed that they should appoint the new ones, the Council of a Hundred only confirm them, and a single voice above the half of the members present should give the casting-vote, whereas a majority of two-thirds of voices had previously been requisite. The same thing happened in the following July, and when the votes were collected it naturally followed that only the names of persons considered reliable came upon the electing tickets, so that the threads of the whole administration were more than ever confined to a few hands. Immediately after Piero de’ Medici’s death, under the plausible pretext that the war occasioned by the Malatesta affair was not yet at an end, an extraordinary tax of 300,000 gold florins was levied, so that the government was provided with funds for all emergencies.
‘By such measures,’ remarks Francesco Guicciardini, ‘Lorenzo de’ Medici began to gain firm footing in Florence. The prevailing party strengthened itself, and he obtained influence and reputation. So he began to wish to be lord and master. Instead of allowing himself to be guided by others, he took care that Messer Tommaso and the others who enjoyed high influence, and had a large number of relations to support them, should not become too strong. Although he never refused to send them on embassies, and confer on them the highest honours and offices, he held them within bounds, frustrated their intentions in several cases, and brought forward others who caused him no anxiety, as at first Messer Bernardo Buongirolami and Antonio Pucci, afterwards Messer Agnolo Niccolini, Bernardo del Nero, Pier Filippo Pandolfini, &c. He was accustomed to say that if his father had done so, and somewhat restrained Messer Diotisalvi and his companions, he would not have been in danger of losing his position in 1466.’ Another measure was taken with the evident intention of withdrawing the government of the city by degrees from all other influences than those of the Medici and their confidants. This time it concerned the lower classes, as that just mentioned did the higher. On September 20, 1471, the Balia appointed in July to superintend the new elections, reduced the number of smaller guilds from fourteen to five, so that there should be altogether only twelve guilds; but the property of the dissolved corporations should serve to form a new credit-fund for the salaries of the officials. But this measure, which had a wider significance than people seemed inclined to attribute to it in the first moment, was never carried into practice.[184]
When Piero died, foreign affairs were by no means secure. The dispute about Rimini was not terminated. Pope Paul II. was extremely indignant at the assistance which Florence and Naples had given his disobedient vassal, and by means of which this vassal had been able to oppose him successfully. He indulged in the most violent expressions against the Medici, even before the assembled Consistorium. His rage against Ferrante even led to action. The old quarrel between Rome and Naples on account of the feudal relation injurious to both, but still legal, had also come to an outbreak between Ferrante and Paul. The king did not pay the tribute, and, when enjoined to do so, was always ready with one excuse or another. Now it was the embarrassment into which troubles at home had plunged him, now it was the expenses for the aid granted to the Church in the contest with the restless counts of Anguillara. If pressed, he answered by claiming Benevento and Terracina and places in the Abruzzi, claims which were not always unfounded, in consequence of the complicated and wavering connections of the empire with the Church. At last, when all seemed to be peacefully settled, a quarrel broke out between the Pope and the Orsini, on account of the rights claimed by the latter over the Alum district of Tolfa, which Paul had contested with force of arms, while the king defended them in like manner. It went so far that Ferrante threatened to league himself with the Turks; the Pope, however, answered him by not only threatening to drive him from Naples, but by actually planning a new campaign against the Aragonese with John of Anjou. This happened just after the affair with Malatesta had ended, and who knows what intrigues would have been begun, had not the war of the Catalans against the Aragonese, in which Anjou commanded, occupied him till a higher hand interfered?
Under circumstances of this kind, the necessity of attaching themselves as firmly as possible to Naples and Milan was made clear to the people of Florence, and as long as Lorenzo lived this necessity always remained uppermost with him, even through momentary fluctuations. The conviction that no firm reliance was to be placed upon the two other great powers of Italy, Venice and the Pope, made the Florentines regard such an alliance as the salvation of Italy. Venice could not be trusted because her thirst for Italian conquest was proportionate to the danger of her Levantine possessions; nor the Pope, because the papal policy changed with every new ruler, nay, it altered several times under the same ruler. When the Pope, displeased with the Venetians, began to lean towards reconciliation, these natural allies determined to agree beforehand on the position to assume towards him. Plenipotentiaries from Naples and Milan came in the spring of 1470 to Florence for this purpose. But when difficulties arose, the consultation was transferred to Naples, whither Otto Niccolini went on behalf of Florence. On July 12 the news reached Florence that the alliance between the three states was prolonged for fifteen years, reserving the power of bringing about a general alliance of the Italian powers beside this special one—a piece of news which was celebrated with festivals and bonfires. It was indeed high time to unite. On the same July 12, the Turks took Negroponte. The besiegers suffered severe losses, but they avenged themselves by a fearful slaughter among the inhabitants and the garrison, and the Venetians had to expiate heavily their neglect in defending one of their most important fortresses. On August 7, they heard of the sad event through an announcement of King Ferrante’s. From all sides unity was now urged, in order to resist the formidable enemy, before whom the whole Archipelago, the Ionian Sea, and the entrance to the Adriatic, lay open. The Pope summoned an assembly of plenipotentiaries of all the Italian States to Rome, while at the same time he determined to compose the Malatesta contest by mediation. To effect an understanding was, however, difficult, because the three powers reserved their separate alliance, and Paul consented to this very unwillingly. Nevertheless, the treaty was concluded at Rome on December 22, express emphasis being laid on the article that the new league should rest on the basis of that which had been agreed upon at Venice at the end of August 1454, by the active mediation of Pope Nicholas V., when the conquest of Constantinople had first brought the threatened danger home to all. During the seventeen years which had elapsed since then, affairs had only grown worse. The Pope, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, the Republics of Venice and Florence, and Borso of Este, to whom the title of Duke of Ferrara had not long been granted, joined the alliance, which was to be extended over all Christendom, for which purpose Paul II. appointed the Cardinal of Siena, Francesco Todeschini Piccolomini, as legate to the Emperor and Empire. Jacopo Guicciardini had concluded the treaty on the part of Florence.
But this time also the result by no means corresponded to the general expectation. Sforza did not ratify the treaty, because the purport of the document did not suit his wishes in some important particulars. Although the Signoria of Florence sent in their ratification, Guicciardini suppressed it, because Lorenzo de’ Medici, who wished to hold with Milan, had given him secret instructions not to sign, so that things remained unsettled. In Germany and Hungary, where the Pope and Venice placed their chief hopes on King Mathias Corvinus, it was not much better. After the sanguinary Bohemian war, which the latter had waged against George Podiebrad, had weakened their strength on both sides, and the Turks, pressing on from Bosnia through Croatia and Carniola, had already set foot on the soil of the empire, and roused Emperor Frederick from his sleep, still nothing could be really effected by the Ratisbon Congress in the spring of 1471. As the princes here were dilatory and the towns disinclined for action, quarrels began anew in Italy. Not to mention the contest between Pope and King, disagreeable communications passed between the former and Florence. The Florentines were willing indeed to furnish subsidies for the Turkish war, but insisted upon including the clergy in the taxes, which the Pope refused to permit.
While this was proceeding, Paul II. died in the night between July 25 and 26, not fifty-four years old, and apparently in the enjoyment of perfect health. At a time when Christendom was everywhere torn by factions and threatened from without, when Italy saw herself exposed to the attacks of the infidels, as in the ninth century, the unity of her states being always problematical, the election of a Pope was of more importance than ever. Shortly before, several princes had passed away who had exercised more or less influence on the course of affairs—George Podiebrad, King of Bohemia, Borso of Este, John of Anjou, who concluded a life more eventful than successful at Barcelona, having only attained the age of forty-five years, and carrying with him to the grave the hopes of his old father René, and of his house. In him, a still numerous party in the south of Italy lost their head; yet they could not make up their minds to give in their allegiance decidedly to the Aragonese government, which seemed daily to grow stronger by its activity, talents, and alliances.
CHAPTER VI.
POSITION AND CONNECTIONS OF THE MEDICI.