Lorenzo de' Medici, the Magnificent (vol. 1 of 2)

by Alfred von Reumont

CHAPTER I.

THE PAZZI CONSPIRACY.

As the year 1478 approached, suspense became intense, in consequence of the events already described, and a political entanglement of some kind became more and more probable. No fear was entertained of intrigues at home. Eleven years had passed since the attempt to ruin the power of the Medici. The leaders of the Opposition were either dead or entirely powerless; a new generation was springing up, whose interests were mostly identical with those of the ruling family. All the modifications of the constitution had contributed to concentrate the power in comparatively few hands; those who longed for honourable posts and outward splendour obtained them according to their desire, while the money-makers never wanted means to enrich themselves, nor did the people lack diversions and the appearance of freedom; the system of taxation was so managed that those of whom the government did not feel certain were kept down, without a pretext being afforded them for opposition to an overstrong system. Lorenzo de’ Medici at this time was in his thirtieth year, and had ruled the state for nine years. All went its usual course: signorie, magistrates, and councils negotiated, concluded, and voted, as in former times; and a number of distinguished citizens conducted the business of every-day. But the leadership was always in one hand. Those who had insight into the state of home affairs and those abroad were by no means deceived regarding them. Lorenzo believed he should be left undisturbed. His brother does not seem to have been a hindrance to him. The plan of making Giuliano a cardinal had been given up, and an alliance with the daughter of the seigneur of Piombino and Appiani had been spoken of. Letters and petitions from abroad were addressed to both brothers, but we never hear of Giuliano’s interfering in affairs of State.

The danger arose from a combination of home and foreign affairs. Like his grandfather, Lorenzo had always been careful not to allow any of the families attached to him to become powerful enough to cause him anxiety. It may be easily understood that this constant endeavour to gain the upper hand, although it secured his position, gave rise to disaffection and hatred. Thus it was with the Pazzi. We have seen how this family, who at first did not find it easy to obtain popular favour, rose to high honours, and how closely they were allied to the Medici. Guglielmo de’ Pazzi had for years always been present at the tourneys, fêtes, and amusements of his brother-in-law. But in his case as in others Lorenzo does not appear to have deviated from his usual policy. He avoided allowing the Pazzi any part in such public offices as they might well claim, considering their position, and at times he appeared almost envious of the rising wealth of this family. Still, for several years harmony was preserved between them. Two letters directed to Lorenzo in 1474 by Jacopo de’ Pazzi, then at Avignon, professing gratitude for services rendered to him, and the hope of future good understanding, are preserved in the archives of the family. This, however, could not last long, nor was the fault all on the Pazzi side. In the year 1476, Lorenzo caused a law on the inheritance ab intestato to pass, which deprived Giovanni de’ Pazzi of the rich Borromeo succession to which his wife had a claim. Giuliano warned his brother, but in vain. Francesco de’ Pazzi, Jacopo’s nephew, who resided in Rome, considered himself ill-used by the magistracy of the Eight. Still it is hardly to be believed that the Pazzi would have put themselves at the head of a perilous enterprise in their native town, if complications in Rome had not brought on a crisis. In the ensuing tragedy, the Pazzi appear as chief actors, but it is more likely they were merely the instruments of Girolamo Riario.[223]

The connections between the Florentine family and the Pope arose from pecuniary affairs. We observed before how the money matters of Rome were chiefly in the hands of the Florentines, and, from the time of Pius II., in those of the Sienese. The Via de’ Banchi, leading to the bridge of St. Angelo, was filled with their counting-houses, and the names of the Altoviti, Niccolini, Strozzi, Chigi, still exist on the houses and various other buildings of that part. The Pazzi had also their banks in the vicinity of the bridge, and the then director was Francesco the nephew of Jacopo. The principal occasion of the misunderstanding between them and the Medici was afforded by the sale of Imola. Lorenzo was said to have attempted to render it impossible for the Pope, who had no spare cash, to raise the sum necessary by gaining over the other banking-houses to his interests. With the Pazzi, however, who had at first also consented, he could not succeed in the end, and by means of 3,000 gold florins advanced by them Girolamo Riario had become master of Imola. That this circumstance, if really true, must have led to a closer connection between the latter, is clear. When the relations between the Pope and Florence were disturbed by political events, the former took from the Medici the management of the finances of the Curia, the so-called ‘Depository,’ and handed over the business to the Pazzi. Sixtus IV. afterwards declared, when he reproached the Medici for their ingratitude, that it was through him that they had amassed wealth. It is uncertain whether, apart from the above circumstances, the adverse reports of the pecuniary position of the Medici, which had lately spread and were not groundless, and more especially of the bad state of their banking business in Flanders, were the real cause of this measure, so keenly affecting them and so hurtful to their credit, or whether they were a mere pretext for its adoption. Certain it is that thenceforward the Pazzi were closely attached to the Papal interest, and to that of Girolamo Riario, which was in this case identical with it. It is, however, evident from the whole course of events that the Medici, notwithstanding these circumstances, felt no distrust of their fellow-countrymen. Girolamo Riario had long been aware that the Florentines would constantly oppose his attempts to extend his dominion on their frontier. To them he ascribed the turn which the affair of Città di Castello had taken, which made it difficult, if not impossible, for the Pope to support his intentions with regard to that town. He did not think himself safe in the possession of Imola, so long as a good understanding lasted between the Republic and Taddeo Manfredi. After the death of the Duke of Milan, who had kept him in a sort of imprisonment, Manfredi had gone to Venice, and there openly complained of the violence which had been done him in the matter of the cession of the above named city to Sforza. Girolamo foresaw that his projects of annexing other possessions of the Manfredi, and his subsequent intentions on the Ordelaffi vicegerency, would meet with like obstacles. He erred in supposing that such plans would succeed better if an end were put to the influence then dominant in Florence; for the effects which he attributed to the special action of that influence were merely in accordance with the traditional maxims of Florentine policy. It was even a political necessity as long as the old system of balance of power existed, which, in regard to Romagna and Umbria, only ceased with the death of its last representative, Lorenzo de’ Medici. But it lay in the character and position of an upstart like Girolamo Riario, who knew that his rise and fall depended on the duration of one life, that of the Pope, to confuse what was nearest and most palpable with conditions which were dependent on individual persons and expressions of their wishes.

We shall certainly not be mistaken if we suppose that the Pope’s nephew first entered into connection with Francesco de’ Pazzi, who superintended the finances in Rome, and that both succeeded in gaining over the Archbishop of Pisa, who, having only entered upon office the preceding year, was just then in Rome. The removal of Lorenzo de’ Medici proved the turning-point of the whole undertaking, in what way appeared indifferent to the accomplices. That they could not reach him by so-called legal means, such as served in Florence to rouse a spirit of rebellion, must have been clear to them. Force must therefore be employed. The three were probably from the first agreed upon this. It was only a question of how and where. It was of importance to ascertain how the Pope would regard the plot, for without his consent nothing could be done. This was all the more necessary because Jacopo de’ Pazzi, when Francesco first revealed to him in Florence the plan of overthrowing the Medicean supremacy, did not show the least desire of taking part in such a venture, and it became clear to the others that they would achieve nothing by themselves. That Sixtus IV., in his irritated feeling towards Lorenzo and the Republic, would willingly offer a hand in the attempt to remodel affairs in Florence, was not to be doubted. But Girolamo Riario was also obliged to confess that his uncle would lend himself to no undertaking which would leave any stain on the honour of the Papacy. It was necessary, therefore, to keep a free hand for a revolution in Florence, and not to let the Pope see through their plans, and at the same time give him a false impression of the feeling prevailing in the city with regard to the Medici and the support they might expect. The nephew undertook this, and succeeded in it with a man whose many praiseworthy and even brilliant qualities were not sufficient to keep him out of the power of those who eventually brought dishonour on his name.

One of the difficulties of the undertaking consisted in being obliged to secure both brothers at the same time, for they perceived that the thing would fail if the possibility were afforded to the younger one of treading in the other’s footsteps. The attempt was first made of enticing Lorenzo to Rome, as, in his absence, they hoped to make away with Giuliano more easily. ‘That my wish may be fulfilled,’ wrote Girolamo Riario to him on January 15, 1478,[224] ‘that the public and private affairs of your Magnificence take a prosperous course, and it is known to me that various things have happened between his Holiness and the illustrious Signoria, in which your Magnificence, as the most distinguished citizen and head of the State, have had occasion to share, and which have somewhat disturbed his Holiness, it would please me much for the State and on account of your personal position if your Magnificence would resolve to come to Rome and present yourself to the Pope for the removal of all misunderstandings and doubts. I do not in the least doubt that the Holy Father would receive you with joy; while I, with the affection which I owe you from our mutual friendly relations, would behave so as fully to satisfy your Magnificence, and all considerations of grievance which may have arisen from the afore-named events would vanish.’

Lorenzo did not say No. He had no particular grounds for believing in the asseverations of Riario’s friendship, for his conscience told him he had not deserved them. But he might well wish to settle differences with the Pope while it was yet possible, he therefore had no desire to refuse the hand apparently extended for reconciliation. Owing to the uncertainty of his coming, his opponents resolved to be beforehand at all events, and prepare the means for executing their projects. For this it was certainly important to secure trusty adherents in Florence, to entrust a soldier with the guidance of affairs, and to take measures on the frontiers so as to follow up the advantage, if the coup succeeded, by advancing immediately an armed force. The leader, who could only be selected from Riario’s intimate friends, must at the same time make preparations in Florence. Giovan Batista da Montesecco, a captain of Abruzzi in the service of the Count, was the man who was considered suitable for the execution of this plan.[225] He was not unknown to the Medici. On September 24, 1477, he had communicated with them from Imola, regarding the soldiers of Marradi, who had announced themselves for service with Riario.[226] The first negotiation between the latter, Francesco de’ Pazzi, and the condottiere, took place in the Archbishop’s residence after Montesecco had sworn to betray nothing that might be confided to him. Salviati revealed to him that it was in the matter of a revolution at Florence that they counted on his support. When Montesecco, who was apparently a sensible and quiet man, remarked that he was not his own master, and could not undertake anything without the permission of the Pope and his nephew, he was answered that everything was undertaken not only by the consent of the latter, but precisely for the preservation and strengthening of his position; for if things in Florence remained as they were then, Riario’s rule would not be worth powder and shot on account of Lorenzo’s enmity, which, after the Pope’s death, would set everything in agitation to take from him his little state, as a quarrel had long existed between the two. The captain only answered that he should be ready for everything which should suffice to the honour and advantage of the Count and themselves, but all depended on the first step. Thus they parted to consult over the matter further on a suitable occasion. This was soon found. The Archbishop and Montesecco met in Riario’s house. A revolution in Florence, they said, was necessary, in order to secure the Count from Lorenzo’s evil intentions; but this revolution would be impossible if both Medici were not got rid of. The families of Salviati and Pazzi were so influential that half Florence would adhere to them; troops must be held ready near the frontiers in order to advance immediately on the city. Montesecco expressed concern. ‘My lords,’ he said, ‘see what you are bringing upon yourselves. Florence is no trifle, and, according to what I hear, Lorenzo has powerful adherents.’ Riario replied, ‘Others say the contrary; they are disinclined towards him, and the people would thank Heaven if both brothers were made away with.’ ‘Gian Batista,’ interposed the Archbishop, ‘you have never been in Florence, and we know better than you how it is with Lorenzo; that is our affair. It is only necessary to agree upon the method of proceeding. Above all, it is necessary to warm Jacopo de’ Pazzi, who is like a block of ice. If we are certain of him, we cannot doubt the result.’ ‘All very well,’ remarked the captain, ‘but our master, the Pope, what will he say to the matter?’ ‘Our master,’ replied the other two, ‘will always do what we advise him, and he also is prejudiced against Lorenzo, and wishes this more than anything.’ ‘Have you spoken with him about it?’ ‘Certainly, and we shall so arrange it that he will speak to you about it also.’ Upon this, measures were debated as to the time for drawing troops together in the Papal territories adjoining Florence, which were to be employed in a given case against the city,and to support the projected movements within her walls. Napoleone Orsini was to hold himself ready in the territory of Todi and Perugia; Lorenzo Giustini, the enemy of the Vitelli, in Città di Castello; Giovan Francesco da Tolentino in the district of Imola.