That the most varied tendencies were manifested at home was but natural. Not only the ancient opponents of the Medici raised their heads but even a few of their own party showed themselves lukewarm or disaffected. The heavy losses made the game easy for the former. It was said to be time to change a system which had lasted so long, and united all political power in the hands of a comparatively small number of families. Offices as well as burdens should for the future be no longer dispensed at the will of these few, but be granted and distributed by the old councils. The uncertainty of Lorenzo’s fate gave this party courage, while it made many of his adherents inclined to come to terms with them by a compromise. It seems, indeed, that they thought of choosing Girolamo Morelli, the former ambassador in Milan, as a new leader. The friends of the Medici thought they had gained much if they prevented a change till Lorenzo’s return. Piero Guicciardini, the historian’s father, was one of those most active in his behalf. The unfavourable position of foreign affairs had been rendered still worse at the moment of his departure. Without regarding the armistice still existing, Lodovico and Agostino Fregoso had by a coup-de-main seized upon Sarzana, which had been only eleven years in the possession of Florence. When the Republic complained to the leaders of the Neapolitan and Papal army, these expressed themselves angry at the breach of peace by the Genoese, and commanded them to leave the city. But they were not expelled; and the Florentines suspected, certainly not without ground, that the Duke of Calabria had had a hand in the game, in order to increase, for his advantage, the number of claims in the forthcoming treaties of peace. The military situation was likewise much injured by the departure of the Venetians, and the exhaustion and disunion of the Florentines gave no prospect of improvement.[306]
The connection with the lords of Romagna was also uncertain. As may easily be understood, the latter followed the negotiations of the Florentines with their former enemies with the greatest anxiety, for their very existence depended on the result. This was particularly the case with Galeotto Manfredi. After the defeat at Poggio Imperiale Costanzo Sforza had marched to Romagna with as many men as could be spared, in order to protect his own territories and those of the Malatesta and Manfredi from an attack which was most to be dreaded by the latter if it came from Imola. But the precaution was not sufficient to pacify Galeotto. On the other side the Florentines could not submit to the capture of their best general Roberto Malatesta, so they ordered an ambassador and 200 men to Faenza in order to protect its master. Gismondo Manfredi, Taddeo’s son, remained in the service of the Republic, and also Antoniello Ordelaffi, Cecco’s son, the rightful heir to Forli, which was withheld from him by his uncle Pino, whom the Pope favoured. Costanzo Sforza felt safer than the other petty lords on account of the Milanese relationship; but a real mutual confidence was not to be thought of, even here.[307]
While affairs were in this state in Florence, Lorenzo de’ Medici was occupied with troubles of another kind.
His appearance in Naples was exceedingly distasteful to the Pope. From the first Sixtus had perceived the king’s inclination to agree to favourable terms, the final result of which he easily foresaw. But, if powerless to prevent an understanding, he would at least have a personal share in it, and insisted that Lorenzo should come to Rome. However, the latter showed no inclination to take the journey, and was strengthened in his objection by Ferrante.[308] Lorenzo Giustini, who had been deputed to Naples by the Pope, left no argument unused to persuade him. When all this resulted in nothing, and the treaty between the king and Florence seemed to take a favourable course, Sixtus IV. despatched a special plenipotentiary Antonio Crivelli. The detailed instructions given to this man put the whole course of affairs and the relations of the Pope and king in the clearest light. ‘After the events in Florence had taken a course so displeasing to the Church,’ says the Pope in this remarkable document,[309] ‘we held it best to hear the king’s opinion of the imprisonment of the cardinal and other things; and, as his Majesty by several writings not only agreed with us, but called upon and encouraged us to take up arms, with the offer and promise to make every exertion and put his son’s and his own life at stake, in order to avenge this insult shown to the Holy See, it was unanimously determined to begin the war against Lorenzo and his adherents as the stumbling-block and disturber of the peace of Italy. At the same time the freedom of Florence must be restored, to which we and the king’s Majesty have pledged ourselves by autograph and other documentary writings, being moved thereto by Lorenzo’s evil proceedings and the disturbances caused by him in Italy. Lorenzo likewise has endeavoured to sow dissension between us and the king, and to dissolve the alliance in favour of one drawn up by himself.’
After the Pope had remarked that the ingratitude of Lorenzo was all the greater because he had won treasure by means of the Holy See, he expatiated on the course of the war, which was only begun when spiritual weapons availed nothing, on the attempts of foreign powers to terminate the strife with due respect to the Holy See and the king, and the great advantages obtained in 1479. When peaceful overtures were made by Milan, the king declined them. At the time it had been remarked by several cardinals that he only did this in order to transfer the negotiations to Naples, and be able to ascribe all the merit to himself, and likewise to negotiate with Lorenzo without any regard to the Holy See, as at present was actually the case, according to the report of the royal ambassador. While the Pope was led to believe that the king agreed with him in views and treatment of affairs, the latter had let a number of other considerations influence him. They had decided to insist upon Lorenzo’s banishment from Florence; and then came the king’s doubt as to whether it would be possible to attain this, and whether there was not danger of his returning like his grandfather Cosimo. Little as the Pope believed in the validity of the reasons urged, as he thought that the principal end of the undertaking was overlooked, and that Lorenzo, having shown himself to be so bad when they were doing him good, would be found still worse now that he was irritated, he had yet persuaded himself to agree to a reconciliation with Lorenzo as the king wished, if the conditions demanded by him through his ambassador could be obtained, while, if this did not happen, the war should be continued. The king had commanded the captains of his army to continue operations although they thought of pacification, and on the showing of the Duke of Calabria the prospect of reconciliation offered by the enemy diminished the prospect of success. He had answered that by negotiation he would neither tie his own hands nor those of the army. Even then the Pope had complied with the king’s wishes, although his son’s opinion had seemed to him correct.
‘Scarcely had this occurred,’ continued Sixtus, ‘than the armistice followed, which filled us with surprise and displeasure, and confirmed us in the suspicion awakened. Therefore we refused decidedly to acknowledge it, and only yielded to the ambassador’s urgency, and because we perceived that we could not continue the war alone; under the express stipulation, however, that, if the conditions of peace should suffer thereby, we should never pardon the king for it. We made a virtue of necessity, but to our serious displeasure, for we saw how we missed the victory while we were deprived of the satisfaction of liberating Florence from these tyrants, and restoring freedom and quiet to her and peace to all Italy. The hope still remained to us that as the king had turned us whither he wished, he would at least conclude peace on the conditions mentioned, and would have some regard to the honour of God, the Church, and himself. Lorenzo went to Naples. The king announced to us he knew nothing of his movements, but in spite of all, if Lorenzo should refuse to accept the stipulations agreed upon, he would dismiss him. In a case of this kind we must stake the tiara and the whole States of the Church, and his Majesty would venture the crown and ten kingdoms, if he had them, to effect Lorenzo’s expulsion and complete ruin.’ The Pope had demanded that Lorenzo should come to Rome and beg for forgiveness, and that the lords of Romagna, who were guilty of rebellion, should do the same. Lorenzo so decidedly declined the former, that the king requested the Pope to withdraw this demand. He, Sixtus, refused this, however, for it was a point which the king disregarded—the only satisfaction he would receive in the whole affair. Respecting the lords of Romagna, the king desired that time might be afforded to them to fulfil their obligations, if the Pope would not leave it to the king to arrange the matter with them. Both conditions were refused, as also the proposal to send ambassadors to Milan at the same time as the king, to settle the other conditions of peace. The Pope had repeatedly shown that the king had it in his power to terminate the matter by force of arms if he fulfilled the conditions of alliance; and as Lorenzo was in his power, and would yield to him whether willing or not, he might also be induced to negotiate. Instead, however, of breaking with Lorenzo as he had hinted he should in case the latter refused to accept the conditions offered him, he treated him more kindly every day he was in Naples. The Pope wished for peace. In order to attain this peace he had begun the war, which had already cost him a heap of money. But he would purchase no peace with his dishonour.
The position of affairs is rendered quite clear by these instructions. Ferrante was inclined to come to terms with Lorenzo, but the Pope’s representations could not fail to make some impression on him. Lorenzo did not conceal this from himself, though he appeared content and cheerful before others, but when alone he had many heavy and anxious hours. His letters to the Ten prove this, by the manner in which he describes the rising and falling of his hopes. The affairs of Romagna increased the difficulties considerably; for if Ferrante believed that he had freedom to act in regard to Florentine affairs, inasmuch as he had not to pay attention to Siena, he found himself tied here towards the Pope. Florence did not cease to urge including the dynasties of Romagna in the peace. ‘The lords of Romagna who are in our pay,’ wrote Agnolo della Stufa on January 4, 1480,[310] ‘are warmly commended to you for our own honour’s sake. For if they are left to the will of the Pope, I consider them as lost, for I know how the priests act. No one will believe in our protection any more. If the king, as I hope, receives us as his devoted sons, he must be also careful to preserve us this reputation as long as he can.’ No less skill was needful to continue the negotiation, as the Duke of Calabria, who speculated on the weakness of the Florentines, was exceedingly disinclined towards it. Perhaps Lorenzo’s aim would not have been attained had he not won over the most distinguished counsellor of the king, Diomede Carafa, Count of Maddaloni, son of that Malizia Carafa who had been so active in the cause of King Alfonso of Aragon. In the endless street which the people had named Spacca-Napoli, near the Dominican convent, is the palace where he resided—a building of architectural value. In the court of this house, once adorned with the colossal antique horse’s head, the arms of the city, King Ferrante had on one occasion stood waiting for the faithful servant who was to accompany him. Diomede Carafa was a man of distinction. He had served under King Alfonso, aided in the conquest of Naples, and penetrated within a few miles of the capital in the Florentine war of 1452. As superintendent of finance he had great influence on the administration—an influence which brought him into violent opposition to the king’s private secretary, a quarrel the fatal ending of which cast a dark shadow on the later period of Ferrante’s reign. With the king and his children, especially the second son Don Federigo, he stood in the most intimate connection. He shared Lorenzo de’ Medici’s interest in literature and art; and, if he was far from rivalling him in his high literary gifts, he showed in several smaller works of a didactic kind, in books on war and courtlife, in the rules of behaviour for the king’s daughters Beatrice and Eleonora, a practical understanding, knowledge of business, and experience of the world that was very rare.
The Count of Maddaloni was not the only one whom Lorenzo gained over to his interest. Naples at that time was a city full of busy life and varied culture, which had been promoted first by King Alfonso and then by his sons, in which Lorenzo must have felt himself all the more at home as the literary connections with his native city were various, and many of the artistic circle which had been so intimate with his family for three generations, beginning with Donatello, had laboured here, while the Florentine banking-houses had the greater part of the money matters of the Neapolitans in their own hands. From the royal family, members of which had repeatedly been his guests, to the citizens and country people, increasing affection was shown him, as Pope Sixtus had said. The Duchess of Calabria, remembering old friendship, became, as the king expressed it, his fellow-ally, and reminded him in later years of their wanderings at the villa—probably that near the Riviera di Chiaja of the present day—between the banks and the heights of Vomero, then with a free prospect over sea and shore, which is now changed into the Ferrandina palace with the adjoining gardens and buildings. ‘The present letter will not be one of those which refer to alliance and State affairs, but will merely bring to your remembrance that we always think of you, although we are by no means certain that you often think of our garden, which is now most beautiful and in full bloom.’[311] The century was not wanting in highly-cultivated women, but Ippolita Maria, who excelled so many in grace, also exceeded the ladies of her time in literary knowledge; and as her familiarity with Cicero’s writings was praised, so did she also shine in her knowledge of Greek, in which Constantinos Lascaris had been her teacher. Her learning did not diminish her womanly charm.[312] Lorenzo lived in Naples en grand seigneur, spared no expense, gave banquets and made presents, and dowered poor girls who came to him from the provinces. He purchased the freedom of a hundred galley-slaves, and gave them new clothes.[313] But that he urgently wished to attain his purpose and be able to return home may be well understood, for the ground under him was not safe either here or there. When the king presented him with a beautiful horse, he remarked, in thanking him, that the man who would be the bearer of good news needed indeed a swift steed.
At length the main conditions of the treaty were agreed upon, and without having come to a formal conclusion Lorenzo deemed it possible to quit Naples, and to leave further steps to the Republic. At the end of February he departed by sea as he had arrived. Three months had passed, a time full of doubts and fears, but crowned with success. ‘He landed,’ says Niccolò Valori, ‘in Livorno, from whence he went to Pisa. In the harbour and town he was received with such a manifestation of joy, with such signs of attachment and shouts of applause from the whole population, that the place itself seemed to join in the rejoicing. But it is impossible to describe how he was received at his entry into Florence. Young and old, men and women, flocked together. The people and the nobles rejoiced together to see him return safely. To all he gave his hand kindly and gratefully. The people embraced each other for joy.’ But a reaction soon set in. On the evening of March 17 a compact was published, which had been concluded on the 13th at Naples by Agostino Biliotti and Niccolò Michelozzi in the name of the Republic.[314] They had made peace; but the conditions were not easy, and the suspicion arose among the people that the most oppressive articles were kept secret. If all the circumstances are considered, however, the conditions were supportable. The Florentines had been conquered, and from whatever point of view the cause of the war might be judged, the fact of defeat could not be denied.
On March 25, 1480, the feast of the Annunciation, peace and alliance were formally proclaimed throughout Florence, and a grand procession took place headed by the statue from Sta. Maria dell’Impruneta, which was brought into the city for the purpose. The two opponents bound themselves mutually to defend their states; the occupied places should be restored to the Florentines, but at the king’s own time, and with the exception of Castellina and a part of the Chianti, which was to be given to Siena. The Duke of Calabria was to be paid a salary under the name of condotta. The Pazzi imprisoned in the tower of Volterra were to be restored to freedom. The lords of Romagna were not included in the treaty of peace but the king pledged himself to preserve their interests. Lorenzo had exerted himself in vain in this respect. Ferrante out of regard for the Pope was not to be moved. The dynasties, with the exception of the Ordelaffi, had not to complain later, as we shall see. Efforts on behalf of the Chianti had likewise been fruitless. Lorenzo endeavoured to show how advantageously it would affect the future connections of the Republic with the king if their territory remained undiminished.[315] It offended the Florentines most of all that they did not even receive a promise respecting Sarzana, the restitution of which they had tried to obtain during the negotiations, in order to diminish the number of claims of compensation from their opponents. The demand of payment to Girolamo Riario which had been threatened them, and would indeed have been an insult, was allowed to remain in abeyance. ‘The conditions,’ remarks Francesco Guicciardini, ‘were not unfavourable to the vanquished.’ But the populace in Florence were not of the same opinion. That they were not satisfied with the demeanour of Lodovico Sforza and his influence on the negotiation is shown by a letter of the Duke of Ferrara to his ambassador, wherein he requires him to represent to Lorenzo that he would do well to go as much as possible hand in hand with Milan, even if some things in the compact were displeasing. He was not to forget that Florence and Milan were two states whose interests coincided, and whose true union would be useful to both, as it had been before.[316]