Lorenzo could not fail to notice that in Louis XI. he lost both a friend and a supporter. The political situation of France foreboded the worst vicissitudes. A delicate illtrained boy of thirteen was left heir to a kingdom which a long, skilful, and despotic reign had considerably enlarged, but also filled more terribly than ever with the elements of discord. The Queen-mother, Charlotte of Savoy, was an invalid, and incapable of acting; according to Louis’ arrangements his elder daughter Anne, wife of Pierre de Bourbon, Count of Beaujeu, was to conduct the government for Charles VIII. without the title of regent. Amid the opposition of the nobles, of whom one, Louis of Orleans, was the next heir to the throne, this task was fulfilled with no little skill by the Princess, then aged twenty-two, of whom her father once said that ‘no woman was wise, but Anne was the least foolish.’ It was she who thwarted all the plans of the restless nobles and put down their attempts to arm. She paved the way for the union of Brittany with the crown, by interfering with the views of Maximilian of Austria who, after the early death of Mary of Burgundy, contemplated extending the new possessions of the house of Habsburg into the very heart of France by his marriage with the heiress of the great western duchy. It is evident, however, that under all the circumstances there was not much chance of French influence extending into Italy or anywhere beyond the borders of the country itself.
Immediately after the death of Louis, Florence despatched an embassy to present to the young king good wishes on his accession, and to express sincere regret for the loss of his father.[265] Gentile Becchi, Antonio Canigiani, and Lorenzo de’ Medici the son of Pier Francesco, were the members of this embassy, which was to visit the potentates of Northern Italy on its way. Its chief object was the fulfilment of formalities. If any intention should be shown on the French side of interfering to restore peace in Italy, the envoys were instructed to take care that this should appear to proceed from an independent resolve of the French government, and not from the influence of the allies (for at that time the war with Venice was still going on). This would be the best way ‘to avoid dangerous conjunctures which might arise in Italy from these obstinate dissensions,’ and at the same time remain most honourable for the young king. But Anne de Beaujeu, who had just summoned the States-General in order to checkmate the allied princes by the same move which they had intended to make against her, had other things to think of than Italian complications; and the Florentine embassy, after all due ceremonies had been gone through, seems to have had to deal merely with commercial and personal interests.
Five years later the Regent of France remembered the old friendship with the Medici, when she was looking about her on all sides for help against the great feudatories who supported Maximilian in his alliance with the mightiest of them all, the Duke of Brittany. On April 5, 1486, Maximilian was crowned king of the Romans at Aachen; and in spite of the great difficulties with which he had to contend in his Burgundian provinces, his position was a very threatening one for France so long as internal peace was not restored, and every addition to his power was an addition to the cares of Anne de Beaujeu. The advanced age of Frederic III. pointed to a speedy vacancy of the imperial throne. That the idea occurred to France of trying to prevent Innocent VIII. from confirming Maximilian’s election is, however, somewhat startling. The Pope was on friendly terms with the emperor and the king; just before, at the end of 1487, he had given proof of this by signing the treaty which put an end to the long-standing war between Venice and Archduke Sigismund of Tyrol. On February 8, 1488, a letter was sent in the name of the young king Charles to Lorenzo de’ Medici, claiming his friendship for the royal house of France and soliciting the employment of his influence with the Pope, in order that Maximilian’s kingly dignity, as injurious to the interests of France, should remain for a time unconfirmed. ‘You may assure the Holy Father that if the matter is delayed, we will so conduct ourselves that his Holiness and all who have anything to do in the matter shall perceive the result.’[266]
It is very clear that Lorenzo, with all his attachment to France, was reluctant to mix himself with such an intrigue as this. ‘By the copy of a letter from the King of France to me,’ he wrote on February 8 to the ambassador at Rome, ‘you will see the king’s desire and the importance of the affair. For practical reasons I do not think it fitting to write to his Holiness; but I am for your informing him of it with your usual adroitness as soon as you think good, and pointing out to him its importance and possible consequences; for I am of opinion that mature reflection and deliberation are needful, that the investiture in question may not give occasion to embarrassment and offence. According to my judgment, the Most Christian king is so powerful and has so much influence in the affairs of Christendom, that it will always appear to me advisable to keep in harmony and friendship with him. I shall always order myself according to the wise judgment of his Holiness; but wish first fully to express my own view. The rest I leave to you, and I shall be glad if you can manage so that the king’s plenipotentiary is pleased. But you will not neglect any precautions which may appear needful, that we may not lose in one quarter what we gain in another.’ Lorenzo was right in his caution. ‘The French envoys,’ reports the Ferrarese ambassador at Florence to his duke on March 10,[267] ‘have petitioned the Pope that he should not invest Maximilian with the dignity of King of the Romans, declaring that, should he do so, their king will set every influence to work at Naples to avenge the insult. The Pope gave them a very sharp reply, saying that no request had as yet been addressed to him in relation to this matter by Maximilian’s orators; and, moreover, he thought that such a message as that just delivered to him must have come not from the King of France, but from his evil counsellors. If he had only the latter to deal with, he would soon be able to make them understand how unworthy of a Pope was such a message, and how his footstool deserved greater reverence.’
CHAPTER IV.
POLITICAL CARES. THE BARONS’ WAR.
After the disturbance and unrest which ended the pontificate of Sixtus IV., the reign of Innocent VIII. seemed destined to commence in peace and tranquillity. The Pope’s desire to terminate the long dispute about Sarzana, which had distracted the Lunigiana for years, and threatened to assume dimensions greater than the worth of the cause, was very honourable to him, especially as it did not arise from partiality for his Genoese home. On September 17, only three weeks after his election, the Pope summoned the ambassadors of Naples, Florence, and Milan[268] to discuss the political situation. After the recent conclusion of peace, he said he considered it a duty of his apostolic office to ensure that peace, in order that all the Italian states might really enjoy its fruits and recover from the heavy expenses which had burthened the holy see with a debt of more than 250,000 ducats. The dispute about Sarzana, complicated by the Florentine attack on Pietrasanta, made him anxious in consideration of the disposition of the Genoese; for the latter, where their honour was at stake, would not scruple to set the world on fire, and had already, in times past, called the foreigner into Italy. He knew that they were not only in league with the Marquis of Saluzzo and Philip of Savoy, lord of Bresse, but were trying to stir up the Duke of Orleans against Milan and the Duke of Lorraine against Naples; in which they would get support from France, as the regent was desirous to find occupation for these princes, and sustenance for their numerous troops in a foreign land. The commonwealth of Genoa had applied to him to bring the matter to a legal conclusion. He knew that his predecessor had made an unsuccessful attempt to do so; but as a native of Genoa, and being in a more favourable position than Pope Sixtus, he hoped to attain his object, as the Signoria would doubtless do all in their power to compose the strife.
The ambassadors of Naples and Milan kept to generalities, though the former could not help owning that Sarzana had been taken from the Florentines in time of truce; that the blame really lay with the son of his king he naturally could not admit. Vespucci, however, went thoroughly into the matter. Sarzana, said he, was sold to the Republic by Lodovico Fregoso, the lord of the place. After we had held it for several years, his son Agostino took it by surprise in time of truce, and as he did not feel able to keep it, made it over to the bank of San Giorgio. In defiance of law and custom, which forbid the acceptance of an object in dispute, the bank received it just as if there were no such place as Florence in the world. Florence has a perfect right to make every effort to get back her own. She has equally a right to attack Pietrasanta, because Pietrasanta is an obstacle and an enemy to her. The Signoria, he added, has no thought of giving your Holiness advice, which you do not need, and is willing to agree to any reasonable compromise. But after all the unsuccessful efforts of Pope Sixtus, there is not much to be hoped. As to the possible introduction of foreigners by the Genoese, that is a matter not to be deemed unworthy of consideration, but it is not a ground for anxiety. The Dukes of Orleans and Lorraine personally are not in a condition to begin such an undertaking; and in the exhausted state of France her rulers will never think of giving them a sou towards it. The Genoese alone would be utterly incapable of holding out long, even were they differently inclined. The Ferrarese ambassador offered his Duke’s mediation in case of a negotiation. The Pope had also consulted on the matter with Cardinal Ascanio Sforza, and expressed his anxiety to him; whereupon Lodovico il Moro declared that nothing but the voluntary surrender of Sarzana on the part of Genoa could render a satisfactory termination possible.[269] Innocent’s mediation came to nothing. The Florentines took Pietrasanta, as has been already related, and the contest went on amid numberless suggestions of compromise for fully three years more.