[II]. Bacon as an Aristotelian, [372]—History the matter of science, [373]—Bacon’s method of arrangement taken from Aristotle, [374]—Origin of his confusion between Form and Law, [375]—The superinduction of Forms and the atomic theory, [376]—Relation of the Novum Organum to the Topics, [377]—The method of negative instances, [378]—The Lord Chancellor and Nature, [379]—The utilisation of natural forces brought about by a method opposed to Bacon’s, [380]—Association of the formal philosophy of Aristotle and Bacon with the geocentric astronomy, [381].
[III]. The philosophic importance of the Copernican system first perceived by Giordano Bruno, [382]—How it led to a revival of Atomism, [383]—Common pantheistic tendency of the anti-Aristotelian schools, [384]—The analytical method applied to mathematics, [385]—Survival of Aristotelian ideas in the physics of Galileo, [385]—His affinities with Plato, [386]—Influence of Platonic ideas on Kepler, [387].
[IV]. Descartes’ theory of Matter derived from the Timaeus, [388]—and developed under the influence of Democritus, [389]—How the identification of Matter with Extension led to its complete separation from Thought, [390]—The denial of final causes a consequence of this separation, [390]—Difference between the Cartesian and Baconian views of teleology, [391]—Doctrine of animal automatism, 391—Localisation of feeling in the brain, [392]—The Cogito ergo sum and its antecedents in Greek philosophy, [392]—Descartes interprets Thought after the analogy of Extension, [393]—Revival of the Stoic and Epicurean materialism: transition to Hobbes, [394].
[V]. Hobbes not a link between Bacon and Locke, [395]—The different meanings which they respectively attached to the notion of experience, [395]—Deductive and mathematical method of Hobbes, [396]—His opposition to the ethics of Aristotle, 397—His identification of happiness with power, [398]—Subordination of the infinite to the finite in Greek philosophy, [398]—Contrast offered by the illimitable aspirations of the Renaissance, [399]—Elements out of which Spinozism was formed, [400].
[VI]. Platonic method of Spinoza, [401]—The limiting principles of Greek idealism, [402]—Their tendency to coalesce in a single conception, [403]—Similar result obtained by an analysis of extension and thought, [404]—Genesis of Spinoza’s Infinite Substance, [405]—The uses of unlimited credit in metaphysics, [406]—Spinoza’s theory of cognition, [407]—The identity of extension and thought, [408].
[VII]. Influence of Aristotle’s logic on Spinoza, [409]—Meaning of ‘the infinite intellect of God,’ [410]—Contingency as a common property of extension and thought, [411]—The double-aspect theory not held by Spinoza, [412]—The distinction between necessity and contingency in its application to ethics, [413]—The study of illusion in Malebranche and Molière, [414]—Intellectual character of Spinoza’s ethics, [415]—Parallel between knowledge and virtue, [416]—Enumeration of the Greek elements in Spinoza’s philosophy, [417].
[VIII]. The place of Scepticism in Greek thought, [418]—Parallel between Locke and the New Academy, [419]—Results obtained by a complete application of the analytical method, [420]—Close connexion between philosophy and positive science, 420—Increased prominence given to ethical and practical interests by the method of Locke, [421]—The idea of Nature and the revival of teleology, [422]—New meaning given to hedonism by modern philosophy, [423]—The Stoic side of modern utilitarianism, [423]—Different combinations of the same ideas in ancient and modern systems, [425].
[IX]. Conflict between analytical criticism and scholasticism, [426]—The theory of evolution as a new application of the atomistic method, [427]—Transitional character of the principal systems of the nineteenth century, [428]—Aristotelian ideas in modern French thought, [428]—Contrasting relations of ancient and modern philosophy to theology, [430].
THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS.