53. Abu ´l-Mughíth al-Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr al-Ḥalláj.
He was an enamoured and intoxicated votary of Ṣúfiism. He had a strong ecstasy and a lofty spirit. The Ṣúfí Shaykhs are at variance concerning him. Some reject him, while others accept him. Among the latter class are `Amr b. `Uthmán al-Makkí, Abú Ya`qúb Nahrajúrí, Abú Ya`qúb Aqṭa`, `Alí b. Sahl Iṣfahání, and others. He is accepted, moreover, by Ibn `Aṭá, Muḥammad b. Khafíf, Abu ´l-Qásim Naṣrábádí, and all the moderns. Others, again, suspend their judgment about him, e.g. Junayd and Shiblí and Jurayrí and Ḥuṣrí. Some accuse him of magic and matters coming under that head, but in our days the Grand Shaykh Abú Sa`íd b. Abi ´l-Khayr and Shaykh Abu ´l-Qásim Gurgání and Shaykh Abu ´l-`Abbás Shaqání looked upon him with favour, and in their eyes he was a great man. The Master Abu ´l-Qásim Qushayrí remarks that if al-Ḥalláj was a genuine spiritualist he is not to be banned on the ground of popular condemnation, and if he was banned by Ṣúfiism and rejected by the Truth he is not to be approved on the ground of popular approval. Therefore we leave him to the judgment of God, and honour him according to the tokens of the Truth which we have found him to possess. But of all these Shaykhs only a few deny the perfection of his merit and the purity of his spiritual state and the abundance of his ascetic practices. It would be an act of dishonesty to omit his biography from this book. Some persons pronounce his outward behaviour to be that of an infidel, and disbelieve in him and charge him with trickery and magic, and suppose that Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr Ḥalláj is that heretic of Baghdád who was the master of Muḥammad b. Zakariyyá[[95]] and the companion of Abú Sa`íd the Carmathian; but this Ḥusayn whose character is in dispute was a Persian and a native of Bayḍá, and his rejection by the Shaykhs was due, not to any attack on religion and doctrine, but to his conduct and behaviour. At first he was a pupil of Sahl b. `Abdalláh, whom he left, without asking permission, in order to attach himself to `Amr b. `Uthmán Makkí. Then he left `Amr b. `Uthmán, again without asking permission, and sought to associate with Junayd, but Junayd would not receive him. This is the reason why he is banned by all the Shaykhs. Now, one who is banned on account of his conduct is not banned on account of his principles. Do you not see that Shiblí said: “Al-Ḥalláj and I are of one belief, but my madness saved me, while his intelligence destroyed him”? Had his religion been suspected, Shiblí would not have said: “Al-Ḥalláj and I are of one belief.” And Muḥammad b. Khafíf said: “He is a divinely learned man” (`álim-i rabbání). Al-Ḥalláj is the author of brilliant compositions and allegories and polished sayings in theology and jurisprudence. I have seen fifty works by him at Baghdád and in the neighbouring districts, and some in Khúzistán and Fárs and Khurásán. All his sayings are like the first visions of novices; some of them are stronger, some weaker, some easier, some more unseemly than others. When God bestows a vision on anyone, and he endeavours to describe what he has seen with the power of ecstasy and the help of Divine grace, his words are obscure, especially if he expresses himself with haste and self-admiration: then they are more repugnant to the imaginations, and incomprehensible to the minds, of those who hear them, and then people say, “This is a sublime utterance,” either believing it or not, but equally ignorant of its meaning whether they believe or deny. On the other hand, when persons of true spirituality and insight have visions, they make no effort to describe them, and do not occupy themselves with self-admiration on that account, and are careless of praise and blame alike, and are undisturbed by denial and belief.
It is absurd to charge al-Ḥalláj with being a magician. According to the principles of Muḥammadan orthodoxy, magic is real, just as miracles are real; but the manifestation of magic in the state of perfection is infidelity, whereas the manifestation of miracles in the state of perfection is knowledge of God (ma`rifat), because the former is the result of God’s anger, while the latter is the corollary of His being well pleased. I will explain this more fully in the chapter on the affirmation of miracles. By consent of all Sunnites who are endowed with perspicacity, no Moslem can be a magician and no infidel can be held in honour, for contraries never meet. Ḥusayn, as long as he lived, wore the garb of piety, consisting in prayer and praise of God and continual fasts and fine sayings on the subject of Unification. If his actions were magic, all this could not possibly have proceeded from him. Consequently, they must have been miracles, and miracles are vouchsafed only to a true saint. Some orthodox theologians reject him on the ground that his sayings are pantheistic (ba-ma`ni-yi imtizáj ú ittiḥád), but the offence lies solely in the expression, not in the meaning. A person overcome with rapture has not the power of expressing himself correctly; besides, the meaning of the expression may be difficult to apprehend, so that people mistake the writer’s intention, and repudiate, not his real meaning, but a notion which they have formed for themselves. I have seen at Baghdád and in the adjoining districts a number of heretics who pretend to be the followers of al-Ḥalláj and make his sayings an argument for their heresy (zandaqa) and call themselves Ḥallájís. They spoke of him in the same terms of exaggeration (ghuluww) as the Ráfiḍís (Shí`ites) apply to `Alí. I will refute their doctrines in the chapter concerning the different Ṣúfí sects. In conclusion, you must know that the sayings of al-Ḥalláj should not be taken as a model, inasmuch as he was an ecstatic (maghlúb andar ḥál-i khud), not firmly settled (mutamakkin), and a man needs to be firmly settled before his sayings can be considered authoritative. Therefore, although he is dear to my heart, yet his “path” is not soundly established on any principle, and his state is not fixed in any position, and his experiences are largely mingled with error. When my own visions began I derived much support from him, that is to say, in the way of evidences (baráhín). At an earlier time I composed a book in explanation of his sayings and demonstrated their sublimity by proofs and arguments. Furthermore, in another work, entitled Minháj, I have spoken of his life from beginning to end; and now I have given some account of him in this place. How can a doctrine whose principles require to be corroborated with so much caution be followed and imitated? Truth and idle fancy never agree. He is continually seeking to fasten upon some erroneous theory. It is related that he said: Al-alsinat mustanṭiqát taḥta nuṭqihá mustahlikát,[[96]] i.e. “speaking tongues are the destruction of silent hearts”. Such expressions are entirely mischievous. Expression of the meaning of reality is futile. If the meaning exists it is not lost by expression, and if it is non-existent it is not created by expression. Expression only produces an unreal notion and leads the student mortally astray by causing him to imagine that the expression is the real meaning.
54. Abú Isḥáq Ibráhím b. Aḥmad al-Khawwáṣ.
He attained a high degree in the doctrine of trust in God (tawakkul). He met many Shaykhs, and many signs and miracles were vouchsafed to him. He is the author of excellent works on the ethics of Ṣúfiism. It is related that he said: “All knowledge is comprised in two sentences: ‘do not trouble yourself with anything that is done for you, and do not neglect anything that you are bound to do for yourself,’” i.e., do not trouble yourself with destiny, for what is destined from eternity will not be changed by your efforts, and do not neglect His commandment, for you will be punished if you neglect it. He was asked what wonders he had seen. “Many wonders,” he replied, “but the most wonderful was that the Apostle Khiḍr begged me to let him associate with me, and I refused. Not that I desired any better companion, but I feared that I should depend on him rather than on God, and that my trust in God would be impaired by consorting with him, and that in consequence of performing a work of supererogation I should fail to perform a duty incumbent on me.” This is the degree of perfection.
55. Abú Ḥamza al-Baghdádí al-Bazzáz.
He was one of the principal Ṣúfí scholastic theologians (mutakallimán). He was a pupil of Ḥárith Muḥásibí, and associated with Sarí and was contemporary with Núrí and Khayr Nassáj. He used to preach in the Ruṣáfa mosque at Baghdád. He was versed in Koranic exegesis and criticism, and related Apostolic Traditions on trustworthy authority. It was he who was with Núrí when the latter was persecuted and when God delivered the Ṣúfís from death. I will tell this story in the place where Núrí’s doctrine is explained. It is recorded that Abú Ḥamza said: “If thy ‘self’ (nafs) is safe from thee, thou hast done all that is due to it; and if mankind are safe from thee, thou hast paid all that is due to them,” i.e., there are two obligations, one which thou owest to thy “self” and one which thou owest to others. If thou refrain thy “self” from sin and seek for it the path of future salvation, thou hast fulfilled thy obligation towards it; and if thou make others secure from thy wickedness and do not wish to injure them, thou hast fulfilled thy obligation towards them. Endeavour that no evil may befall thy “self” or others from thee: then occupy thyself with fulfilling thy obligation to God.
56. Abú Bakr Muḥammad b. Músá al-Wásiṭí.
He was a profound theosophist, praiseworthy in the eyes of all the Shaykhs. He was one of the early disciples of Junayd. His abstruse manner of expression caused his sayings to be regarded with suspicion by formalists (ẕáḥiriyán). He found peace in no city until he came to Merv. The inhabitants of Merv welcomed him on account of his amiable disposition—for he was a virtuous man—and listened to his sayings; and he passed his life there. It is related that he said: “Those who remember their praise of God (dhikr) are more heedless than those who forget their praise,” because if anyone forgets the praise, it is no matter; but it does matter if he remembers the praise and forgets God. Praise is not the same thing as the object of praise. Neglect of the object of praise combined with thought of the praise approximates to heedlessness more closely than neglect of the praise without thought. He who forgets, in his forgetfulness and absence, does not think that he is present (with God), but he who remembers, in his remembrance and absence from the object of praise, thinks that he is present (with God). Accordingly, to think that one is present when one is not present comes nearer to heedlessness than to be absent without thinking that one is present, for conceit (pindásht) is the ruin of those who seek the Truth. The more conceit, the less reality, and vice versâ. Conceit really springs from the suspiciousness (tuhmat) of the intellect, which is produced by the insatiable desire (nahmat) of the lower soul; and holy aspiration (himmat) has nothing in common with either of these qualities. The fundamental principle of remembrance of God (dhikr) is either in absence (ghaybat) or in presence (ḥuḍúr). When anyone is absent from himself and present with God, that state is not presence, but contemplation (musháhadat); and when anyone is absent from God and present with himself, that state is not remembrance of God (dhikr), but absence; and absence is the result of heedlessness (ghaflat). The truth is best known to God.