ISOLATION OF THE SOUTHWEST: 1863

Until the latter part of 1863 the Union was unable to hamper the growing cotton traffic from Texas to Mexico. According to the United States Navy Department, there were frequently several hundred ships standing off the mouth of the Rio Grande depositing goods in the Matamoros-Bagdad area and picking up Texas cotton for trans-oceanic shipment. Before the war, scarcely a half-dozen vessels visited these Mexican towns each year.[73] Because the Rio Grande was an international body of water, the Union was unable to blockade it. Foreign vessels, claiming to be trading with Mexico, could not legally be denied use of it. About the only way that this trade could be neutralized was for a Federal force to seize the Texas side of the river and to establish a patrol system to intercept all cotton haulers.[74] Most cotton for the Mexican trade was transported overland by ox wagon from agricultural regions for distances of up to five hundred miles or more. Convoys of three to fifteen ponderous wagons, well equipped with food and water, would normally take about three months to complete a round trip to the Rio Grande. Once across the river, the bales would be exchanged for blankets, shoes, powder, and chemicals used in the manufacturing and servicing of weapons of war.[75]

A small portion of Texas cotton was carried to the outside world by blockade runners. When the Union tightened its blockade against the southeastern part of the Confederacy, a number of runners shifted their bases of operation to the less closely patrolled coast of Texas. By 1863 Tampico, Vera Cruz, and Belize (British Honduras) had become rendezvous areas for cotton runners and cotton purchasers.[76] To gain maximum benefit from cargo space available in ships that were to run the blockade, screw-jacks were used to compress the bales of cotton into holds. It soon became a source of pride among stevedores to force the greatest number of bales into a given ship. In fact one unfortunate vessel was sunk when “over-ambitious bale handlers compressed the cargo through the bottom of the ship.”[77]

Weapons and ammunition continued to be critically short in Texas. General Magruder, in 1863, estimated that 40,000 arms were needed to defend the Department of the Trans-Mississippi West.[78] With only a trickle of guns coming from outside sources, the state continued to urge local craftsmen to produce them. A cartridge factory was set up in the old land office building in Austin. Also in the capital city were a cap factory and a state foundry. Another cap factory, that used home-made machinery, was in Gillespie County. A limited number of firearms were fabricated in Rusk (Whitescarver and Campbell Co.) and near Tyler (Short, Biscoe and Co.) Elsewhere, tiny weapons shops were busy in Dallas County, and in the towns of Columbia, Lancaster, and Marshall.[79]

The first half of 1863 saw campaigning in the Mississippi Valley that was seriously to affect the future of Texas. United States forces sought to wrest control of the great river from the Southerners. As Grant maneuvered to take Vicksburg, northern Confederate stronghold on the great river, Banks moved through Louisiana in preparation for an onslaught against Port Hudson, lowest Mississippi River point still held by the South. To scatter and confuse enemy defenders, Banks advanced on Port Hudson in such a way as to endanger key points in Louisiana.[80] These disruptive thrusts caused many Louisiana planters to bring their slaves into Texas to escape possible capture.[81] Also, Banks’ probes caused many Texas regiments to be shifted to Louisiana, where they were to assist in blocking Banks’ column. Pyron’s Regiment was one such Texas force. As it hurried from Galveston towards Niblett’s Bluff, on the Sabine River enroute to Louisiana, a distinguished British military observer reported on the unit’s appearance as it paraded by:

First came eight or ten instruments braying discordantly, then an enormous Confederate flag, followed by about four hundred men moving by fours—dressed in every variety of costume, and armed with every variety of weapon; about sixty had Enfield rifles; the remainder carried shot-guns (fowling pieces), carbines or long rifles of a peculiar and antiquated manufacture. None had swords or bayonets—all had six-shooters and bowie knives.[82]

Finally, when Banks withdrew to the east of the Mississippi River and proceeded to concentrate against Port Hudson, most Texas commands in the area were shifted to the Red River Valley of northern Louisiana.[83]

That summer the Union forces captured Vicksburg and Port Hudson, thus gaining full control of the Mississippi River. By instituting a very tight gunboat patrol system, the Union was able to transform this river into a formidable barrier that cut the Southwest away from other states of the Confederacy.[84] To size up the new situation Lieutenant General Edmund Kirby Smith, commander of the Confederate Department of the Trans-Mississippi West, called for a conference with the governors of Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri. The meeting was held at Marshall in mid-August of 1863. The key question to be discussed was that of Kirby Smith’s powers. While the governors showed a reluctance to admit it, the General would obviously have to become virtual dictator of the isolated trans-Mississippi region. Only in that way could the states involved gain the vital strength in leadership that would allow them to remain undefeated. Tacit recognition of Kirby Smith’s need for extensive control was indicated by the governors’ agreement that he should supervise all defenses and oversee all future cotton transactions with Mexico.[85]

As the Marshall Conference was in progress, the Union War Department ordered an invasion of Texas. In view of French gains against the Juarez government of Mexico, General Banks was told that “there are important reasons why our flag should be restored in some points of Texas with the least possible delay.”[86] Left to his own discretion as to the exact point of attack, Banks decided to land an expedition at Sabine Pass. The main defense of the Pass was an unimpressive earthwork named Fort Griffin which commanded the narrows about one and a half miles below Sabine City. The fort had six guns and was manned by Company “F” of the First Texas Heavy Artillery. This particular unit, under Captain F. H. Odlum and Lieutenant Dick Dowling, was composed of Irish stevedores who had been recruited in Houston and Galveston.

At midnight on September 6, a sentry sighted ship signals off the coast. Because the company commander was absent, Dowling assumed command of the fort. By mid-morning a fleet of twenty-two transport ships and five gunboats was standing off Sabine Pass. On board the vessels was an invasion force of 5,000 men. Until the following dawn the ships stood off the narrows, and then the shelling of Fort Griffin commenced. Dowling, who wished to draw the enemy closer, offered no fire in response. Finally, when three of the enemy gunboats had been lured to within a very close range, the Confederate cannoneers opened with a tremendous barrage of fire. In forty-five minutes the battle ended with Dowling the complete victor. His guns sank two gunboats, damaged one, and drove off the remaining ships. He took three hundred and fifty prisoners, killed almost one hundred men, and gained a number of Federal weapons and supplies. No injuries were suffered on the Southern side, although some of Dowling’s guns were almost ruined by the heat of the rapid firing. The men of the company were highly honored for this success, and their incredible victory served to boost the morale of Texas and of the Confederate cause.[87]