Notwithstanding all that has been said and written upon this subject, I have no hesitation in expressing the opinion, that had not the President and his advisors, stood in such ungrounded fear for the safety of Washington, and had not withheld McDowell's forces at a time when their absence was a most serious blow to the plans of General McClellan, the close of the year would have seen the Rebellion crushed, and the war ended.
At the commencement of the campaign I had an interview with General McClellan, and he expressed the utmost confidence in his ability, provided his plans were fully supported and carried out, to gain the objective point of the war, and to accomplish the reduction of the rebel capital. My force of operatives had been diligently at work in procuring what information that was possible of attainment, of the numbers of the enemy, and with such success that in March I was able to report the approximate strength of the rebel army at 115,500 men, apportioned about as follows:
| At Manassas, Centerville and vicinity, | 80,000 |
| " Brooks' Station, Dumfries, &c., | 18,000 |
| " Leesburg, | 4,500 |
| In the Shenandoah Valley, | 13,000 |
| ———— | |
| Total, | 115,500 |
In gaining this important information, Timothy Webster, Pryce Lewis, John Scobell and a host of other efficient members of my force, some of whom have already been mentioned in these pages, deserve especial credit for their sleepless energy in prosecuting the work that had been assigned to them.
On the 4th of April the forward movement was made, and the siege of Yorktown was begun. The result of this siege the student of history already knows, a simple detention of the Army of the Potomac, until the enemy could occupy and fortify Richmond. Here is where McClellan suffered from the detention of McDowell at Washington—he had prepared a plan with McDowell as one of its principal actors, and with that force withdrawn, the General's intentions were not only radically interfered with, but seriously deranged.
During this time the rebel army was being daily reinforced and strengthened, until, by June 26th, its numbers were swelled to nearly 200,000 effective men. McClellan, on the contrary, starting as he did, with a smaller army than he thought was necessary to cope with the enemy, found himself, when before their fortifications, after being deprived of McDowell's division, with an army of less than 90,000 effective troops.
Another element in this campaign must not be lost sight of. The Navy, whose co-operation and assistance had been promised and relied upon, was unable to aid him at all. Can it be wondered at, therefore, that his plans, however well laid, and whatever their merits, viewed from a military stand-point, or the stand-point of common sense, failed in their execution.
One writer, in speaking of the treatment of General McClellan, has well said: "A general of high spirit and sensitive soul might have found in the government's action the occasion for sending in his resignation; but General McClellan continued in command, accepted the situation, and endeavored to make the best of it."
And still another has said, although inclined to be partial and unfair, in his account of the battles of Antietam and Fredericksburg:
"His capacity and energy as an organizer are universally recognized. He was an excellent strategist, and, in many respects, an excellent soldier. He did not use his own troops with sufficient promptness and vigor to achieve great and decisive results, but he was oftener successful than unsuccessful with them; and he so conducted affairs that they never suffered heavily without inflicting heavy loss upon their adversaries. It may appear a strange statement to follow the other matter which this volume contains, but it is none the less true, that there are strong grounds for believing that he was the best commander the Army of the Potomac ever had." Concluding a comparison, that redounds much to the credit of General McClellan, both as a soldier and a patriot, the same writer says: