Bystander, while freely admitting that the Theistic theory is compassed with difficulties; and requires "re-statement," reminds us that the-"materialistic hypothesis is not free from difficulty." The difficulty he discovers in materialism relates to the order of priority of matter and force. He asks:—
"Which of the two is the First Principle? Force cannot have been produced by matter, for without force, matter cannot move, change, or generate at all. Matter cannot have been produced by force, because force is nothing but the impulsion of matter. Apparently there must have been something before both, which produced them and determined their relations; and it must be something beyond the range of sense."
Bystander. I think, has not correctly apprehended the materialistic position here, and hence the argument for a "something before both matter and force which produced them," being built upon a postulated premiss which we cannot accept, has no weight in establishing the existence of a God behind matter and force. His error lies in the assumption of the possibility of matter and force existing separately and independently. He asks, "Which of the two is the First Principle?" Our answer is, there can be no first as between matter and force, for there can be no matter without force, and vice versa. The two are inseparable, even in conception, and the existence of one is absolutely essential to the existence of the other. Hence the argument proceeding from the assumption of their divisibility and possible independence fails. The Theist has no right whatever, logically speaking, to assume that there "must have been something before matter and force which produced them." So long as matter and force are amply adequate (as far as we can discern) to the production of all cognizable phenomena, we are not warranted in assuming the existence of any being or thing behind them. As soon as the Theist does this, we have the logical right to carry his reasoning further, and at once assume something else behind it again, and thus not only one but a thousand gods could be postulated without the shadow of real proof of one of them.
There is an ultimate ground, however, upon which the Theist and Materialist may meet in common, and, so far as I can see, the only ultimate position they can occupy in perfect corelation. The universe exists; man as a part of the universe—a mode of existence—is here; in this we agree. Man, then, being himself the highest intelligence he knows of, continually seeks an explanation of the universe and of himself as a part of it. This is the common ground upon which we all stand—Rationalist, Theist, Agnostic, Atheist—barbarous and civilized—the weakest and the mightiest intellect.
All seek to explain the great mystery of the universe—some one way, some another—from the rude thaumaturgic fancies of the primitive barbarian up to the abstruse speculations and subtle reasonings of the cultured Pantheist, intellectual Agnostic, and logical Materialist. It is true one may be more reasonable and logical than the rest (as I undoubtedly think is the case), yet they all occupy the common ground of uncertainty. Not one can demonstrate his position, and in this we are all alike. (One, however, among all the rest thinks he knows he is right and can prove it, viz., the dogmatic Christian Theist.) We may all, therefore, stand together in the presence of Nature and acknowledge our ignorance. Though each school has its theory, its hypothesis, its solution, yet the mystery of the mighty universe is still an unsolved problem.
REPLY TO "A RATIONALIST"
We have another reply to Ingersoll in a pamphlet of twenty pages, issued in Toronto, with the following modest title:—"A Refutation of Col. R. G. Ingersoll's Lectures, by 'A Rationalist.'" This proemial announcement is certainly calculated to excite high expectations; but it is only necessary to look into the rational (?) "refutation" (?) to see that the names the writer has given himself and pamphlet are both misnomers. How such an irrational jumble of orthodoxy, heterodoxy, obsolete philosophy, and moribund metaphysics could by any possibility pass for rationalism, even in the eyes of its author, is one of those profound mysteries which "no fellah can understand." Is it not a little singular that all these "replies" and "refutations" from the orthodox side come from theological nondescripts—from men who are but half orthodox (the other half not being recognizable), and not one reply from a thoroughly orthodox champion? A correlative fact, not without much significance, is that, though no argument comes from the orthodox side, the denunciations all come from that source. On the other hand in proportion as the opposing champion is unorthodox, in that ratio is he tolerant, courteous, and in favor of free speech and equal rights. "A Rationalist's" essay is pervaded by the kindliest spirit personally towards his opponent, and this, in a measure, redeems its literary and logical defects.
Though "Rationalist" zealously defends the Bible, and argues for a God, it is impossible to tell how much of the Bible he accepts, or what God he believes in. He says, "every jot and tittle of the Bible is inspired," yet in another place tells us, "The Apostle Paul is not one of the inspired writers," as "His words will not bear a spiritual interpretation." It would, therefore, seem that no part of the Bible is inspired except that which will stand this method of "spiritual interpretation." To get rid of the numerous errors, absurdities, and immoralities contained in the Bible, "Rationalist" spiritualizes them. He has a first-class recondite and spiritual meaning for every one of them, which seems to be entirely satisfactory—to himself. With the utmost facility everything is explained away; and armed with his occult style of Bible exegesis he can laugh at the infidel scientist. He says we must "rub off the literal meaning" in order to get at the spiritual, and by this convenient method every difficulty between the two sacred lids vanishes into thin air. This "rubbing off" business he also applies to the God of the Bible, whose characteristic anthropomorphism "Rationalist," of course, rubs all off, even his intelligence. So that there would seem to be little more left of the Jewish Jehovah, under modern scriptural exegesis, than what Beecher describes as a "dim and shadowy influence." "Rationalist" divests Deity of intelligence to escape the effects of the following argument:—
Intelligence presupposes a greater intelligence,
God has intelligence,
Therefore, there must be an intelligence greater than God.