"The belief in God has often been advanced as not only the greatest, but the most complete, of all the distinctions between man and the lower animals. It is, however, impossible, as we have seen, to maintain that this belief is innate or instinctive in man. On the other hand, a belief in all-pervading spiritual agencies seems to be universal; and apparently follows from a considerable advance in the reasoning powers of man, and from a still greater advance in his faculties of imagination, curiosity and wonder. I am aware that the assumed instinctive belief in God has been used by many persons as an argument for His existence. But this is a rash argument, as we should thus be compelled to believe in the existence of many cruel and malignant spirits, possessing only a little more power than man; for the belief in them is far more general than of a beneficent Deity. The idea of a universal and beneficent Creator of the universe does not seem to arise in the mind of man, until he has been elevated by long-continued culture."
I would refer the reader who wishes to pursue the subject further, to Livingston's writings, to Sir J. Lubbock's "Prehistoric Times," and his "Origin of Civilization," and also to the Anthropological Review for August, 1864.
Mr. Wendling's next argument to prove the existence of a personal God is the once celebrated but now obsolete "design" argument of Catwell and Paley; but he seems either not to know or he ignores the fact that this "design argument" has been so thoroughly refuted by the sternest logic and most indisputable natural facts that the more advanced theologians of the present day have wholly abandoned it. To reproduce these, or to give any elaborate refutation, it is unnecessary here. The whole matter may be disposed of briefly by one or two simple syllogisms which everybody can comprehend. The famous "design argument," then, may be formulated into simple syllogistic propositions thus:—
Whatever manifests design must have had a designer:
The world manifests design;
Therefore, the world must have had a designer.
This is the whole Christian reasoning on the subject in a nutshell, and it has been considered by them perfectly conclusive and unanswerable. The logic is certainly unexceptionable, that is, the conclusion is quite legitimate from the premises; but it so happens that the premises are unsound, and in such a case the most unexceptionable logic goes for naught. If premises be erroneous, though the reasoning be ever so good, the conclusion must be erroneous. The major premiss of the foregoing syllogism, that "whatever manifests design must have had a designer," is a pure assumption, if by design is meant adaptation in Nature. So, likewise, is the minor premiss an assumption if by design is meant anything more than the adaptation pervading the universe, or at least that part cognizable to us. That the fitness and adaptation observable in Nature do not establish intelligent design, is amply shown by the highest authorities—by the most eminent naturalists (Hæckel, Darwin, &c.) of the present day, to whom the reader is referred, and I need not here amplify in that direction. Nor is it at all necessary for my present purpose and work. It is only necessary to apply the teductio ad absurdum to the above argument from design to show its utter fallacy. We will admit the premises and carry the reasoning of our Christian friends out a little further. By granting the truth of their major proposition and reasoning, logically from it we can prove more than is wholesome for the theologian, as thus:—
Whatever manifests design must have had a designer:
God, in his alleged personality and attributes, manifests design;
Therefore, God must have had a designer.
It will thus be seen that Mr. Wendling's design argument from Catwell and Paley proves entirely too much for his own good, and hence it is that the astute theologians of the day have abandoned Paley and his design argument to their fate, where they have been duly relegated by the incisive logic of the modern materialist.
Finally, Mr. Wendling comes to the moral argument, and in conscience finds proof of the existence of a personal God. He complacently avers that "God made man with this omnipresent 'I ought' implanted in his nature." Now, in the first place, it is a great mistake that this "I ought" or conscience is universally implanted in man—is "omnipresent," as Mr. Wendling puts it. That there are tribes without the moral sense of conscience, is sustained by the same unimpeachable authorities referred to in proof of the absence in them of any theistic conception or belief; and even in civilized (?) society we unfortunately find an occasional specimen of the genus homo with no noticeable trace of that "variable quality" we call conscience.
That conscience is innate in man, and a God-given faculty, instead of acquired by development, is another convenient assumption without any substantial foundation. If conscience is a Divine gift to humanity, how is it that consciences differ so widely, not only in degree, but in kind? If conscience is a Divine "monitor" and "guide" from heaven, why is it that it so often becomes a very blind guide, and leads people into many by-paths? How is it that under the sanction of conscience the most horrid crimes and cruelties against humanity have been committed in the name of God, its alleged author? How is it, if conscience is an "unerring guide" to conduct, implanted by God, that it has guided man, in the name of its author, to let out the life blood of his fellow-creatures in rivers, on account of differences of opinion conscientiously entertained? Does God give one man one sort of conscience and another man another and wholly different sort, leading them in opposite directions, and then prompt the conscience of one to put the other (his fellow) to death for conscience sake and for God's sake? If so, it is very questionable work, surely, for a good (?) God to be engaged in! If God implants the conscience in man, why not be fair and just and give all men consciences? and give them all the same article? and not give one man a tolerably good article of conscience (the Freethinker, for example) and then go and give others (some of our Christian friends, for example) so poor an article, so to speak—so flexible and elastic—that it allows them to murder, cheat, lie, slander, rob widows and orphans, and run away with other people's money and other men's wives without compunction—without any troublesome pangs from this universal "I ought" over which Mr. Wendling grows so eloquent!
The Christian world has been quite long enough teaching an irrational and absurd doctrine about conscience. They not only blunder as to its origin, but as to its nature and functions. Nearly every Christian writer defines conscience as an "inward monitor" to tell us right from wrong; a divine faculty enabling us to "judge between the good and the bad;" a "guide to conduct," &c, &c. In the light of our present mental science this definition of conscience is utterly false. Conscience is not an intelligent faculty at all—it is simply a feeling. By modern metaphysics conscience has been relegated from the domain of the intellect to its proper place among the emotions. Hence it decides nothing, judges nothing as between right and wrong, or anything else, for that is a function of intellect. Conscience, instead of being a "guide" or "judge," is but a blind impulse needing itself to be guided. It is simply a feeling for the right—a thirsting for the good—but the intellect must decide what is right; and the nature and character of its decisions will depend upon various circumstances, such as organization, education, &c.; and the decisions of different individuals as to right and wrong will differ as those circumstances differ. We hear a great deal about "enlightening the conscience;" but it cannot be done. You might as well talk of enlightening a sunflower, which instinctively turns its head to the light; or a vine, which instinctively creeps up the portico. The intellect, however, may be enlightened. Reason, which is the only and ultimate arbiter and guide to conduct, may be enlightened; and we may thus modify, guide and direct the blind impulses of conscience. The truth is, conscience in man, such as it is, is a development—is acquired rather than innate; has been developed by Nature instead of "implanted" by God. The moral sense, without doubt, gradually developed in man as he rose in the scale of intelligence. Where there is little or no intelligence, the moral sense would be inapplicable and incongruous, and is not needed, hence does not exist. When it is required, Nature, in perfect keeping with all her other adaptations, develops it. Darwin, in the "Descent of Man," vol. i, pp. 68-9, says:—