I
PALLIATIVES OR CORRECTIVES FOR THE DIS-
CONTENT OF WOMAN . . . . . . . 155
What are the Suffragist's Grievances?--Economic and
Physiological Difficulties of Woman--Intellectual
Grievances of Suffragist and Corrective.
APPENDIX
LETTER ON MILITANT HYSTERIA . . . . . . 167
PREFACE
IT has come to be believed that everything
that has a bearing upon the concession of the
suffrage to woman has already been brought
forward.
In reality, however, the influence of women
has caused man to leave unsaid many things
which he ought to have said.
Especially in two respects has woman re-
stricted the discussion.
She has placed her taboo upon all general-
isations about women, taking exception to
these on the threefold ground that there would
be no generalisations which would hold true of
all women; that generalisations when reached
possess no practical utility; and that the ele-
ment of sex does not leave upon women any
general imprint such as could properly be
brought up in connexion with the question of
admitting them to the electorate. 11
Woman has further stifled discussion by
placing her taboo upon anything seriously un-
flattering being said about her in public.
I would suggest, and would propose here
myself to act upon the suggestion, that, in con-
nexion with the discussion of woman's suf-
frage, these restrictions should be laid
aside.
In connexion with the setting aside of the
restriction upon generalising, I may perhaps
profitably point out that all generalisations,
and not only generalisations which relate to
women, are ex hypothesi [by hypothesis] subject to individual
exceptions. (It is to generalisations that the
proverb that "the exception proves the rule"
really applies.) I may further point out that
practically every decision which we take in or-
dinary life, and all legislative action without
exception, is based upon generalisations; and
again, that the question of the suffrage, and
with it the larger question as to the proper
sphere of woman, finally turns upon the ques-
tion as to what imprint woman's sexual sys- 12
tem leaves upon her physical frame, character,
and intellect: in more technical terms, it turns
upon the question as to what are the secondary
sexual character[istic]s of woman.
Now only by a felicitous exercise of the fac-
ulty of successful generalisation can we arrive
at a knowledge of these.
With respect to the restriction that nothing
which might offend woman's amour propre [self love]
shall be said in public, it may be pointed out
that, while it was perfectly proper and equit-
able that no evil (and, as Pericles proposed,
also no good) should be said of woman in pub-
lic so long as she confined herself to the do-
mestic sphere, the action of that section of
women who have sought to effect an entrance
into public life, has now brought down upon
woman, as one of the penalties, the abrogation
of that convention.
A consideration which perhaps ranks only
next in importance to that with which we have
been dealing, is that of the logical sanction of
the propositions which are enunciated in the 13
course of such controversial discussions as that
in which we are here involved.
It is clearly a precondition of all useful dis-
cussion that the author and reader should be in
accord with respect to the authority of the gen-
eralisations and definitions which supply the
premisses for his reasonings.
Though this might perhaps to the reader
appear an impractical ideal, I would propose
here to attempt to reach it by explaining the
logical method which I have set myself to fol-
low.
Although I have from literary necessity em-
ployed in my text some of the verbal forms of
dogmatism, I am very far from laying claim
to any dogmatic authority. More than that, I
would desire categorically to repudiate such a
claim.
For I do not conceal from myself that, if I
took up such a position, I should wantonly be
placing myself at the mercy of my reader.
For he could then, by merely refusing to see 14
in me an authority, bring down the whole edi-
fice of my argument like a house of cards.
Moreover I am not blind to what would hap-
pen if, after I claimed to be taken as an author-
ity, the reader was indulgent enough still to go
on to read what I have written.
He would in such a case, the moment he en-
countered a statement with which he disagreed,
simply waive me on one side with the words,
"So you say."
And if he should encounter a statement with
which he agreed, he would in his wisdom, cen-
sure me for neglecting to provide for that
proposition a satisfactory logical founda-
tion.
If it is far from my thoughts to claim a right
of dictation, it is equally remote from them to
take up the position that I have in my argu-
ments furnished proof of the thesis which
I set out to establish.
It would be culpable misuse of language to
speak in such connexion of proof or disproof . 15
Proof by testimony, which is available in con-
nexion with questions of fact, is unavailable in
connexion with general truths; and logical
proof is obtainable only in that comparatively
narrow sphere where reasoning is based--as in
mathematics--upon axioms, or--as in certain
really crucial experiments in the mathematic
sciences--upon quasi-axiomatic premisses.
Everywhere else we base our reasonings on
premisses which are simply more or less prob-
able; and accordingly the conclusions which
we arrive at have in them always an element
of insecurity.
It will be clear that in philosophy, in juris-
prudence, in political economy and sociology,
and in literary criticism and such like, we are
dealing not with certainties but with proposi-
tions which are, for literary convenience, in-
vested with the garb of certainties.
What kind of logical sanction is it, then,
which can attach to reasonings such as are to
be set out here?
They have in point of fact the sanction which 16
attaches to reasonings based upon premisses
arrived at by the method of diacritical judg-
ment.
It is, I hasten to notify the reader, not the
method, but only the name here assigned to it,
which is unfamiliar. As soon as I exhibit it
in the working, the reader will identify it as
that by which every generalisation and defini-
tion ought to be put to the proof.
I may for this purpose take the general
statements or definitions which serve as prem-
isses for my reasonings in the text.
I bring forward those generalisations and
definitions because they commend themselves
to my diacritical judgment. In other words, I
set them forth as results which have been
reached after reiterated efforts to call up to
mind the totality of my experience, and to de-
tect the factor which is common to all the in-
dividual experiences.
When for instance I propose a definition, I
have endeavoured to call to mind all the dif-
ferent uses of the word with which I am fa- 17
miliar--eliminating, of course, all the obviously
incorrect uses.
And when I venture to attempt a generalisa-
tion about woman, I endeavour to recall to
mind without distinction all the different
women I have encountered, and to extricate
from my impressions what was common to all,
--omitting from consideration (except only
when I am dealing specifically with these) all
plainly abnormal women.
Having by this procedure arrived at a gen-
eralisation--which may of course be correct
or incorrect--I submit it to my reader, and
ask from him that he should, after going
through the same mental operations as myself,
review my judgment, and pronounce his ver-
dict.
If it should then so happen that the reader
comes, in the case of any generalisation, to the
same verdict as that which I have reached, that
particular generalisation will, I submit, now
go forward not as a datum of my individual
experience, but as the intellectual resultant of 18
two separate and distinct experiences. It will
thereby be immensely fortified.
If, on the other hand, the reader comes to
the conclusion that a particular generalisation
is out of conformity with his experience, that
generalisation will go forward shorn of some,
or perchance all, its authority.
But in any case each individual generalisa-
tion must be referred further.
And at the end it will, according as it finds,
or fails to find, acceptance among the thought-
ful, be endorsed as a truth, and be gathered
into the garner of human knowledge; or be
recognised as an error, and find its place with
the tares, which the householder, in time of the
harvest, will tell the reapers to bind in bundles
to burn them.
A. E. W. 19
1913.
INTRODUCTION
Programme of this Treatise--Motives from which
Women Claim the Suffrage--Types of Men who
Support the Suffrage--John Stuart Mill.
THE task which I undertake here is to show
that the Woman's Suffrage Movement has no
real intellectual or moral sanction, and that
there are very weighty reasons why the suf-
frage should not be conceded to woman.
I would propose to begin by analysing the
mental attitude of those who range themselves
on the side of woman suffrage, and then to pass
on to deal with the principal arguments upon
which the woman suffragist relies.
The preponderating majority of the women
who claim the suffrage do not do so from mo-
tives of public interest or philanthropy.
They are influenced almost exclusively by
two motives: resentment at the suggestion that 21
woman should be accounted by man as inher-
ently his inferior in certain important re-
spects; and reprehension of a state of society
in which more money, more personal liberty
(In reality only more of the personal liberty
which the possession of money confers), more
power, more public recognition and happier
physiological conditions fall to the share of
man.
A cause which derives its driving force so
little from philanthropy and public interest
and so much from offended amour propre and
pretensions which are, as we shall see, unjusti-
fied, has in reality no moral prestige.
For its intellectual prestige the movement
depends entirely on the fact that it has the
advocacy of a certain number of distinguished
men.
It will not be amiss to examine that ad-
vocacy.
The "intellectual" whose name appears at
the foot of woman's suffrage petitions will,
when you have him by himself, very often 22
Make confession:--"Woman suffrage," he
will tell you, "is not the grave and important
cause which the ardent female suffragist
deems it to be. Not only will it not do any
of the things which she imagines it is going to
do, but it will leave the world exactly where
it is. Still--the concession of votes to women
is desirable from the point of view of sym-
metry of classification; and it will soothe the
ruffled feelings of quite a number of very
worthy women."
It may be laid down as a broad general rule
that only two classes of men have the cause of
woman's suffrage really at heart.
The first is the crank who, as soon as he
thinks he has discerned a moral principle, im-
mediately gets into the saddle, and then rides
hell-for-leather, reckless of all considerations
of public expediency.
The second is that very curious type of man,
who when it is suggested in his hearing that the
species woman is, measured by certain intel-
lectual and moral standards, the inferior of the 23
species man, solemnly draws himself up and
asks, "Are you, sir, aware that you are insult-
ing my wife?"
To this, the type of man who feels every un-
favourable criticism of woman as a personal
affront to himself, John Stuart Mill, had
affinities.
We find him writing a letter to the Home
Secretary, informing him, in relation to a Par-
liamentary Bill restricting the sale of arsenic
to male persons over twenty-one years, that it
was a "gross insult to every woman, all women
from highest to lowest being deemed unfit to
have poison in their possession, lest they shall
commit murder."
We find him again, in a state of indignation
with the English marriage laws, preluding his
nuptials with Mrs. Taylor by presenting that
lady with a formal charter; renouncing all au-
thority over her, and promising her security
against all infringements of her liberty which
might proceed from himself. 24
To this lady he is always ascribing credit for
his eminent intellectual achievements. And
lest his reader should opine that woman stands
somewhat in the shade with respect to her own
intellectual triumphs, Mill undertakes the
explanation. "Felicitous thoughts," he tells
us, "occur by hundreds to every woman of in-
tellect. But they are mostly lost for want of a
husband or friend . . . to estimate them
properly, and to bring them before the world;
and even when they are brought before it they
generally appear as his ideas."
Not only did Mill see woman and all her
works through an optical medium which gave
images like this; but there was upon his ret-
ina a large blind area. By reason of this
last it was inapprehensible to him that there
could be an objection to the sexes co-operating
indiscriminately in work. It was beyond his
ken that the sex element would under these
conditions invade whole departments of life
which are now free from it. As he saw things, 25
there was in point of fact a risk of the human
race dying out by reason of the inadequate im-
perativeness of its sexual instincts.
Mill's unfaithfulness to the facts cannot,
however, all be put down to constitutional de-
fects of vision. When he deals with woman
he is no longer scrupulously conscientious.
We begin to have our suspicions of his up-
rightness when we find him in his Subjection
of Women laying it down as a fundamental
postulate that the subjection of woman to man
is always morally indefensible. For no up-
right mind can fail to see that the woman who
lives in a condition of financial dependence
upon man has no moral claim to unrestricted
liberty. The suspicion of Mill's honesty
which is thus awakened is confirmed by
further critical reading of his treatise. In
that skilful tractate one comes across, every
here and there, a suggestio falsi [suggestion of a falsehood], or a sup-
pressio veri [suppression of the truth], or a fallacious analogy nebulously
expressed, or a mendacious metaphor, or a
passage which is contrived to lead off attention 26
from some weak point in the feminist case.1
Moreover, Mill was unmindful of the obliga-
tions of intellectual morality when he allowed
his stepdaughter, in connexion with feminist
questions, to draft letters 2 which went forward
as his own.
There is yet another factor which must be
kept in mind in connexion with the writings
of Mill. It was the special characteristic of
the man to set out to tackle concrete problems
and then to spend his strength upon abstrac-
tions.
In his Political Economy, where his proper
subject matter was man with his full equip-
ment of impulses, Mill took as his theme an
abstraction: an economic man who is actuated
solely by the desire of gain. He then worked
out in great elaboration the course of conduct
which an aggregate of these puppets of his
imagination would pursue. Having per- 27
1 Vide [See] in this connexion the incidental references to Mill
on pp. 50, 81 footnote, and 139.
2 Vide Letters of John Stuart Mill , vol. ii, pp. 51, 79, 80,
100, 141, 157, 238, 239, 247, 288, and 349.
suaded himself, after this, that he had in his
possession a vade mecum [handbook] to the comprehension
of human societies, he now took it upon him-
self to expound the principles which govern
and direct these. Until such time as this pro-
cedure was unmasked, Mill's political econ-
omy enjoyed an unquestioned authority.
Exactly the same plan was followed by Mill
in handling the question of woman's suffrage.
Instead of dealing with woman as she is, and
with woman placed in a setting of actually sub-
sisting conditions, Mill takes as his theme a
woman who is a creature of his imagination.
This woman is, by assumption, in mental en-
dowments a replica of man. She lives in a
world which is, by tacit assumption, free from
complications of sex. And, if practical con-
siderations had ever come into the purview of
Mill's mind, she would, by tacit assumption, be
paying her own way, and be making full per-
sonal and financial contributions to the State.
It is in connexion with this fictitious woman
that Mill sets himself to work out the benefits 28
which women would derive from co-partner-
ship with men in the government of the State,
and those which such co-partnership would
confer on the community. Finally, practis-
ing again upon himself the same imposition as
in his Political Economy, this unpractical
trafficker in abstractions sets out to persuade
his reader that he has, by dealing with fictions
of the mind, effectively grappled with the
concrete problem of woman's suffrage.
This, then, is the philosopher who gives in-
tellectual prestige to the Woman's Suffrage
cause.
But is there not, let us in the end ask our-
selves, here and there at least, a man who is of
real account in the world of affairs, and who
is--not simply a luke-warm Platonic friend or
an opportunist advocate--but an impassioned
promoter of the woman's suffrage movement?
One knows quite well that there is. But
then one suspects--one perhaps discerns by
"the spirit sense"--that this impassioned pro-
moter of woman's suffrage is, on the sequest- 29
ered side of his life, an idealistic dreamer: one
for whom some woman's memory has become,
like Beatrice for Dante, a mystic religion.
We may now pass on to deal with the argu-
ments by which the woman suffragist has
sought to establish her case. 30