The free statehood which is claimed in the concluding part of the Declaration to be the right of the Colonies is by the Declaration based on the philosophical declarations of the preamble. The particular proposition which bears upon the right of free statehood is evidently the one which declares that, "to secure these [unalienable] rights [of individuals], governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." The intermediate propositions, as the result of which the universal right of free statehood follows from this proposition, are, it would seem, these: If government is the doing of justice according to public sentiment, government is the expression and application of a spiritually and intellectually educated public sentiment, since, although a rudimentary knowledge of what is just is implanted in every human being, a full knowledge of what is just comes only after a course of spiritual and intellectual education. Hence it follows that the forms and methods of government should be such as are adapted to such spiritual and intellectual education. Education takes place by direct personal contact, and can be best accomplished only through the establishment of permanent groups of individuals who are all under the same conditions. The formation and expression of a just public sentiment, therefore, requires the establishment of permanent groups of persons, more or less free from any external control which interferes with their rightful action, under a leadership which makes for their spiritual and intellectual education in justice. Such permanent groups within territorial limits of suitable size for developing and expressing a just public sentiment, are free states. Territorial divisions of persons set apart for the purpose of convenience in determining the local public sentiment, regardless of its justness or unjustness, are not states, but are mere voting districts. Just public sentiment, for its expression and application, requires the existence of many small free states, disconnected to the extent necessary to enable each to be free from all improper external control in educating itself in the ways of justice; mere public sentiment, for its expression and application, requires only the existence of a few great states divided into voting districts, each district being under the control of the Central Government, which is to it an external control. Just public sentiment, as the basis of government, is a basis which makes government a mighty instrument for spirituality and growth; mere public sentiment, regardless of its justness or unjustness, as the basis of government, is a basis which makes government a mighty instrument for brutality and deterioration. Human equality, unalienable rights, government according to just public sentiment, and free statehood, are inevitably and forever linked together as reciprocal cause and effect.
The ultimate meaning of the expression "that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed," seems therefore to be that by the common law of nature and of nations there is a universal right of free statehood which pertains to all communities on the face of the earth within territorial limits of suitable size for the development and operation of a just public sentiment.
So complete and universal are the principles of government by just public sentiment and of free statehood that, according to the Declaration, even when all the people of a free state are meeting together to alter or abolish a form of government which has become destructive of the ends of its institution, as it is declared they may rightfully do, their right to form a new government is not absolute so that they can rightfully do whatever the majority wills, but is limited by this universal common law, so that they can rightfully institute only a new form of government whose foundation principles and mode of organization are such "as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness"—that is, to secure the unalienable rights of individuals to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
The declaration of the universal right of free statehood is accompanied, in the Declaration, by the claim that the Colonies, as free states, had always been in political "connection" with the State of Great Britain. The concluding part of the Declaration reads:
"We, therefore,... declare that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states,... and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved."
In this it was necessarily implied that the Colonies had always been free states or free and independent states, and that, by the Declaration, at most their right of independent statehood came into existence; that they had theretofore at all times been in political connection, either as free states under the law of nature and of nations, or as free and independent states by implied treaty, with the free and independent State of Great Britain; that the dissolution of the connection had not come about by an act of secession on their part, but was due to the violation, by the State of Great Britain, either of the law of nature and of nations, or of the implied treaty on which the political connection was based.
The term "connection" was an apt term to express a relationship of equality and dignity. "Connection" implies two things, considered as units distinct from one another, which are bound together by a connecting medium. Just connection implies free statehood in all the communities connected. Union is a form of connection in which the connected free states are consolidated into a unity for the common purposes, though separate for local purposes. Merger is the fusion of two or more free states into a single unitary state. Connection between free states may be through a legislative medium, or through a justiciary medium, or through an executive medium. The connecting medium may be a person, a body corporate, or a state. States connected through a legislative medium, whether a person, a body corporate or a state, and whether wholly external to the states connected or to some extent internal to them, whose legislative powers are unlimited or which determines the limits of its own legislative powers, are "dependent" upon or "subject" to the will of the legislative medium. Such states are "dependencies," "dominions," "subject-states," or more accurately "slave-states,"—or more accurately still, not states at all, but mere aggregations of slave-individuals. States connected through a legislative medium, whether a person, a body corporate or a state, and whether wholly external to the states connected or in part internal to them, whose legislative powers are granted by the states and which has only such legislative powers as are granted, are in a condition of limited dependence, dominion, and subjection; but their relationship is by their voluntary act and they may, and by the terms of the grant always do to some extent control the legislative will to which they are subject and on which they are dependent. Where states are connected or united through a justiciary medium, whether that justiciary medium is a person, a body corporate, or a state, all the states are free states, their relationships being governed by law. Where states are connected through an executive medium, whether that executive medium is a person, a body corporate, or a state, all the states are free and independent states, and each acts according to its will. All connections in which the legislative medium,—whether a person, a body corporate or a state, and whether wholly external to the states connected, or to some extent internal to the states connected,—has unlimited legislative powers or determines the limits of its own legislative powers, are fictitious connections, the relationship being really one which implies "empire" or "dominion" on one side, and "subjection" or "dependence" on the other. Such connections are properly called "empires" or "dominions." So also all connections in which the only connecting medium is a common executive, whether a person, a body corporate or a state, are fictitious connections, the relationship being one of "permanent alliance" or "confederation" between independent states. Such connections are properly called "alliances" or "confederations." The only true connections are those in which there is a legislative medium, whether a person, a body corporate or a state, whose legislative powers are limited, by agreement of the connected states, to the common purposes, and those in which there is a justiciary medium, whether a person, a body corporate, or a state, which recognizes its powers as limited to the common purposes by the law of nature and of nations, and which ascertains and applies this law, incidentally adjudicating, according to this law, the limits of its own jurisdiction. Just connections tend to become unions, it being found in practice necessary, for the preservation of the connection in due order, that the power of limited legislation for the common purposes and the power of adjudicating and applying the law for the common purposes should extend not only to the states, but to all individuals throughout the states.
Thus "dependence," as a fictitious and vicious form of connection, is, it would appear, forever opposed to "connection" of a just and proper kind. If it were attempted to sum up the issue of the American Revolution in an epigram, would not that epigram be: "'Colony,' or 'Free State?' 'Dependence,' or 'Just Connection?' 'Empire,' or 'Union?'"
According to the opinion of the Revolutionary statesmen, as it would seem, a universal right of free statehood does not imply a universal right of self-government. Statehood and self-government are two different and distinct conceptions. The Americans claimed the right of free statehood as a part of the universal rights of man, but they claimed the right of self-government because they were Englishmen trained by generations of experience in the art of self-government and so capable of exercising the art. A state is not less or more a free state because it has self-government. It is a free state when its just public sentiment is to any extent ascertained and executed by its government,—however that government may be instituted,—free from the control of any external power. It does not prevent a region from being a free state that its government is wholly or partly appointed by an external power, if that government is free from external control in ascertaining and executing the just local sentiment to any extent. Nor does it interfere with the right of free statehood when an external power stands by merely to see that the local government ascertains and executes the just local sentiment to a proper extent. The external power in that case is upholding the free statehood of the region. It stands as surety for the continuance of free statehood.
The right of self-government, according to this view, is a conditional universal right of free states. When a community, inhabiting a region of such territorial extent that it is not too large to make it possible for a just public sentiment concerning its affairs to be developed and executed, and not so small as to make it inconvenient that it should be in any respect free from external control, is of such moral and intellectual capacity that it can form and execute a just public sentiment concerning its internal affairs and its relations with other communities, states and nations, it has not only the right of free statehood,—that is, of political personality,—which is of universal right, but also the right of self-government. The right of such a free state to self-government is complete if there be no just political connection or union between it and other free states, or partial, if such a just connection or union exists, being limited, in this latter case, to the extent necessary for the preservation, in due order, of the connection or union.