(e) That with a property interest in the business the tendency of the operatives to shift from one concern to another without real purpose would be reduced to the minimum, and that the consequent advantage to the management would result in a distinct gain in the stability of the business.
Would such a plan when perfected succeed? If it would increase the productivity of the workers, if it would tend to elevate character, to develop a greater loyalty to the concern and help to change an operative from an automaton into a man, if it would strengthen the security of vested interests and narrow the gulf between wealth and work, and finally, if it would be in the direction of righteousness and justice, it must finally succeed. It cannot be expected that at first the introduction of such a scheme would be received by the operatives with enthusiasm. It would only be through the medium of their more intelligent leaders that they could be assured of its benefits, and only after several years of successful operation could we expect it to receive the unqualified support of the workers. When, however, their capitalized extra wages show an accumulation and they begin to receive annual cash dividends upon the surplus earnings of previous years, we may be reasonably assured of a decided change of sentiment in its favor.
In the meanwhile the masters would do well in avoiding undue antagonism to labor organizations per se, so far as the large body of wage-earners is concerned, the benefits of profit-sharing are still to them unproven, while the trade union has in many ways demonstrated its usefulness in protecting the interests of its members. Whether it does more really to help the best interests of the worker than to hinder, may be an open question. However this may be, certain it is that the institution is strongly established in the mind of the workman as his strongest friend, his one means of expression and his only hope of material salvation. In its reverses as well as in its successes his heart will remain loyal to his union, until he shall have been furnished a substitute which has proven to him its larger usefulness.
In view of the increasing tendency to incorporate business, this paper has treated the question as it relates to organized capital. It is nevertheless clearly true that the same general situation obtains in the strictly partnership concerns and that the principles herein suggested could be the more readily applied in such cases, especially as the power to act is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals who have no one else to consult.
In such a case it is suggested, in place of the issue of the deferred stock debentures, that the surplus net earnings—after the payment of the agreed interest to capital, and the assignment in cash of the percentage to contingent fund—shall be credited to a “mutual reserve fund” which fund shall take the place of the proposed trustee in a stock company, and shall be entitled to receive dividends (or interest) upon the same terms and subject to the same limitations provided for the deferred stock debentures, and that said fund shall be held for the joint and equal benefit of capital and employees—the respective interests of the employees to be entered in a pass-book similar in terms to the debenture books herein particularly described.
The plan briefly outlined is offered as a suggestion. Doubtless every point made can be improved by modification or substitution. If it influences in a small degree more earnest thought on the part of those in whom the power is vested, towards the formation of a comprehensive plan looking to a more reasonable division of the product of all and a fuller acknowledgment of the humanity of man, its purpose will have been accomplished.
III. The Housing Problem
TENEMENT HOUSE REGULATION—THE REASONS FOR IT—ITS PROPER LIMITATIONS
By Robert W. De Forest
Tenement House Commissioner of the City of New York