The Anti-Slavery Examiner, Omnibus

by American Anti-Slavery Society

PETERBORO, MARCH 21, 1839.

HON. HENRY CLAY:

DEAR SIR,

In the Annual Meeting of the American Colonization Society, held in the Capitol in the city of Washington, December, 1835, you commented on a speech made by myself, the previous autumn. Your objections to that speech formed the principal subject matter of your remarks. Does not this fact somewhat mitigate the great presumption of which I feel myself guilty, in undertaking, all unhonored and humble as I am, to review the production of one of the most distinguished statesmen of the age?

Until the appearance of your celebrated speech on the subject of slavery, I had supposed that you cherished a sacred regard for the right of petition. I now find, that you value it no more highly than they do, who make open war upon it. Indeed, you admit, that, in relation to this right, "there is no substantial difference between" them and yourself. Instead of rebuking, you compliment them; and, in saying that "the majority of the Senate" would not "violate the right of petition in any case, in which, according to its judgment, the object of the petition could be safely or properly granted," you show to what destructive conditions you subject this absolute right. Your doctrine is, that in those cases, where the object of the petition is such, as the supplicated party can approve, previously to any discussion of its merits--there, and there only, exists the right of petition. For aught I see, you are no more to be regarded as the friend of this right, than is the conspicuous gentleman[[A]] who framed the Report on that subject, which was presented to the Senate of my state the last month. That gentleman admits the sacredness of "the right to petition on any subject;" and yet, in the same breath, he insists on the equal sacredness of the right to refuse to attend to a petition. He manifestly failed to bear in mind, that a right to petition implies the correlative right to be heard. How different are the statesmen, who insist "on the right to refuse to attend to a petition," from Him, who says, "Whoso stoppeth his ears at the cry of the poor, he also shall cry himself, but shall not be heard." And who are poor, if it be not those for whom the abolitionists cry? They must even cry by proxy. For, in the language of John Quincy Adams, the champion of the right of petition, "The slave is not permitted to cry for mercy--to plead for pardon--to utter the shriek of perishing nature for relief." It may be well to remark, that the error, which I have pointed out in the Report in question, lies in the premises of the principal argument of that paper; and that the correction of this error is necessarily attended with the destruction of the premises, and with the overthrow of the argument, which is built upon them.

[Footnote [A]: Colonel Young.]

I surely need not stop to vindicate the right of petition. It is a natural right--one that human laws can guarantee, but can neither create nor destroy. It is an interesting fact, that the Amendment to the Federal Constitution, which guarantees the right of petition, was opposed in the Congress of 1789 as superfluous. It was argued, that this is "a self-evident, inalienable right, which the people possess," and that "it would never be called in question." What a change in fifty years!

You deny the power of Congress to abolish the inter-state traffic in human beings; and, inasmuch as you say, that the right "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states," does not include the right to prohibit and destroy commerce; and, inasmuch as it is understood, that it was in virtue of the right to regulate commerce, that Congress enacted laws to restrain our participation in the "African slave trade," you perhaps also deny, that Congress had the power to enact such laws. The history of the times in which the Federal Constitution was framed and adopted, justifies the belief, that the clause of that instrument under consideration conveys the power, which Congress exercised. For instance, Governor Randolph, when speaking in the Virginia Convention of 1788, of the clause which declares, that "the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year 1808," said, "This is an exception from the power of regulating commerce, and the restriction is to continue only till 1808. Then Congress can, by the exercise of that power, prevent future importations."

Were I, however, to admit that the right "to regulate commerce," does not include the right to prohibit and destroy commerce, it nevertheless would not follow, that Congress might not prohibit or destroy certain branches of commerce. It might need to do so, in order to preserve our general commerce with a state or nation. So large a proportion of the cloths of Turkey might be fraught with the contagion of the plague, as to make it necessary for our Government to forbid the importation of all cloths from that country, and thus totally destroy one branch of our commerce with it, to the end that the other branches might be preserved. No inconsiderable evidence that Congress has the right to prohibit or destroy a branch of commerce, is to be found in the fact, that it has done so. From March, 1794, to May, 1820, it enacted several laws, which went to prohibit or destroy, and, in the end, did prohibit or destroy the trade of this country with Africa in human beings. And, if Congress has the power to pass embargo laws, has it not the power to prohibit or destroy commerce altogether?

It is, however, wholly immaterial, whether Congress could prohibit our participation in the "African slave trade," in virtue of the clause which empowers it "to regulate commerce." That the Constitution does, in some one or more of its passages, convey the power, is manifest from the testimony of the Constitution itself. The first clause of the ninth section says: "The migration or importation of such persons, as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to they year 1808." Now the implication in this clause of the existence of the power in question, is as conclusive, as would be the express and positive grant of it. You will observe, too, that the power of Congress over "migration or importation," which this clause implies, is a power not merely to "regulate," as you define the word, but to "prohibit."