The Anti-Slavery Examiner, Omnibus

by American Anti-Slavery Society

It has hitherto been supposed, that you distinctly and fully admitted the Constitutional power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. But, on this point, as on that of the right of petition, you have for reasons known to yourself, suddenly and greatly changed your tone. Whilst your speech argues, at no small length, that Congress has not the right to abolish slavery in the District, all that it says in favor of the Constitutional power to abolish it, is that "the language (of the Constitution) may possibly be sufficiently comprehensive to include a power of abolition." "Faint praise dams;" and your very reluctant and qualified concession of the Constitutional power under consideration, is to be construed, rather as a denial than a concession.

Until I acquire the skill of making white whiter, and black blacker, I shall have nothing to say in proof of the Constitutional power of Congress over slavery in the District of Columbia, beyond referring to the terms, in which the Constitution so plainly conveys this power. That instrument authorises Congress "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District." If these words do not confer the power, it is manifest that no words could confer it. I will add that, never, until the last few years, had doubts been expressed, that these words do fully confer that power.

You will, perhaps, say, that Virginia and Maryland made their cessions of the territory, which constitutes the District of Columbia, with reservations on the subject of slavery. We answer, that none were expressed;[[A]] and that if there had been, Congress would not, and in view of the language of the Constitution, could not, have accepted the cessions. You may then say, that they would not have ceded the territory, had it occurred to them, that Congress would have cleared it of slavery; and that, this being the fact, Congress could not thus clear it, without being guilty of bad faith, and of an ungenerous and unjustifiable surprise on those States. There are several reasons for believing, that those States, not only did not, at the period in question, cherish a dread of the abolition of slavery; but that the public sentiment within them was decidedly in favor of its speedy abolition. At that period, their most distinguished statesmen were trumpet-tongued against slavery. At that period, there was both a Virginia and a Maryland society "for promoting the abolition of slavery;" and, it was then, that, with the entire consent of Virginia and Maryland, effectual measures were adopted to preclude slavery from that large territory, which has since given Ohio and several other States to the Union. On this subject, as on that of the inter-state slave trade, we misinterpret Virginia and Maryland, by not considering, how unlike was their temper in relation to slavery, amidst the decays and dying throes of that institution half a century ago, to what it is now, when slavery is not only revivified, but has become the predominant interest and giant power of the nation. We forget, that our whole country was, at that time, smitten with love for the holy cause of impartial and universal liberty. To judge correctly of the view, which our Revolutionary fathers took of oppression, we must go back and stand by their side, in their struggles against it,--we must survey them through the medium of the anti-slavery sentiment of their own times, and not impute to them the pro-slavery spirit so rampant in ours.

[Footnote [A]: There is a proviso in the Act of Virginia. It was on this, that three years ago, in the Senate of the United States, Benjamin Watkins Leigh built his argument against the constitutional power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. I well remember that you then denied the soundness of his argument. This superfluous proviso virtually forbids Congress to pass laws, which shall "affect the rights of individuals" in the ceded territory. Amongst the inviolable "rights" was that of holding slaves, as Mr. Leigh contended. I regret, that, in replying to him, you did not make use of the fact, that all the members of Congress from Virginia voted in favor of the Ordinance, which abolished slavery in the North-West Territory; and this too, notwithstanding, that, in the Act of 1784, by which she ceded the North-West Territory to the Confederacy, she provided, that the "citizens of Virginia" in the said Territory, many of whom held slaves, should "be protected in the enjoyment of their rights." This fact furnishes striking evidence that at, or about, the time of the cession by Virginia of her portion of the District of Columbia, her statesmen believed, that the right to hold slaves in those portions of our country under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, was not beyond the reach of the controlling power of Congress.]

I will, however, suppose it true, that Virginia and Maryland would not have made the cessions in question, had they foreseen, that Congress would abolish slavery in the District of Columbia:--and yet, I affirm, that it would be the duty of Congress to abolish it. Had there been State Prisons in the territory, at the time Congress acquired jurisdiction over it, and had Congress immediately opened their doors, and turned loose hundreds of depraved and bloody criminals, there would indeed have been abundant occasion for complaint. But, had the exercise of its power in the premises extended no farther than to the liberation of such convicts, as, on a re-examination of their cases, were found to be clearly guiltless of the crimes charged upon them; the sternest justice could not have objected to such an occasion for the rejoicing of mercy. And are not the thousands in the District, for whose liberation Congress is besought, unjustly deprived of their liberty? Not only are they guiltless, but they are even unaccused of such crimes, as in the judgment of any, justly work a forfeiture of liberty. And what do Virginia and Maryland ask? Is it, that Congress shall resubject to their control those thousands of deeply wronged men? No--for this Congress cannot do. They ask, that Congress shall fulfil the tyrant wishes of these States. They ask, that the whole people of the United States--those who hate, as well as those who love slavery, shall, by their representatives, assume the guilty and awful responsibility of perpetuating the enslavement of their innocent fellow men:--of chaining the bodies and crushing the wills, and blotting out the minds of such, as have neither transgressed, nor even been accused of having transgressed, a single human law. And the crime, which Virginia and Maryland, and they, who sympathise with them, would have the nation perpetrate, is, not simply that of prolonging the captivity of those, who were slaves before the cession--for but a handful of them are now remaining in the District. Most of the present number became slaves under the authority of this guilty nation. Their wrongs originated with Congress: and Congress is asked, not only to perpetuate their oppression, but to fasten the yoke of slavery on generations yet unborn.

There are those, who advocate the recession of the District of Columbia. If the nation were to consent to this, without having previously exercised her power to "break every yoke" of slavery in the District, the blood of those so cruelly left there in "the house of bondage," would remain indelible and damning upon her skirts:--and this too, whether Virginia and Maryland did or did not intend to vest Congress with any power over slavery. It is enough, that the nation has the power "to deliver them that are drawn unto death, and those that are ready to be slain," to make her fearfully guilty before God, if she "forbear" to exercise it.

Suppose, I were to obtain a lease of my neighbor's barn for the single and express purpose of securing my crops; and that I should find, chained up in one of its dark corners, an innocent fellow man, whom that neighbor was subjecting to the process of a lingering death; ought I to pause and recall President Wayland's, "Limitations of Human Responsibility," and finally let the poor sufferer remain in his chains; or ought I not rather, promptly to respond to the laws of my nature and my nature's God, and let him go free? But, to make this case analogous to that we have been considering--to that, which imposes its claims on Congress--we must strike out entirely the condition of the lease, and with it all possible doubts of my right to release the victim of my neighbor's murderous hate.

I am entirely willing to yield, for the sake of argument, that Virginia and Maryland, when ceding the territory which constitutes the District of Columbia, did not anticipate, and did not choose the abolition of slavery in it. To make the admission stronger, I will allow, that these States were, at the time of the cession, as warmly opposed to the abolition of slavery in the District as they are said to be now: and to make it stronger still, I will allow, that the abolition of slavery in the District would prove deeply injurious, not only to Virginia and Maryland but to the nation at large. And, after all these admissions, I must still insist, that Congress is under perfectly plain moral obligation to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia.

They, who are deterred from favoring the abolition of slavery in the District by the apprehension, that Virginia and Maryland, if not, indeed, the nation at large, might suffer injurious consequences from the measure, overlook the fact, that there is a third party in the case. It is common to regard the nation as constituting one of the parties--Virginia and Maryland another, and the only other. But in point of fact, there is a third party. Of what does it consist? Of horses, oxen, and other brutes? Then we need not be greatly concerned about it--since its rights in that case, would be obviously subordinate to those of the other parties. Again, if such be the composition of this third party, we are not to be greatly troubled, that President Wayland and thousands of others entirely overlook its rights and interests; though they ought to be somewhat mindful even of brutes. But, this third party is composed, not of brutes--but of men--of the seven thousand men in the District, who have fallen under the iron hoofs of slavery--and who, because they are men, have rights equal to, and as sacred as the rights of any other men--rights, moreover, which cannot be innocently encroached on, even to the breadth of one hair, whether under the plea of "state necessity"--of the perils of emancipation--or under any other plea, which conscience-smitten and cowardly tyranny can suggest.

If these lines shall ever be so favored, as to fall under the eye of the venerable and beloved John Quincy Adams, I beg, that, when he shall have read them, he will solemnly inquire of his heart, whether, if he should ever be left to vote against the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, and thus stab deeply the cause of civil liberty, of humanity, and of God; the guilty act would not result from overlooking the rights and interests, and even the existence itself, of a third party in the case--and from considering the claims of the nation and those of Virginia and Maryland, as the only claims on which he was called to pass, because they were the claims of the only parties, of which he was aware.