Mr. Smith. He would now proceed to state his objections to the clause just read, (section 2, of article 1, clause 3.) His objections were comprised under three heads: 1st, the rule of apportionment is unjust; 2d, there is no precise number fixed on, below which the house shall not be reduced; 3d, it is inadequate. In the first place, the rule of apportionment of the representatives is to be according to the whole number of the white inhabitants, with three-fifths of all others; that is, in plain English, each State is to send representatives in proportion to the number of freemen, and three-fifths of the slaves it contains. He could not see any rule by which slaves were to be included in the ratio of representation;—the principle of a representation being that every free agent should be concerned in governing himself, it was absurd to give that power to a man who could not exercise it—slaves have no will of their own: the very operation of it was to give certain privileges to those people, who were so wicked as to keep slaves. He knew it would be admitted, that this rule of apportionment was founded on unjust principles, but that it was the result of accommodation; which, he supposed, we should be under the necessity of admitting, if we meant to be in union with the southern States, though utterly repugnant to his feelings.
Mr. Hamilton. In order that the committee may understand clearly the principles on which the General Convention acted, I think it necessary to explain some preliminary circumstances.
Sir, the natural situation of this country seems to divide its interests into different classes. There are navigating and non-navigating States—the Northern are properly the navigating States: the Southern appear to possess neither the means; nor the spirit of navigation. This difference of situation naturally produces a dissimilarity of interest and views respecting foreign commerce. It was the interest of the Northern States that there should be no restraints on their navigation, and that they should leave full power, by a majority in Congress, to make commercial regulations in favor of their own, and in restraint of the navigation of foreigners. The Southern States wished to impose a restraint on the Northern, by requiring that two-thirds in Congress should be requisite to pass an act in regulation of commerce: they were apprehensive that the restraints of a navigation law would discourage foreigners, and by obliging them to employ the shipping of the Northern States would probably enhance their freight. This being the case, they insisted strenuously on having this provision engrafted in the constitution; and the Northern States were as anxious in opposing it. On the other hand, the small States seeing themselves embraced by the confederation upon equal terms, wished to retain the advantages which they already possessed: the large States, on the contrary, thought it improper that Rhode Island and Delaware should enjoy an equal suffrage with themselves: from these sources a delicate and difficult contest arose. It became necessary, therefore, to compromise; or the Convention must have dissolved without effecting any thing. Would it have been wise and prudent in that body, in this critical situation, to have deserted their country? No. Every man who hears me—every wise man in the United States, would have condemned them. The Convention were obliged to appoint a committee for accommodation. In this committee the arrangement was formed as it now stands; and their report was accepted. It was a delicate point; and it was necessary that all parties should be indulged. Gentlemen will see, that if there had not been a unanimity, nothing could have been done: for the Convention had no power to establish, but only to recommend a government. Any other system would have been impracticable. Let a Convention be called to-morrow—let them meet twenty times; nay, twenty thousand times; they will have the same difficulties to encounter; the same clashing interests to reconcile.
But dismissing these reflections, let us consider how far the arrangement is in itself entitled to the approbation of this body. We will examine it upon its own merits.
The first thing objected to, is that clause which allows a representation for three-fifths of the negroes. Much has been said of the impropriety of representing men, who have no will of their own. Whether this be reasoning or declamation, I will not presume to say. It is the unfortunate situation of the southern states, to have a great part of their population, as well as property, in blacks. The regulations complained of was one result of the spirit of accommodation, which governed the convention; and without this indulgence, no union could possibly have been formed. But, sir, considering some peculiar advantages which we derived from them, it is entirely just that they should be gratified. The southern states possess certain staples, tobacco, rice, indigo, &c., which must be capital objects in treaties of commerce with foreign nations; and the advantage which they necessarily procure in these treaties will be felt throughout all the states. But the justice of this plan will appear in another view. The best writers on government have held that representation should be compounded of persons and property. This rule has been adopted, as far as it could be, in the Constitution of New-York. It will, however, by no means, be admitted, that the slaves are considered altogether as property. They are men, though degraded to the condition of slavery. They are persons known to the municipal laws of the states which they inhabit as well as to the laws of nature. But representation and taxation go together—and one uniform rule ought to apply to both. Would it be just to compute these slaves in the assessment of taxes, and discard them from the estimate in the apportionment of representatives? Would it be just to impose a singular burthen, without conferring some adequate advantage?
Another circumstance ought to be considered. The rule we have been speaking of is a general rule, and applies to all the states. Now, you have a great number of people in your state, which are not represented at all; and have no voice in your government; these will be included in the enumeration—not two-fifths—nor three-fifths, but the whole. This proves that the advantages of the plan are not confined to the southern states, but extend to other parts of the Union.
Mr. M. Smith. I shall make no reply to the arguments offered by the hon. gentleman to justify the rule of apportionment fixed by this clause: for though I am confident they might be easily refuted, yet I am persuaded we must yield this point, in accommodation to the southern states. The amendment therefore proposes no alteration to the clause in this respect.
Mr. Harrison. Among the objections, that, which has been made to the mode of apportionment of representatives, has been relinquished. I think this concession does honor to the gentleman who had stated the objection. He has candidly acknowledged, that this apportionment was the result of accommodation; without which no union could have been formed.