The Anti-Slavery Examiner, Omnibus

by American Anti-Slavery Society

"IT IS THE SPIRIT THAT QUICKENETH."

It seems that though, according to our Princeton professor, "the subject" of slavery "is hardly alluded to by Christ in any of his personal instructions,"[[9]] he had a way of "treating it." What was that? Why, "he taught the true nature, DIGNITY, EQUALITY, and destiny of men," and "inculcated the principles of justice and love."[[10]] And according to Professor Stuart, the maxims which our Savior furnished, "decide against" "the theory of slavery." All, then, that these ecclesiastical apologists for slavery can make of the Savior's alleged silence is, that he did not, in his personal instructions, "apply his own principles to this particular form of wickedness." For wicked that must be, which the maxims of the Savior decide against, and which our Princeton professor assures us the principles of the gospel, duly acted on, would speedily extinguish.[[11]] How remarkable it is, that a teacher should "hardly allude to a subject in any of his personal instructions," and yet inculcate principles which have a direct and vital bearing upon it!—should so conduct, as to justify the inference, that "slaveholding is not a crime,"[[12]] and at the same time lend its authority for its "speedy extinction!"

[Footnote [9]: Pittsburg pamphlet, (already alluded to,) p. 9.]

[Footnote [10]: Pittsburg pamphlet, p. 9.]

[Footnote [11]: The same, p. 34.]

[Footnote [12]: The same, p. 13.]

Higher authority than sustains self-evident truths there cannot be. As forms of reason, they are rays from the face of Jehovah. Not only are their presence and power self-manifested, but they also shed a strong and clear light around them. In their light, other truths are visible. Luminaries themselves, it is their office to enlighten. To their authority, in every department of thought, the same mind bows promptly, gratefully, fully. And by their authority, he explains, proves, and disposes of whatever engages his attention and engrosses his powers as a reasonable and reasoning creature. For what, when thus employed and when most successful, is the utmost he can accomplish? Why, to make the conclusions which he would establish and commend, clear in the light of reason;—in other words, to evince that they are reasonable. He expects that those with whom he has to do will acknowledge the authority of principle—will see whatever is exhibited in the light of reason. If they require him to go further, and, in order to convince them, to do something more than show that the doctrines he maintains, and the methods he proposes, are accordant with reason—are illustrated and supported with "self-evident truths"—they are plainly "beside themselves." They have lost the use of reason. They are not to be argued with. They belong to the mad-house.

"COME NOW, LET US REASON TOGETHER, SAITH THE LORD."

Are we to honor the Bible, which Professor Stuart quaintly calls "the good old book," by turning away from "self-evident truths" to receive its instructions? Can these truths be contradicted or denied there? Do we search for something there to obscure their clearness, or break their force, or reduce their authority? Do we long to find something there, in the form of premises or conclusions, of arguing or of inference, in broad statement or blind hints, creed-wise or fact-wise, which may set us free from the light and power of first principles? And what if we were to discover what we were thus in search of?—something directly or indirectly, expressly or impliedly prejudicial to the principles, which reason, placing us under the authority of, makes self-evident? In what estimation, in that case, should we be constrained to hold the Bible? Could we longer honor it as the book of God? The book of God opposed to the authority of REASON! Why, before what tribunal do we dispose of the claims of the sacred volume to divine authority? The tribunal of reason. This every one acknowledges the moment he begins to reason on the subject. And what must reason do with a book, which reduces the authority of its own principles—breaks the force of self-evident truths? Is he not, by way of eminence, the apostle of infidelity, who, as a minister of the gospel or a professor of sacred literature, exerts himself, with whatever arts of ingenuity or show of piety, to exalt the Bible at the expense of reason? Let such arts succeed and such piety prevail, and Jesus Christ is "crucified afresh and put to an open shame."

What saith the Princeton professor? Why, in spite of "general principles," and "clear as we may think the arguments against DESPOTISM, there have been thousands of ENLIGHTENED and good men, who honestly believe it to be of all forms of government the best and most acceptable to God."[[13]] Now these "good men" must have been thus warmly in favor of despotism, in consequence of, or in opposition to, their being "enlightened." In other words, the light, which in such abundance they enjoyed, conducted them to the position in favor of despotism, where the Princeton professor so heartily shook hands with them, or they must have forced their way there in despite of its hallowed influence. Either in accordance with, or in resistance to the light, they became what he found them—the advocates of despotism. If in resistance to the light—and he says they were "enlightened men"—what, so far as the subject with which alone he and we are now concerned, becomes of their "honesty" and "goodness?" Good and honest resisters of the light, which was freely poured around them! Of such, what says Professor Stuart's "good old Book?" Their authority, where "general principles" command the least respect, must be small indeed. But if in accordance with the light, they have become the advocates of despotism, then is despotism "the best form of government and most acceptable to God." It is sustained by the authority of reason, by the word of Jehovah, by the will of Heaven! If this be the doctrine which prevails at certain theological seminaries, it must be easy to account for the spirit which they breathe, and the general influence which they exert. Why did not the Princeton professor place this "general principle" as a shield, heaven-wrought and reason approved, over that cherished form of despotism which prevails among the churches of the South, and leave the "peculiar institutions" he is so forward to defend, under its protection?