On January 19th, 1916, in the Reichstag, Deputy Martin stated that “The German nation would be very ill-pleased if Germany were to restore the territories she now occupies” (Le Temps, 21st January, 1916). This sentence summarizes the opinion prevalent beyond the Rhine.
In their endeavours to retain the greater part of the territories occupied by them at the beginning of 1916 the Germans have combined military measures with political manœuvres.
THE GERMAN FORTRESS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1916.
They have entrenched themselves tremendously on all fronts which the Allies could possibly attack. By the accumulation everywhere of defensive works, machine-guns and heavy artillery, the Germans hope to counter-balance the losses of their troops and thus to persevere in their resistance to the allied attacks, till the enemy grow weary of the dreadful struggle. The experience of the war having proved how extremely difficult it is to pierce strongly fortified lines, the German Headquarters Staff appears to have taken this knowledge as the base of the following calculation:
“We have achieved nine-tenths of the annexations on which we counted; only Calais, Verdun, Belfort, Riga and Salonika are wanting. We will try to obtain possession of these places if opportunity offers; if not, in order to avoid excessive risks, we shall remain everywhere in Europe on a keen defensive, but we will pretend, all the time, to wish to take the offensive, so as to mislead our adversaries. If the Franco-English insist on concentrating their efforts, above all against our lines of the Western front, as these lines are manifold and very strong, the enemy losses will be such, that even if they succeed in throwing us back, they will finally be so utterly exhausted as to be unable to cross the Rhine. Therefore, they will be powerless to dictate peace to Germany.”
Surely the Allies, taught by experience, can foil this probable calculation of their antagonists by well managed, simultaneous attacks on the whole accessible circuit of the German fortress. In fact this is what the Allies seem more and more inclined to do.
The indented line on the map (p. 72) shows what a strange shape is assumed by the enormous territories which build up that fortress. For alimentary purposes it is victualled, firstly, by the resources of non-German countries which are occupied and most thoroughly drained, and secondly by importations; which come through the channel of neutral countries—Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Roumania, and Switzerland—which have responded, more or less liberally, whether voluntarily or not, to the pressing applications of Germany.
On the other hand, thanks to the passage through the Balkans, the German fortress, early in 1916, had a wide open door on Persia, the Caucasus, Central-Russian Asia, Afghanistan, India and Egypt. After having armed all the Moslems on whom they could lay hands, and who were able to shoulder a gun, the German Staff reckoned on striking at Great Britain and Russia in all these directions. The successes obtained by the Tsar’s troops in Eastern Turkey have, since then, baffled these projects.