That this project has for a long while past been in course of preparation by the Kaiser and his megalomaniac advisers cannot for a moment be doubted. When, in November, 1898, William II. pronounced his famous speech at Damascus, in which he stated that all the three hundred millions of Mohammedans in the world could rely upon him as their true friend, the world was inclined to regard the utterance as mere rhodomontade. It was nothing of the sort. It involved the declaration of a definite and far-reaching policy, the execution of which was delayed until a favourable moment occurred and, notably, until the Kiel Canal was completed. The whole conspiracy very nearly succeeded. In spite of their careful attention to detail, their talent for organization, and their elaborate preparations to meet what appears to them every contingency which may occur, the Germans seem to have a constitutional inability to grasp the motives which guide the inhabitants of other countries. A very close analogy to the mistake made by the Kaiser is to be found in an incident of recent English history. It is alleged, I know not with what truth, that when, in 1886, Lord Randolph Churchill resigned his position as Chancellor of the Exchequer in Lord Salisbury’s administration, he “forgot Goschen,” who, as it will be remembered, was speedily nominated to succeed him. The Kaiser forgot England. For various reasons, which are too well-known to require repetition, he and his advisers were firmly convinced that England would not join in the war. The programme was, first, to destroy the power of France and Russia, and then, after that had been done, to fall upon England. In one sense it was fortunate that the Germans committed the gross international crime of invading Belgium. Had they not done so, it is quite possible that the English nation would not have woke up to the realities of the situation. As it was, however, it became clear, even to the most extreme pacificists, that honour and interest alike pointed to the necessity of decisive action. Thus as M. Chéradame indicates, the original German plan was completely upset. The advance on Paris had to be stayed. But the programme, which was the result of long and deliberate contemplation, has by no means been abandoned. On the contrary, with the adhesion of the Bulgarians, who will eventually, unless the Allies secure a decisive victory, become the victims of Pan-Germanism, and also that of the Turks, who were manœuvred into the war by an adroit and absolutely unscrupulous diplomacy, a very considerable portion of the plan has already been put into execution.
M. Chéradame states with great reason that France, Italy, Russia, England, and all the minor Powers are vitally interested in frustrating the German project of establishing their dominion from the Persian Gulf to the North Sea. He also warns us against making a separate peace with either Austria-Hungary or Turkey, both of these Powers being merely vassals of Germany. He is very clearly of opinion that the mere cession of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the rehabilitation of Belgium cannot form the foundations of a durable peace. If peace were concluded on this basis, the Germans would have achieved their main object, and, as Herr Harden pointed out last February, even if Germany was obliged, under pressure, to cede Alsace-Lorraine, there would still be seventy millions of Germans firmly determined to regain possession of those provinces at the first suitable opportunity. In fact, the realization of the German project, although accompanied by certain temporary disabilities from the German point of view, would eventually enable Germany to strangle Europe.
I need not dwell upon all the proposals set forth by M. Chéradame with a view to the frustration of this plan, but the corner-stone of his programme is similar to that advocated with great ability in this country by Mr. Wickham Steed and Mr. Seton Watson. It is to create a Southern Slav State, which will afford an effectual barrier to German advance towards the East. It is essential that the immense importance of dealing with the territories of the Hapsburgs as a preliminary to a final settlement of all the larger aspects of the Eastern question should be fully realized. It constitutes the key of the whole situation.
For these reasons, I hope that M. Chéradame’s work, which develops more fully the arguments which I have very briefly stated above, will receive in this country the attention which it certainly merits. I should add that the book is written in a popular style, and that M. Chéradame’s arguments can be easily followed by those who have no special acquaintance either with Eastern policy or with the tortuous windings of Austrian and German diplomacy during the last quarter of a century.
Cromer.
September 4, 1916.
PREFACE.
The Pangerman plot is the only cause of the war. It is, in fact, the cause at once of its outbreak and of its prolongation till that victory of the Allies has been won which is indispensable to the liberty of the world. In this book I propose to demonstrate this truth by a series of documents, precise, clear, and intelligible to all. The fate of every man in the allied countries, and even in some of the countries which are still neutral, really depends on the issue of the formidable war now being waged. This cataclysm, unprecedented in history, let loose by Prussianized Germany, will have infinite reverberations in every sphere, reverberations which will affect every one of us individually for good or, alas! too often for ill. Every one, therefore, has a direct interest in knowing clearly why these inevitable reverberations of the immense struggle will be produced, and on what fundamental conditions those of them which bode ill for the Allies, and are yet but imperfectly understood, can and must be avoided. Hence every one of the Allies should acquire an exact notion of the present realities. Once fortified by the evidence, his opinion will become a force for the Allied Governments; it will then contribute to the victory and to the imposition of the conditions necessary for the peace.