THE NEUTRAL STATES OF EUROPE AND PANGERMANISM.
“If the Rhine from its source to its mouth becomes a truly German river, it will then be the Low German (or Dutch) commercial towns and seaports near its mouth, which will chiefly benefit thereby.
“It will thus be seen that a singularly attractive prospect for the economic and political future of the Low Countries, is being opened up, if they will only consent to become members of the Pangerman Confederation. God grant that our Low German cousins may at last abandon that jealous regard for their independence as a separate State, which we, the Germans of the Empire, also felt down to the years 1866 and 1870” (see Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950, p. 13, Thormann und Goetsch, S.W. Bessel-Strasse 17, Berlin, 1895).
So it seems that twenty years ago the Germans trusted to moral suasion to open the eyes of the Dutch to the intrinsic beauties of Pangermany. The hope was built on the familiar fact that many Dutchmen, addicted, like their ancestors for ages before them, to the profitable occupation of foreign trade, devote their energies to the pursuit of gain, and have very little time, and even less taste, for situations that call for bellicose resolutions. The same turn of mind explains why ever since the outbreak of war the Germans have easily found in Holland plenty of enterprising firms, which have smuggled ample supplies of all sorts into Germany and snapped their fingers at the blockade.
However, 1895 is a long time ago, and since then Pangerman ideas have marched with the time. As we have seen (p. 103), the plan of 1911 provides for the “conveyance” of the Dutch colonies to Pangermany under conditions which would not allow the Low Countries to cherish the least illusion as to the ultimate preservation of their independence.
But the revelation of the German plans for the perpetration of burglary and the appropriation of other people’s goods, has had its effect, and even the Dutch, in spite of their intense desire not to be drawn into the great war, are now forced to look hard facts in the face.
In truth, the moral situation of the Dutch is hard, for they are pulled in opposite directions by sentiments which logically lead to contradictory decisions. On the one side, historical memories and ancient rivalries in the commerce of the sea still inspire them with a lively dread of England; on the other side, they are constrained to admit that the Pangerman peril has grown imminent for their country. It is plain, in fact (see the map on p. 188) that if Germany were to tighten her grip on Belgium, or if she emerged from the war much strengthened by the establishment of her supremacy over Austria-Hungary, Holland would soon inevitably be forced, even in time of peace, to acquiesce in vassalage to her formidable neighbour, Pangermany.
The Dutch are all the more perplexed and irresolute, before they can screw their courage up to the sticking point, because they are sometimes disconcerted by the action of their government, which, as everybody knows, is open to both direct and powerful German influences. The situation is described as follows in a few paragraphs of the Telegraaf, which earned for their author a series of prosecutions on the pretext that they endangered the neutrality of the country:—