The intermediate works in the intervals are easy to take because of their small dimensions. On the 9th of May, they were generally found knocked to pieces.
(c) Preparation against Artillery.
The infantry urgently demands that the hostile artillery be put out of action before the attack. If the enemy artillery gets into action, the troops, crowded into the trenches, boyaux,[[4]] and parallels, have to suffer a painful bombardment, which causes losses and obliges everyone to hunt cover—an inauspicious attitude for troops which will have shortly to rush forward. Communications become difficult, the telephonic connections are broken, everyone gets nervous and perturbed. On the attack proper, artillery fire has an extraordinary disturbing effect; the bullets of the rifles and machine guns cause disorder by the sudden and serious losses they occasion, but the shells spread confusion almost solely by the sight and the crash of explosions. On the 9th of May, we hardly received any shells at all, not one during the attack itself, and this contributed in a large degree to the magnificent élan of the first attacking waves.
At Langemarck on the contrary, in a night attack on the trenches on the 4th of December, the unsilenced hostile artillery bombarded our trenches of departure, and I had my second section dispersed through being saluted by a rafale of shrapnel that had put the chief of section and the file closers, hors de combat.
In order to silence the hostile artillery, it seems that, knowing the probable emplacement of the batteries, it would be necessary suddenly and without warning to let loose on them a deluge of fire. The personnel of these batteries not being continually at their firing positions, this sudden tempest would surprise them and keep them inside their shelters. In the midst of the confusion, the fire of the batteries which try to get into action is much disturbed, impeded, and frequently interrupted. On the 9th of May, the hostile artillery must have been completely surprised and literally stupefied during the whole morning, for they abandoned their infantry. Only a few pieces fired some hasty shots.
In order to render the emplacements of the batteries completely untenable, they might be overwhelmed with shells giving off clouds of smoke and also asphyxiating shells; by this means the cannoneers would be obliged to quit their pieces or serve them under extremely difficult conditions.
The aviators hovering over the hostile lines could complete the preparation by indicating by means of luminous balls to the batteries on watch the hostile batteries not yet silenced or which have come into action.
(d) Preparation against Reinforcements and Reserves.
In the second and third trenches, the garrison does not generally occupy its firing positions; it is obliged to get to them in case of attack. As long as the artillery preparation lasts, it does not budge from the shelters; but as soon as the artillery ceases its fire, the garrison hastily mans the positions. It is necessary then for the artillery to extend its fire to the second and third lines and to continue this fire while the infantry rushes the first line. The approach trenches and their junctions should especially be swept. This has, moreover, the advantage of keeping crouched in their holes the defenders of the first line, who are not reassured by sensing the compact sheaves of the terrible explosive passing close over their heads. The preparation on the second line of defense is absolutely identical.
It is next necessary to cut the battlefield in two and isolate the zone of the first and second lines of defence, constantly manned by the troops near their combat positions, from the zone of cantonment. It is a matter of establishing an insuperable barrier. A barrier solely of ordinary shell fire is extremely expensive. The Germans have more simply solved the question by establishing a barrier of asphyxiating gas. They have employed this extremely effective scheme, it seems, at Bagatelle in the Argonne, on the 30th of June and the 1st and 2d of July.