The government class book / Designed for the instruction of youth in the principles of constitutional government and the rights and duties of citizens.

by Andrew W. Young

Chapter LXV.

Offensive and Defensive War; just Causes and Objects of War; Reprisals; Alliances in War.

§1. Wars are offensive and defensive. The use of force to obtain justice for injuries done, is offensive war. The making use of force against any power that attacks a nation or its privileges, is defensive war. A war may be defensive in its principles, though offensive in its operation. For example: one nation is preparing to invade another; but before the threatened invasion takes place, the latter attacks the former as the best mode of repelling the invasion. In this case, the party making the attack acts on the defensive. (§10.) The contending parties are called belligerents. The word belligerent is from the Latin bellum, war, and gero, to wage or carry on. Nations that take no part in the contest, are called neutrals.

§2. War ought never to be undertaken without the most cogent reasons. In the first place, there must be a right to make war, and just grounds for making it. Nations have no right to employ force any further than is necessary for their own defense, and for the maintenance of their rights. Secondly, it should be made from proper motives, the good of the state, and the safety and common advantage of the citizens. Hence, there may be, according to the law of nations, just cause of war, when it would be inexpedient to involve the nation in such a calamity.

§3. The numerous objects of a lawful war may be reduced to these three: (1.) To recover what belongs to us, or to obtain satisfaction for injuries. (2.) To provide for our future safety by punishing the offender. (3.) To defend or protect ourselves from injury by repelling unjust attacks. The first and second are objects of an offensive war; the third is that of a defensive war.

§4. Injury to an individual citizen of a state, by the subjects of another state, is deemed a just cause of war, if the persons offending, or the government of the state to which they belong, do not make reparation for the injury; for every nation is responsible for the good behavior of its subjects. But, although this would, according to the law of nations, afford justifiable cause of war, neither the honor nor the true interest of a nation requires that war should always be made for so slight a cause.

§5. Generally, the injury sought to be redressed should be serious, and satisfaction be demanded and refused, before recourse should be had to arms. Where there is a question of right between the parties, the government making war should have no reasonable doubt of the justice of its claim. And even when no such doubt exists, it would be the duty of such government to prevent a war, if possible, by proposals of compromise. It is believed that war ought in no case to be made, until attempts have been made to effect an adjustment of difficulties by compromise, or by offers to submit them for arbitration.

§6. One of the means by which satisfaction is sought without making war, is that of reprisals. (Chap. XXXVI, §4, 5.) If a nation has taken what belongs to another, or refuses to pay a debt, or to make satisfaction for an injury, the offended nation seizes something belonging to the former or to her citizens, and retains it, or applies it to her own advantage, till she obtains satisfaction: and when there shall be no longer any hope of satisfaction, the effects thus seized are confiscated. To confiscate is to adjudge property to be forfeited, and to appropriate it to the use and benefit of the state. But as the loss in this case would fall upon unoffending citizens, it is the duty of their government to grant them indemnity.

§7. But to justify reprisals by the law of nations, the grounds upon which they are authorized must be just and well ascertained. If the right of the party demanding satisfaction is doubtful, he must first demand an equitable examination of his claim, and next be able to show that justice has been refused, before he can justly take the matter into his own hands. He has no right to disturb the peace and safety of nations on a doubtful pretension. But if the other party refuses to have the matter brought to the proof, or to accede to any proposition to terminate the dispute in a peaceable manner, reprisals become lawful.

§8. By treaties of alliance, nations sometimes agree to assist each other in case of war with a third power. It is a question not clearly settled, whether the government that is to afford the aid is bound to do so when it deems the war to be unjust. The reasonable conclusion seems to be, that, in cases simply doubtful, the justice of the war is to be presumed; and the government pledging its aid is bound to fulfill its engagement. The contrary doctrine would furnish a nation with too ready a pretext for violating its pledge. In cases only of the clearest injustice on the part of its ally, can a nation rightfully avoid a positive engagement to afford assistance.