Again, she must ‘make no claims, and maintain no rights, but what are the gifts of honor, rectitude and love.’ From whom does woman receive her rights? From God, or from man? What dost thou mean by saying, her rights are the gifts of honor, rectitude and love? One would really suppose that man, as her lord and master, was the gracious giver of her rights, and that these rights were bestowed upon her by ‘the promptings of chivalry, and the poetry of romantic gallantry,’—out of the abundance of his honor, rectitude and love. Now, if I understand the real state of the case, woman’s rights are not the gifts of man—no! nor the gifts of God. His gifts to her may be recalled at his good pleasure—but her rights are an integral part of her moral being; they cannot be withdrawn; they must live with her forever. Her rights lie at the foundation of all her duties; and, so long as the divine commands are binding upon her, so long must her rights continue.
‘A woman may seek the aid of co-operation and combination among her own sex, to assist her in her appropriate offices of piety, charity,’ &c. Appropriate offices! Ah! here is the great difficulty. What are they? Who can point them out? Who has ever attempted to draw a line of separation between the duties of men and women, as moral beings, without committing the grossest inconsistencies on the one hand, or running into the most arrant absurdities on the other?
‘Whatever, in any measure, throws a woman into the attitude of a combatant, either for herself or others—whatever binds her in a party conflict—whatever obliges her in any way to exert coercive influences, throws her out of her appropriate sphere.’ If, by a combatant, thou meanest one who ‘drives by physical force,’ then I say, man has no more right to appear as such a combatant than woman; for all the pacific precepts of the gospel were given to him, as well as to her. If, by a party conflict, thou meanest a struggle for power, either civil or ecclesiastical, a thirst for the praise and the honor of man, why, then I would ask, is this the proper sphere of any moral, accountable being, man or woman? If, by coercive influences, thou meanest the use of force or of fear, such as slaveholders and warriors employ, then, I repeat, that man has no more right to exert these than woman. All such influences are repudiated by the precepts and examples of Christ, and his apostles; so that, after all, this appropriate sphere of woman is just as appropriate to man. These ‘general principles are correct,’ if thou wilt only permit them to be of general application.
Thou sayest that the propriety of woman’s coming forward as a suppliant for a portion of her sex who are bound in cruel bondage, depends entirely on its probable results. I thought the disciples of Jesus were to walk by faith, not by sight. Did Abraham reason as to the probable results of his offering up Isaac? No! or he could not have raised his hand against the life of his son; because in Isaac, he had been told, his seed should be called,—that seed in whom all the nations of the earth were to be blessed. O! when shall we learn that God is wiser than man—that his ways are higher than our ways, his thoughts than our thoughts—and that ‘obedience is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams?’ If we are always to reason on the probable results of performing our duty, I wonder what our Master meant by telling his disciples, that they must become like little children. I used to think he designed to inculcate the necessity of walking by faith, in childlike simplicity, docility and humility. But if we are to reason as to the probable results of obeying the injunctions to plead for the widow and the fatherless, and to deliver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor, &c., then I do not know what he meant to teach.
According to what thou sayest, the women of this country are not to be governed by principles of duty, but by the effect their petitions produce on the members of Congress, and by the opinions of these men. If they deem them ‘obtrusive, indecorous, and unwise,’ they must not be sent. If thou canst consent to exchange the precepts of the Bible for the opinions of such a body of men as now sit on the destinies of this nation, I cannot. What is this but obeying man rather than God, and seeking the praise of man rather than of God? As to our petitions increasing the evils of slavery, this is merely an opinion, the correctness or incorrectness of which remains to be proved. When I hear Senator Preston of South Carolina, saying, that ‘he regarded the concerted movement upon the District of Columbia as an attempt to storm the gates of the citadel—as throwing the bridge over the moat’—and declaring that ‘the South must resist the danger in its inception, or it would soon become irresistible‘—I feel confident that petitions will effect the work of emancipation, thy opinion to the contrary notwithstanding. And when I hear Francis W. Pickens, from the same State, saying in a speech delivered in Congress—‘Mr. Speaker, we cannot mistake all these things. The truth is, the moral power of the world is against us. It is idle to disguise it. We must, sooner or later, meet the great issue that is to be made on this subject. Deeply connected with this, is the movement to be made on the District of Columbia. If the power be asserted in Congress to interfere here, or any approach be made toward that end, it will give a shock to our institutions and the country, the consequences of which no man can foretell. Sir, as well might you grapple with iron grasp into the very heart and vitals of South Carolina, as to touch this subject here.’ When I hear these things from the lips of keen-eyed politicians of the South, northern apologies for not interfering with the subject of slavery, ‘lest it should increase, rather than diminish the evils it is wished to remove’ affect me little.
Another objection to woman’s petitions is, that they may ‘tend to bring females, as petitioners and partisans, into every political measure that may tend to injure and oppress their sex.’ As to their ever becoming partisans, i.e. sacrificing principles to power or interest, I reprobate this under all circumstances, and in both sexes. But I trust my sisters may always be permitted to petition for a redress of grievances. Why not? The right of petition is the only political right that women have: why not let them exercise it whenever they are aggrieved? Our fathers waged a bloody conflict with England, because they were taxed without being represented. This is just what unmarried women of property now are. They were not willing to be governed by laws which they had no voice in making; but this is the way in which women are governed in this Republic. If, then, we are taxed without being represented, and governed by laws we have no voice in framing, then, surely, we ought to be permitted at least to remonstrate against ‘every political measure that may tend to injure and oppress our sex in various parts of the nation, and under the various public measures that may hereafter be enforced.’ Why not? Art thou afraid to trust the women of this country with discretionary power as to petitioning? Is there not sound principle and common sense enough among them, to regulate the exercise of this right? I believe they will always use it wisely. I am not afraid to trust my sisters—not I.
Thou sayest, ‘In this country, petitions to Congress, in reference to official duties of legislators, seem, IN ALL CASES, to fall entirely without the sphere of female duty. Men are the proper persons to make appeals to the rulers whom they appoint,’ &c. Here I entirely dissent from thee. The fact that women are denied the right of voting for members of Congress, is but a poor reason why they should also be deprived of the right of petition. If their numbers are counted to swell the number of Representatives in our State and National Legislatures, the very least that can be done is to give them the right of petition in all cases whatsoever; and without any abridgement. If not, they are mere slaves, known only through their masters.
In my next, I shall throw out my own views with regard to ‘the appropriate sphere of woman’—and for the present, subscribe myself,
Thy Friend,